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ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis looks at the communication between the management on shore and crew on 
board vessels, and examines the role of such communication in influencing shipboard 
OHSM in two Chinese chemical shipping companies. The study was conducted in the shore 
offices of two companies, as well as on four of their chemical tankers. The data was mainly 
collected by semi-structured interviews, supplemented by field observations, informal 
discussions and document analyses.  
 
In order to better understand the research question, both shore management and crew’s 
perspectives are considered. By examining major areas of communication closely related to 
OHSM, i.e., shore to ship communication for work support, shore to ship communication 
for management control, ship to shore communication for safety reporting, ship to shore 
communication for safety suggestions, the study presents the range of purposes behind 
communication between the two.  
 
The study shows that communication between shore management and ship’s crew is 
significantly influenced by divergent interests between the two. It reveals a set of 
socio-economic and cultural factors that underlie their communication. As a consequence, 
such communication has noticeable influence on crew’s shipboard working practices as 
well as indirect effects on crew’s health, safety and well-being. The findings of this study 
show that shore-ship communication is mainly in an asymmetrical form. It was generally 
disengaged with the concerns of OHSM. The communication contributed to an 
unfavourable working environment. The study suggested that communication achieved 
very limited outcomes for OHSM. The study concludes by calling policy makers as well as 
industrial practitioners to rethink the role of communication in effective OHSM and 
reshape maritime regulatory strategy in promoting OHSM in the shipping industry.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The thesis explores the role of communication in influencing shipboard Occupational 
Health and Safety Management (OHSM) in two Chinese chemical shipping companies. 
The study investigates the role of communication in the onshore management of 
Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) onboard ships by operating companies and the 
response of seafarers. For this purpose, the thesis examines key communication processes 
between shore and ship such as those involving technologically mediated communication 
as well as ship visits. It explores the immediate and underlying influences behind 
shore-ship communication and how this communication influences the practice of OHSM 
onboard ships and seafarers' OHS. This study uses qualitative methods, which include 
semi-structured interviews, field observations along with informal discussions and 
document analysis. 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
The study was initiated from a systematic review of the current literature in relation to the 
research topic. In particular, it was shaped on the basis of the analysis of the literature and 
identification of the gaps that existed in previous studies in relation to communication and 
OHSM.  
 
In day-to-day life communication is one of our main activities, and every aspect of our 
lives is affected by our communication with other people (Littlejohn and Foss, 2008). In a 
similar vein communication in organisational contexts (organisational communication) is 
equally important. It is a key to the functioning of an organisation, and is ‘inseparable from 
and essential to everything that occurs in organisation life’ (Fisher, 1993, p.3). Many 
authors have argued that regular and direct communication is a valuable characteristic of 
any organisation (Pace and Faules, 1994, Jablin and Putnam, 2001; and Vuuren et al., 
2007). Michael et al. (2006) argued that good communication features free and open 
conversation between management and employees about solutions to routine and 
non-routine problems, which often results in mutually beneficial behaviours over the long 
run. Appleman and Bratnick (2001) found that effective communication helps foster 
employees’ positive safety attitudes and consequently their work practices. Hofmann and 
Morgeson (1999), in a survey in the wood products manufacturing industry in the US, 
showed that good supervisor-employee communication tended to produce employees who 
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were more likely to have a better understanding of safety issues such as operational 
procedures, raise safety concerns and experience fewer incident occurrences. In general, 
both common sense and the multiple studies on communication suggest that good 
communication in organisational contexts can lead to the improvement of employee’s 
safety awareness and performance.  
 
More formally, authors also argue that proper communication helps shape the 
organisational safety environment. The quality of communication is well recognised as a 
main factor influencing efficiency and effectiveness of organisational performance and 
achieving a positive safety environment (Fisher, 1993). This view is widely agreed by other 
authors such as Clarke (1999), Appleman and Bratnick (2001), and Leiss (2004). In the 
shipping industry it has been similarly argued that improved communication between shore 
management and ship’s crew is a prerequisite in achieving an effective maritime safety 
environment (ISF, 2000; Veiga, 2001; Valkonen, 2000; IMO, 2002a; Anderson, 2003; 
Thebault, 2004).  
 
Therefore, these two streams of literature, that concerning communication and 
organisational behaviour generally and that addressing OHS more specifically, both 
highlight the importance of proper communication in influencing employee’s safety 
behaviours and the organisation's safety environment. However, relatively few previous 
studies have focused in detail on the role of communication in OHSM. Also, those that 
have, tend to rely on quantitative questionnaire-based social psychological methods (Klauss 
and Bass, 1982, Appleman and Bratnick, 2001, Ridder, 2006; and Shaw et al., 2007). 
While valuable within their own field, these approaches are limited in the extent to which 
they can provide an in-depth understanding of social factors, social relations or social 
processes behind communicative behaviours (Ellis et al., 2010; Oltedal, and Wadsworth, 
2010). Fundamental to the approach adopted in the present study therefore, is the idea that 
more sociologically orientated qualitative methods may provide additional insights on the 
role of communication between management and workers and vice versa in achieving 
effective OHSM in organisations.  
 
The importance of OHSM has been widely discussed in the literature. Starting from the late 
1970s, this systematic approach to OHSM has been increasingly widespread throughout 
most developed nations as well as some developing ones (Quinlan and Mayhew, 2000). In 
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general, an international trend over the past decades has been a greater focus on systematic 
management of health and safety within organisations, which has become the ‘leitmotif’, of 
current OHS regulation and practice, particularly in developed westerns counties (Walters, 
2005, p.26). However, a number of previous studies suggest that the increased adoption of 
Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems (OHSMSs) by organisations in a 
range of different industries has led to both ‘positive and negative’ OHS consequences 
(Nichols and Tucker, 2000; Walters, 2005; Robson et al., 2007; Bornstein and Hart, 2010, 
Walters, Bhattacharya and Xue, 2011). We are as yet unclear as to what are the underlying 
causes of such ‘positive or negative consequences’ and as Robson (2007, p.333) and her 
colleagues comment, there is a need for better understandings through further ongoing 
studies on the effectiveness of OHSM in different work situations.  
 
As one of the major components of an OHSMS, communication influences workplace 
health and safety management and practice. Among all forms of organisational 
communication, that between management and employee
i
 and vice versa, particularly 
highlights the importance of their interaction/cooperation for organisational health and 
safety management (Kamp, 2009). Humphreys (2007) sees employer-employee 
engagement as an essential channel to improve OHS. Larsson (2000, p.199) and Mouritsen 
and Larsen (2005) argue that the success of OHSMSs relies on both management and 
employees to maintain good practices in health and safety activities, while communication 
between them plays a key role in ensuring these activities are completed. Michael et al. 
(2006) suggest management-staff communication is an area worthy of further investigation 
given its potential to enhance safety performance. Thus, focusing on communication 
between the two major actors (management and employee) in an organisation best explains 
how and to what extent it affects workplace OHSM.  
 
This study focuses on the chemical shipping industry. The shipping industry generally is 
described as ‘high-risk’ by many authors, including Anderson (2003), Havold (2005), and 
Oltedal and Wadsworth (2010). Past research showed a higher reported frequency of 
incidences in high-risk industries than others (Walters, 2005). Research findings by Lindoe 
(2007) also showed that seafarers’ fatality and injury rates are much higher than the 
average in land based industries in many seafaring countries. Therefore, it is important to 
conduct research in relation to shipboard OHSM. Moreover, the significance of making a 
                                                        
i
 The author acknowledges that not all workers are employees; they were in this study.  
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study in the chemical shipping industry is acknowledged, since ‘a substantial proportion of 
global chemical products’ and ‘many substances that are known to be hazardous to health’ 
are transported by ship (Walters, 2007, p.62).  
 
The introduction of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code in 1998 brought 
about fundamental changes to the international shipping industry and made mandatory a 
system-based approach to OHSM in shipping organisation. The review of maritime 
literature suggests that comparatively little attention has been given to what makes for 
effective OHSM in this industry and lack of studies was evident (Psarros et al., 2010; 
Oltedal and McArthur, 2011). Bailey et al. (2006) pointed out that 
interaction/communication is a central feature of safety related activities in the shipping 
industry, and ineffective communication can result in serious incidents. The communication 
between shore management and ship’s crew was particularly addressed by the Swedish 
Shipowners’ Association (SSA, 2003). The Association asserted that the ‘distance’ between 
the two should be ‘shortened’ and integrated into a single unit by mutual effective 
communication for common goals. After the introduction of the Code, a global survey was 
conducted by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) (2005). Although the survey 
suggested that communication between shipboard and shore-based staff may have 
improved, it could not provide detailed evidence to support this. Furthermore, it did not 
establish the cause-effect relationship between communication between shore and ship and 
its influence for shipboard OHSM. Bhattacharya (2009) conducted a small scale qualitative 
study in two oil tankers companies with special focus on a few selected elements from the 
broad composition of an OHSMS. The justification of such a choice seemed to be weak and 
he did not directly address the core issue - the interaction (communications) between the 
management and employees. Such literature as there is, shows the gap between and 
suggests the desirability of conducting this empirical study. Indeed the effective 
implementation of the regulatory requirements on safety management at sea – the ISM 
Code – depends to a large extent on ensuring adequate communication between shore 
management and ship personnel (Celik, 2009). This thesis therefore attempts to make a 
contribution to knowledge concerning the communication between the two with an attempt 
to further explore how such communication affects shipboard OHSM practice. 
 
In the light of the analysis of current literature on the studies of communication and its 
relations to OHSM in the shipping industry, an overarching research question for this 
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research project was shaped: How effective are existing communication practices between 
management on shore and crew onboard in delivering the aims and objectives of OHSM? 
In order to better address the main research question, the following sub-questions were 
developed: 
1) How effective is shore-ship communication as it pertains to OHSM?  
2) What are the immediate and underlying factors that influence shore-ship 
communication? 
3) In which way does shore-ship communication influence shipboard OHSM? What are 
the consequences? 
4) What are the implications of this study for effective OHSM? 
 
The study will focus on shore management in two Chinese chemical shipping companies 
and four vessels operated by them. Based on analysis of qualitative evidence gathered from 
interviews and some supplementary techniques conducted in company offices and on-board 
ships during their voyages, the study will identify inferences concerning the likely role of 
communication in the effectiveness of OHSM and maritime regulatory strategy in the 
shipping industry more widely. The general aims for the study are elaborated, and more 
detailed account of the research questions presented in Chapter 2, following the systematic 
analysis of the relevant literature in relation to this research project.  
 
The study was conducted in Chinese shipping companies all having Chinese managers and 
crew. As the largest developing country, China has been ranked the fourth largest shipping 
nation in the world (UNCTAD, 2007). The rapid expansion of China's ocean fleet brings 
about significant challenges for the OHSM. A ‘poor safety record’ was witnessed by an 
exploratory study in the Chinese shipping industry (Sampson and Wu, 2007). In general, 
Frick et al. (2000) found that systematic OHSM has become popular in developed countries, 
but there is little evidence to show that it is anywhere nearly as fully recognised in 
developing countries. This study provides an opportunity to produce some fresh empirical 
evidence from the perspective of shore-ship communication on the operation of OHSMSs 
on Chinese chemical shipping companies. Previous studies on OHSM in the maritime 
industry have tended to focus on multinational crews (which are fairly typical in the 
industry globally). However, the subjects of the present study were all Chinese. A study 
among managers and crew with a singular nationality can avoid the ‘particular issues’ 
raised from a multicultural workforce (Gunningham and Johnstone, 1999). In China, all 
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Chinese ships are manned by Chinese seafarers (Wu, 2004). In this sense, the study among 
Chinese managers and crew is unique. 
 
1.2 OUTLINE OF THE CONTENTS OF THE THESIS 
The thesis has been organised into a further nine chapters following this introduction. They 
will provide an outline of the relevant background literature, in which the key issues for the 
study will be explored at length and research questions elaborated. This is followed by an 
explanation of the research design and methods used in the collection and analysis of 
empirical data informing the research. Four further chapters are devoted to the analysis of 
this data and a fifth presents a discussion of the results in the light of the literature already 
reviewed. Following the discussion chapter, major conclusions from this study are 
presented in the end of the thesis. These chapters are outlined in the following paragraphs.  
 
Chapter 2 reviews several different areas of knowledge that closely related to this research 
project. Broadly, it consists of three subjects: communication, OHSM in the context of 
shipping and contextual information for this research. The communication literature 
highlights the importance of communication between management and employees in terms 
of the key elements relating to OHSM. The OHSM literature gives a broad overview on the 
development of the OHSM in the international shipping industry. Both parts of the 
literature help us to understand how and in which way management-employee 
communication affects workplace OHSM practice. The review of the literature was 
followed by the presentation of the detailed research questions that have been derived from 
it. A third part of the literature describes the contextual information with regard to the OHS 
status in China, the Chinese cultural influence on the workplace and a brief introduction to 
the Chinese seafarers’ labour market. This Chapter discusses the wider issues of OHSM in 
the literature to provide a context for the specific issues involved in OHSM in the shipping 
industry. It is ended with a summary of literature discussion.  
 
Chapter 3 introduces the research design of the study and the research methods used. The 
experience from the pilot study is summarised. Also, preparations for the field work which 
included company identification, justification of the choice and negotiation for access, as 
well as participation in a training programme for the acquisition of credentials for sailing 
are described. The progress of the field work in two companies and four of their ships is 
elaborated. Finally, techniques for the analysis of the data are outlined and consideration of 
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the way in which the research method addressed ethical issues that arose throughout this 
study is given. In general, this chapter presents a holistic view of occurrences in the field.  
 
Chapter 4 locates the study in a wider description on the development of the chemical 
shipping industry at the both international level and national level. It describes different 
types of chemical tankers, the global chemical fleet, major industrial players, and the 
pattern shift of global chemical production and trading that had significant implications for 
the development of the chemical shipping fleet. There follows a brief introduction to the 
development of the chemical shipping industry in China. Furthermore, since this study is 
based on two chemical shipping companies, their basic information is presented and 
summarised. The chapter includes an introduction to the policy and objectives of OHSM 
and the structure and functions of the companies, based on which a comparative assessment 
on them is made. It helps us to understand the responsibilities of each position in the 
organisational hierarchy that underpins the communication between shore management and 
ship’s crew.  
 
The next four chapters (Chapter 5-8) present the findings from the field research. Chapter 5 
assesses the effectiveness of shore to ship communication for the purpose of supporting the 
operation of OHSMSs on board ships. The examination of shore-ship communication 
revealed three types of shore support: technical support, safety information support as well 
as material resource support. From management’s perspective, they showed a positive 
concern about OHSM problems occurring on board ships. From the crew’s perspective, 
communication for technical support to ships played a moderate role in shipboard problem 
solving; communication for safety information support played a positive role in coping 
with potential threats to ship’s safety management; but communication for material 
resource support was found to be unsatisfactory. On the whole, the result shows that the 
shore management failed to give substantial support to ships. The chapter concludes that, 
due to the lack of sufficient material resources as an essential pre-condition for OHSM, 
some inherent problems in relation to shipboard OHSM remain unsolved and shipboard 
OHSM was apparently undermined.  
 
Chapter 6 assesses the effectiveness of shore to ship communication for the purpose of 
management control. The assessment is conducted in two typical scenarios: 
technology-based communication and ship visit communication. As for the 
 8 
technology-based communication, although the shore management showed their respect to 
ship’s crew and a willingness to have more communication with crew for better OHSM 
onboard ships, the crew’s opinion was divergent. The study shows that senior crew’s 
independent decision making power particularly that relating to ship’s sailing, was strongly 
influenced by the shore management. It highlights an emergent dichotomy of purpose 
behind communication between the management on shore and crew on board. As a result, 
crew bore significant safety-related pressures that were imposed by the company 
management through this form of communication. As for the ship visit (face-to-face) 
communication, it shows that the management tended to focus more on the crew’s 
performance and behaviours than the improvement of their working environment. These 
results indicate that ship visits did not improve management-crew communication, and its 
role in improving shipboard OHSM practice was rather limited.  
 
Chapter 7 examines the role of ship to shore communication in safety reporting. In line 
with the way the ISM Code categorises safety reports, this chapter examines three types of 
reporting, i.e., nonconformity reporting, accident reporting and near miss reporting. From 
the management’s perspective they strongly encouraged crew to report whatever problems 
crew encountered on board. However, the data suggests that from the crew’s perspective, 
they did not feel that they were really encouraged to do so. The chapter identifies and 
distinguishes some immediate factors that affected crew decisions on making these reports. 
The findings show that the problem of under-reporting and biased reporting was prevalent 
among crew on all four ships and suggest some reasons for this that are embedded in the 
social and economic relations surrounding the precarity of work at sea. 
 
Chapter 8 examines the role of ship to shore communication in reporting crew’s 
suggestions for the purpose of improving shipboard OHSM practice. Its analysis indicates 
that while from the management’s perspective, they welcomed crew’s reasonable 
suggestions for improving OHSM, the crew were reluctant to make any constructive 
suggestions to the shore management. The chapter explores a range of factors affecting 
crew’s willingness of doing so. As with the previous chapter, the data discussed in this 
chapter suggests the lack of crew’s contributions to the improvement of OHSM practice 
can be explained with reference to a set of social and cultural factors that are embedded in 
the Chinese context. As a consequence, the study revealed more peer communication on 
good practice on board a ship or between other ships of a company than ship to shore 
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upward communication to management.  
 
On the basis of the preliminary findings in the previous 4 chapters (Chapter 5-8), Chapter 9 
discusses the contexts of communication – factors underlying the nature of workplace and 
organisational communication. The chapter identifies the greatest factor that influences 
shore-ship communication, namely a company’s underlying profit motive. Also, social, 
cultural and industrial influences are considered. Following the identification of these 
influential factors, the chapter continues to explore the impact of shore-ship communication 
on OHSM practice. The discussion shows that management's support for and control over 
shipboard OHSM activities, the use of OHS indicators, and the objective of continuous 
improvement of OHSM failed to achieve the expected outcomes of OHSMSs. Furthermore, 
the study reveals that ship-shore communication can contribute to the increase of both 
physical and psychological pressures on crews. It can lead to indirect effects on crew’s 
health, safety and well-being.  
 
Finally, Chapter 10 discussed the conflicts of interests behind the divergent approaches to 
safety related communication between shore and ship. Then the chapter presents the major 
findings from the study. The findings suggest the need for rethinking the role of 
communication in OHSM as well as the effectiveness of maritime regulatory strategy. The 
chapter concludes by making some comments on future studies in this subject area.  
 
To sum up, this introductory chapter has briefly outlined the nature of the study presented 
in this thesis. It has provided some background highlighting the relevance and importance 
of such a study by briefly indicating the scope and limitations of previous work on 
communication in relation to OHSM in organisational context. It identified a comparative 
lack of sociologically informed work on the role of communication between the 
management and employee in influencing OHSM in the maritime industry. It presented the 
broad research question that the present work addresses and has explained the location of 
the study in the Chinese chemical shipping industry. Finally it has presented an outline of 
the structure of the thesis that follows. This begins in the following chapter with a review of 
the relevant research literature and the consequent development of the more detailed 
research questions addressed in the thesis.  
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
This thesis examines the range of shore-ship communications and its influence on 
shipboard OHSM in the Chinese chemical shipping companies. There is a need to review 
the existing literature which addresses this research topic. What follows is a general review 
of the literature on relevant aspects of communication, organisational communication and 
channels and means of communication. The focus shifts to communication between 
management and employee, a key link that underpins the workings of an OHSMS. Major 
elements of communication between them that affect OHSM practice are identified and 
discussed. Next is a discussion of pertinent OHSM literature. This includes a brief 
overview of OHSM strategy in the shipping industry, a comparative assessment of the ISM 
Code, and a brief introduction to system based approaches to OHSM relevant to this study. 
Implications for this study and detailed research questions will also be discussed and 
presented sequentially along with the review of the literature. Since my research was 
performed in China, I include an account of the Chinese national context to set the local 
scene for this study. The Chapter concludes with a summary of the discussion of the 
literature as well as the aims of the study. 
 
2.2 COMMUNICATION AND ORGANISATIONAL COMMUNICATION 
Communication is omnipresent in human societies. The word communication itself has 
many definitions subject to the interpretation of different disciplines and it can take place in 
many forms (Frank and Brownell, 1989; Donnelly and Neville, 2008). Mainly, the essence 
of communication is conveyance of certain information (or a message) from one party (side) 
to another. Hampel (2006) named two ways of understanding communication, i.e., in 
technology and in the social sciences. The former means that communication is 
independent from its context, while the latter emphasises the context-dependence of the 
communication process by social scientists. The notion of communication I am going to 
examine is closely related to the latter. Hampel (2006) addresses context-dependent 
communication as a form of social interaction or a mutual construction of sense. Under 
such circumstances, a sender is not just sending information but is primarily using signs 
and symbols which have meanings and are defined within a certain shared social and 
cultural context (Jones et al., 2004). Thus, the examination of communications between 
different parties brings out wider social implications and contributes to contemporary social 
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science research. This study examines communication in the organisational contexts of the 
Chinese merchant marine, i.e., organisational communication. Current literature related to 
this topic is reviewed and examined below.  
 
Organisational communication is similar to ordinary forms of communication, however, the 
difference is that organisational communication is ‘part of an ongoing process that includes 
patterns of interaction between organisation members that both emerge from and shape the 
nature and actions of the organisation and the events within it’ (Fisher, 1993, p.4). Some 
authors such as Adair (1988) and Michael et al. (2006) found that adequate communication 
results in greater productivity, because employees direct their work more effectively and 
cooperate more with their leaders. Haney (1986) argues that communication contributes to 
harmonious working relationships between management and employees. While the positive 
role of organisational communication is generally accepted by many authors (see Chapter 
1), the negative consequences of poor communication are equally significant. In a general 
sense, poor communication is ‘a primary reason for substandard behaviours ranging from 
poor safety performance to low productivity and morale’ (Michael et al., 2006, p.471). It 
‘upset the whole rhythm of production, lessened cooperation between employees and their 
managers and created ill-feeling’ (Adar, 1988, p.1). Moreover, the neglect/lack of 
communication or inability to communicate clearly is ‘at the heart of a great deal of 
industrial unrest, job dissatisfaction and operational inefficiency’ (Wilkinson, 1989, p.4). 
Failures of communication are very costly, and this cost cannot be measured merely in 
terms of the hours lost (Adar, 1988).  
 
In the health care sector, communication failures accounted for a majority of unexpected 
adverse events in patients (Leonard et al., 2004). Lingard et al. (2004, p.330) found that 
‘36.4 percent of communication failures resulted in visible effects on system processes 
which included inefficiency, team tension, resource waste, work-around, delay, patient 
inconvenience, and procedural error’. The direct causes identified were that team members 
failed to convene to discuss key issues before a case, and decisions were usually made 
regardless of relevant team members’ presence, and much communication tended to be 
reactive. While the failure of communication in health care sector showed ‘moderate’ 
negative consequences, its failure was seen to be implicated in many disasters in some 
other industries (Turner and Pidgeon, 1997). The investigation of the Esso gas explosion 
accident in Australia revealed the failure to communicate critical risk information between 
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managers and shop floor workers (Hopkins, 2000). Thus, it is clear that communication 
between people should be managed and carefully coordinated for the purpose of avoiding 
implicit and/or explicit problems resulting from misunderstandings and lack of information 
communication (Leiss, 2004). 
 
As a whole, the literature presented in this section and in Chapter 1 shows universal 
recognition of the importance of communication, particularly in organisational contexts. 
While the outcome of good communication is relatively positive, the consequences of bad 
communication, particularly the failure of communication in an organisation are 
multifaceted. Some are damaging and even disastrous. Thus, sketch of the literature above 
shows the usefulness of doing research on communication in organisational contexts.  
 
2.3 CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION 
Communication is achieved through certain channels. In an organisational context, a wide 
body of literature distinguishes three channels of organisational communication: downward 
communication, upward communication and horizontal communication (Pace and Faules, 
1994; Byers, 1997; Miller, 1999). First, downward communication refers to the 
communication from a higher level to a low level within an organisational hierarchy 
through certain channels. Contents of communication may contain, but are not limited to, 
information or messages such as organisational policy and practices, instructions or orders, 
operational procedures and quality control measures. Downward communication is 
essential to the efficient functioning of an organisation. It affects employees’ sense of 
acceptance, recognition, security and organisational efficiency (Scheider et al., 1975, p.49). 
Second, upward communication means communication from a lower level to a higher level 
along the hierarchy through certain channels. It is based on organisational demand (or 
reporting) systems designed for monitoring various workplace activities. This channel 
provides valuable information for decision making which is crucial for effective 
functioning of an organisation (Byers, 1997). Third, horizontal communication refers to the 
communication that is not classified as upward or downward one. Typically, 
interdepartmental and peer communication can be regarded as such examples. An 
organisation will benefit from horizontal communication that potentially promotes 
coordination or cooperation among members of the organisation. Where there is little 
opportunity for upward (or downward) communication, people tend to talk with their peers 
to find out information they need or desire (Neher, 1997).  
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In most scenarios, organisational communication occurs in a vertical (downward or upward) 
direction. Communication between management and employees dominates this process. 
The main focus of this thesis lies in exploring communication between shore management 
and ship crews. This management-employee communication will be further detailed in 
section 2.5. 
 
2.4 MEANS OF COMMUNICATION  
The following section introduces the primary means of communication in the shipping 
industry, i.e. the means of communication between shore and ship.  
 
Generally, communication is achieved in forms of spoken language (verbal communication) 
or written symbols (written communication) (Harris, 1987). Verbal communication includes 
face-to-face communication and technology-mediated verbal communication. Klauss and 
Bass (1982) found that managers relied more heavily on verbal channels than on written 
ones in land based industries. Face-to-face communication is frequently preferred and more 
satisfying than technology-based communication such as telephone conversations. It is 
regarded as the richest medium for communication (Fisher, 1993), because it permits 
instant feedback and accommodates multiple cues such as body language. Miller (1999, 
p.58) emphasised the role of face-to-face communication, because it has ‘the highest level 
of social presence and should serve best to satisfy higher-order needs’. Its richness fits it to 
deal with tasks with a high level of uncertainty (ibid). Garrison and Bly (1997) found that 
workers often can identify and describe problems better in face-to-face settings. They argue 
that in most situations, ‘this is the most effective form of communication’ (ibid, p.40). In 
the shipping industry a ship visit is the way of communication for the company 
management to meet crew face-to-face. These visits are usually arranged at regular 
intervals. Commonly, the arrangement is made when a ship calls into a domestic port where 
it is convenient for a visit.  
 
Technology-mediated verbal communication is an alternative means of communication. 
Teleconferences and telephone communication are examples of this mode of verbal 
communication. In view of the development of communication technology that is applied 
in the shipping industry, the telephone is a popular means of communication between shore 
and ship. In general telephone is the most commonly used tool for communication over 
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long distances. The biggest advantage for telephone communication is that it is the fastest 
communication channel and provides real-time communication (Wikipedia, 2010). While 
Wan (1988) identified the limited role of communication media in his study of British and 
Chinese shipping companies in the 1980s, the limits have become less of a problem since 
the early 1990s due to the well established Global Maritime Distress and Safety System 
(GMDSS)
ii
 dedicated to maritime communication. Telephone communication within the 
GMDSS can be via satellite telephone communication or use terrestrial Medium Frequency 
(MF)/High Frequency (HF)/Very High Frequency (VHF)
iii
 radio telephone communication. 
Verbal communication can be achieved anytime and anywhere in the world. It is essential 
for shore-ship communication involving mutual negotiation, immediate decision making 
and emergent problem solving. Furthermore, independent of onboard dedicated 
communication systems, mobile phones can also be used for communication when ships 
sail along coastal waters where land mobile networks are available. Satellite phone pricing 
(4.66 USD in peak hours and 2.87 USD in off peak hours) [World Communication Centre 
(WCC)] (2011) means the use of mobile phones is usually prioritised, unless service is 
unavailable.  
 
Written communications also play a role as an indispensable means of contact in 
organisational communications. As suggested by Miller (1999), it is suitable for dealing 
with tasks with a low level of uncertainty. In practice, there are quite a number of forms of 
written communication. They include but not limited to, written orders, reports, bulletin 
boards, letters, or emails. In the shipping industry, written communication is also important 
for shore-ship interaction. The communication modes mainly include email, telex or fax. In 
general, written communications are often used for non-emergency issues such as the 
allocation of routine tasks and work reports. Cost can be a factor when considering the use 
of different modes. Principally, the use of written communication is prioritised in 
consideration of its cheaper cost as opposed to telephone communication. More 
significantly, written communication is usually documented, which provides both evidence 
of communication and often the possibility of later retrieval.  
 
                                                        
ii
 GMDSS is an internationally agreed set of safety procedures, communication protocols and equipment 
used for distress, emergency, safety and routine communication in the maritime industry (Wikipedia, 
2011). 
 
iii
 MF: the ITU 300 KHz – 3000 KHz radio frequency range  
HF: the ITU 3–30 MHz radio frequency range 
VHF: the ITU 30 MHz – 300 MHz radio frequency range  
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The description and discussion in this section help readers understand the main features of 
different means of communication, particularly those used in the shipping industry. They 
are the platforms of shore-ship communication this study aims to illuminate.  
 
2.5 MANAGEMENT-EMPLOYEE COMMUNICATION 
In Chapter 1, it was explained that the central focus of this thesis is communication 
between management and employees and its role in the delivery of OHSM – which 
themselves are situated within the employment relationship. Thus, the role of both 
management and employees in communicating OHS-related issues shall be examined 
respectively. In order to avoid ambiguity, the meaning of communication in this study will 
be defined prior to the examination. At the end of this section, implications for this study 
will be discussed based on the literature review.  
 
2.5.1 Defining Communication in This Study 
Communication has a wide range of definitions in different disciplines and contexts. 
Organisations are basically all about communication (Pace and Faules, 1994). Although the 
importance of communication between the management and employees was justified, there 
is a need to define ‘what’ to communicate between them and ‘for what purpose’ the 
communication is made in relation to OHSM. An examination of the respective 
responsibilities and obligations for OHSM participants can shed some light on the 
identification of the major aspects of communication between them.  
 
For a company’s management, OHS policies, information, instructions and orders have to 
be communicated to all areas of a company (Hutter, 2001). Authors such as Zwetsloot 
(2000), Dwyer (1991) and Hutter (2001) identified management’s ‘work support’ and 
‘workplace control’ are the two major purposes of downward communication with 
employees. Employers’ responsibilities and obligations as stated in various OHS standards 
such as Occupational Health and Safety Assessment Series (OHSAS) 18001, and the 
European Union (EU) Framework Directive 89/391 imply a similar importance of 
communication with employees with regards to the delivery of aims and objectives of 
OHSM. For example, in the Framework Directive, the organisation’s obligation to give 
support to employees is particularly addressed in Article 6.1, 6.2.h and 9.1.b, while the 
control of workplace hazards and risks is stated in Article 6.2.i, 6.3.b and 6.3.d [see 
European Economic Community (EEC), 1989]. Essentially, they were achieved by 
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communication between management and employees. In the international shipping industry, 
the case is also similar. According to the ISM Code, a shipping company needs to define 
‘lines of communication between and among shore and shipboard personnel (section 1.4.3, 
ISM Code) (IMO, 2002b). In section 3, a company’s responsibility in shore to ship 
communication is clearly stated, i.e., ‘the company is responsible for ensuring that 
shore-support and adequate resources are provided’ (ibid). Moreover, for shore departments 
in charge of ship’s safety management, a ‘communication link’ to ships was required to be 
established in order to ‘monitor the safety and pollution-prevention aspects of the operation 
of each ship’ (section 4, ISM Code) (ibid). In terms of its relevance to this study, the 
Chinese regulatory context in implementing these requirements will be introduced in 
section 2.7.1 in detail. 
 
For company employees, safety related reporting and participation are an integral part of a 
rigorous safety management system [Health and Safety Executive (HSE), 2000]. The major 
purposes of employee upward communication are making ‘safety reporting’ and ‘being 
consulted’, which is of great value for ‘proactive remedies’, ‘organisational learning’, 
‘continuous improvement’ as well as ‘increased safety’ (Psarros et al., 2010; Oltedal and 
Wadsworth, 2010; Oltedal and McArthur, 2011). Acknowledgement of such importance 
could be seen in regulation such as in the EU Framework Directive. Article 13.d deals with 
workers obligation in ‘safety reporting’, while Article 6 specifically addresses ‘workers 
consultation and participation’ (see EEC, 1989). The ISM Code clearly states that a 
company should establish procedures to ‘ensure that non-conformities, accidents and 
hazardous situations are reported to the Company’ by seafarers (section 9.1, ISM Code) 
(IMO, 2002b). Furthermore, a company should also consult ship masters and other crew for 
the purpose of ‘reviewing the safety management system and reporting its deficiencies to 
the shore-based management’ (section 5.1.5, ISM Code) (ibid).  
 
The identification of the major aspects of communication between management and 
employees helps to limit this study to specific areas. It avoids broad and ambiguous 
interpretations of the terms of communication and makes this study practicable. The major 
purposes of communication between the two domains are elaborated in the following 
sub-sections.  
 
2.5.2 The Role of Management in Downward Communication 
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It is widely recognised that the responsibility for ensuring organisational OHSM rests 
primarily with the management in an organisation. Gunningham (2007, p.13) states that 
‘the management systems can only be effective when implemented with genuine 
commitment on the part of management’. Zwetsloot (2000) and Hutter (2001) stress the 
importance of strong management commitment in order to maintain routine OHS activities. 
When the management takes responsibility for creating a health and safety environment, it 
helps to create a positive workplace atmosphere (HSE, 1997). No matter whether it is about 
management’s responsibility or commitment, organisational support and management 
control lie at the centre as a prerequisite for operationalisation of OHSM systems, as 
outlined in the following.  
 
Organisational Support 
One of the major purposes of management-employee communication is to deliver 
organisational support to employees in their workplaces. Employers have a duty of care in 
order to protect the OHS of their employees (Frick et al., 2000; Guthrie and Waldeck, 2008, 
p.31).  
 
Organisational support theory was developed by Eisenberger et al. (1986) in 1980s. 
Communication for organisational support is needed when a wide range of issues/problems 
emerge in workplaces. In a broad sense, such a communication involves hardware, software 
and 'liveware' – the three key dimensions of a work environment in an organisation (Wiener 
and Nagel, 1988). In practical terms, the communication for the provision of technical, 
informational and material resource support is essential for maintaining the normal 
operation of an OHSMS. Such communication makes particular sense in the context of 
shipping where shore management and crew are separated from each other. Given the 
importance of such communication for organisational support that underpins the operation 
of a management system, some basic antecedents were identified by Rhoades and 
Eisenberger (2002, p.712), i.e., fairness and equal resource distribution, management’s 
concern about employees’ contribution and organisational recognition of employees’ 
endeavours in the given work conditions.  
 
The organisational support theory can be explained by a reciprocity norm (Eisenberger et 
al., 2001). Their argument is that ‘when one person treats another well, the norm of 
reciprocity obliges the return of favourable treatment’ (Gouldner, 1960, cited in Eisenberger 
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et al., 2001, p.42). Equally, it could apply to the relationship between management and 
employees. It predicates that if employees are treated fairly, they might be motivated to 
repay their organisation with better performance. The reciprocal exchange relationship 
reflects mutual dependence and ‘extends beyond a formal contract’ (Allen et al., 2008, 
p.556). It also implies that the outcome of communication between management and 
employee could go beyond the rigid contract terms which bind their work relationship.  
 
Based on the ‘reciprocity norm’, the consequences of communication between management 
and employee were that employees who perceive a high level of organisational support are 
obliged to perform in a way conducive to their organisation. Popma (2009) noted the 
assumed outcome of organisational support is the prevention of work-related harm such as 
workplace accidents or occupational diseases. Adequate communication for organisational 
support could improve employees’ safety performance and active participation and 
reduction of their withdrawal behaviours (Rhoades and Eisenberger, 2002, p.712). A 
general survey in the UK offshore oil and gas industry showed that high levels of support 
from management may be returned with ‘unanticipated benefits’ from employees, and 
‘increased safety citizenship behaviour’ (Mearns and Reader, 2008, p.388). Riggle et al.’s 
research findings (2009, p.1027) also showed that organisational support can have a strong 
negative effect on intentions to leave. Ferris et al. (2009) pointed out that it helps reduce 
organisational deviance. Thus, the review of the literature showed that the communication 
for organisational support is essential for the smooth functioning of any OHSMS.  
 
Although much of the literature showed that communication for organisational support 
between management and employee showed positive effects on OHSM, variations of 
different levels of support and employees performance were also observed. Some found it 
did not necessarily lead to positive OHSM consequences (see Riggle et al., 2009). In a 
general sense, organisational support is high if employees feel that decisions are fair and 
that their opinions are valued by their leaders. As a consequence, their contributions will be 
recognised and appreciated (Parsons et al., 2011).  
  
To sum up, previous studies on organisational support showed a variety of consequences 
(Valentine et al., 2006). Some researchers identified strong positive relationships between 
the level of support and the expected employee outcomes; others found their relationship 
was weak. Above all, it is certain that the absence of organisational support seldom leads to 
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positive outcomes. The lack of support functions in modern management puts more 
responsibilities and pressures on individual employees (Bennett and Foster, 2007). The 
review of literature on organisational support helps explain and evaluate the effectiveness 
of organisational support in this study. It suggests that an organisation should invest in 
communication, one consequence of which it is to better motivate employees and 
subsequently achieve more positive outcomes in OHSM.  
  
Management Control  
As illustrated in section 2.5.1, one of the main purposes of management-employee 
communication is the execution of management control. Management control is one of the 
substantial aspects of organisational management. In the wide literature, a series of major 
disasters in 1970s and 1980s such as the Seveso chemical accident in Italy (1976), the Three 
Mile Island accident in the US (1979), the sinking of Herald of Free Enterprise (1987), and 
the Piper Alpha disaster in the UK (1988) highlighted the role of management control in 
safety (Cox and Cox, 1996). Simons (1995) defines management control as ‘formal, 
information-based routines and procedures managers use to maintain or alter patterns in 
organisational activities.’ Skoog (2007, p.42) finds this definition too broad, and suggests it 
be defined as ‘a process of understanding, communicating and encouraging action in 
accordance with the value creation of the firm’. These definitions help us understand the 
processes and issues involved in management control. The practices of management control 
in organisational contexts are examined in the following paragraphs.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, over the past decades, more and more organisations have 
adopted a system based approach to OHSM. In the literature the management system itself 
serves as a tool of management control. It is a fact that many OHSMSs were established on 
the principles of International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) 9000 series. 
Zwetsloot (2000, p.407) regards the ISO series as a ‘power-force tool’ to control workers. 
Nichols and Tucker found (2000, p.306) that there was a sense among managers and 
workers that ‘OHSM systems are used by management to assert more control over 
plant-level OHS, to the detriment of worker rights and to gain the moral high ground by 
shifting the blame onto workers while portraying themselves as committed to continuous 
improvement, and ultimately, the prevention of all accidents’. The consequence was that 
employees were obliged to do certain things rather than others (Dwyer, 1991; Walters and 
Frick, 2000). A situation could go more extreme in work environments where workers 
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autonomy was limited. Gunningham and Johnstone (1999) suggest that such systems may 
bind employees to pay more attention to their own duties, undergo management 
surveillance and comply with various complicated reporting requirements.  
 
In general, the management control over OHS is characterised by the control over the 
process of work across a hierarchy in an organisation. Basically, management control is 
organised into a hierarchy of dedicated roles underpinned by allocating authority to 
positions in the hierarchy (Walton, 2003). In some industries and work organisations this 
was rooted in Taylorist approaches to ‘scientific management’ and has long influenced both 
management practice and the reactive strategies of the labour movement (ibid, p.116). The 
role of management control was highlighted by Zwetsloot (2000), since control of work 
process is usually achieved by communication across the hierarchy and it generates results. 
It directly affects workplace health and safety. This was agreed by HSE (1997) which 
claimed that a majority of accidents and incidents were not caused by careless workers, but 
by failures in process control. In routine practice, management control over OHS is 
achieved by specific measures. HSE (1997, p.59) noted some of the typical measures that 
were widely used by management: regular health and safety tours, random observation, 
periodic surveys, regular inspection, and open discussions etc. Among them, the role of 
regular internal inspection is particularly highlighted in OHSM literature. Workplace risks 
are not easily managed by external OHS officers for a company; therefore, the emphasis on 
an internal health and safety management is reasonable and understandable (Dorman, 2000). 
The process of internal inspection is an occasion of mutual interaction (communication) for 
monitoring non-compliance (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). The basic assumption behind it 
is that if the process is well controlled, the result should be satisfactory. In order to ensure 
that the outcome of the process control can be reviewed, a monitoring system has to be in 
place. It provides a feedback mechanism to ensure that when OHSM approaches are 
reviewed, information about the outcomes of workplace OHSM are accessible for the 
management. A key element of monitoring is the communication of its results so that 
responsive actions may be taken. In principle, the communication process can be explained 
by the classic Deming Cycle of ‘plan, do, check, and act’ (HSE, 1997, p.14; Gallagher et al., 
2003, p.68; Frick and Zwetsloot, 2007). It is illustrated and interpreted in Figure 1.  
 
The review of the literature raised several further issues which are worth elaboration with 
regard to the execution of management control. First, the system based approach to OHSM  
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Figure 1: Communication Process on Plan-Do-Check-Act for Health and Safety 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: HSE (1997, p.14) 
 
as a tool of management control showed that the impact of management systems on 
employee’s OHS was considerable. It was criticised as paying special intention to ‘safe 
people’ and ‘workers behaviour’, rather than creating a ‘safe place’ or ‘safe environment’, 
leading to a skewed focus on a behavioural-oriented approach (Frick and Wren, 2000; 
Wokutch and VanSandt, 2000; Gunningham and Jonestone, 2000). It is argued that such an 
approach shifts away from real industrial problems: ‘the unsafe and unhealthy working 
conditions’ (Wokutch and VanSandt, 2000, p.373). Particular criticisms were made by 
(Shaw and Blewett, 2000): 
[They] do not seek to change relations in the workplace and risk merely replacing 
the myth of the careless worker with the myth of the safety management system. 
This has little effect on OHS and the experience of the workforce…A narrowly 
conceived safety management systems approach also risks reinforcing the 
individualisation of risk, because it creates the illusion of control – that the only way 
an injury or disease could occur is if an individual does not follow the current 
procedures ( ibid, p.462-463). 
 
A study by Nichols and Tucker (2000) in the UK and Canada showed that the OHSMSs 
tended to focus on worker behaviour as a primary cause of accidents, to suppress injury 
reporting and to ignore trade unions. They questioned the abstract argument that ‘OHSMSs 
are a good thing’ for lack of clear evidence in the effectiveness of OHSMSs (ibid, p.307). 
Although the behavioural oriented approach was often criticised, it was found that this 
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approach worked well in DuPont (Wokutch and VanSandt, 2000), which might be 
explained by ‘contextual specific theories’ (Kamp and Blansch, 2000; Quinlan and Mayhew, 
2000; Bennett and Foster, 2007).  
 
Second, the system based management control can lead to an imbalance of power in an 
organisation (Pfeffer, 1992). Dorman (2000) conducted research on the question ‘if safety 
pays, why do employers not invest in it,’ and the result shows that health and safety debates 
are about power and control. Giddens (1984) pointed out that in a broad sense, power can 
be related to the ability to get things done, i.e. create activity. In a narrow sense, power is 
simply domination through an organisational hierarchy. Bellaby (1999) found that 
asymmetrical power relations arise when workers work in an unsafe condition which is 
created by their employer. Due to this power asymmetry, workers become powerless bodies. 
As a result, they tend to be vulnerable to work related health and safety problems.  
 
Third, in order to ensure that aims and objectives of OHSM are achieved, some kind of 
incentive or discipline needs to be in place to ensure that the strictures of the management 
are followed. Considerations of these measures in management control processes are 
advocated by scholars such as Dwyer (1991) and Podsakoff et al. (2006). The positive role 
of adopting incentive measures in OHSM has been confirmed in studies by authors such as 
Eakin et al. (2000), Wokutch and VanSandt (2000) and Robson et al. (2007). Gouldner 
(1957) in his study on ‘punishment centred bureaucracy’ suggests that discipline is indeed a 
routine tool in organisations (cited in Dwyer, 1991). The assumption under McGregor’s XY 
theory model (1960) was that most employees must be controlled with punishment so that 
they will contribute to organisational objectives, even though punishment constitutes the 
last available resource in dealing with non-compliance (Dwyer 1991; Hutter, 2001). 
Therefore, vacillation between the carrot of financial rewards and stick of authoritarianism 
is needed for management control (see Dwyer, 1991). Particularly, the proper use of 
economic punishment, or discipline, is emphasised in the current literature.  
  
This part of literature discussed the communication process of management control and 
several issues involved the process. In practice, management control is achieved through 
various OHSM measures, and the outcomes of management control are communicated to 
management and used for periodic review to continuously improve the management system. 
Quinlan and Mayhew (2000) argue that the management control in an organisation is a 
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pre-requisite for effective OHSM. But, it makes fundamental differences in terms of what 
kind of control it exerts. The review of the literature implies that the management control, 
in essence, is about the control of workers and workplace OHSM. It can have direct impact 
on the outcome of organisational OHSM. The Behavioural controls, rather than the control 
of safe working environment, may lead to negative consequences, which discourage 
‘experimentation’ as a key means for innovation as well as ‘organisational learning’ 
(Zwetsloot, 2000). In addition, the literature identified that management control can lead to 
the imbalance of power between the management and employees in an organisation. Also, 
it showed a certain positive role in the application of some incentive or discipline measures 
in the process of management control. The review of the literature on the role of 
management control helps to explain the effect of downward (shore to ship) communication 
in this study.  
 
2.5.3 The Role of Employees in Upward Communication 
Having discussed the role of management in downward communication, this sub-section 
will explore the role of employees in upward communication. In general, employees can 
provide critical inputs into OHSM (Dwyer, 2000). Empirical results in the literature show 
that when OHS arrangements do not involve employees and their representatives, OHS 
outcomes are poorer than when they do (Nichols, 1997). This point was further reinforced 
in ten case studies from the UK construction and chemicals industries conducted by Walters 
and Nichols (2007). Employees can be supportive by their active involvement in 
organisational decision making processes by contributing their knowledge and experience. 
As discussed in section 2.5.1, employee’s upward communication is mainly for ‘safety 
reporting’ and ‘being consulted’, which allows them to participate in organisational OHSM 
activities.  
 
Safety Reporting  
The argument in section 2.5.1 noted that it is essential that procedures for employee’s safety 
reporting should be established so that upward communication can be guaranteed. In 
general, smooth functioning of an upward communication system is underpinned by an 
effective communication culture (Havold, 2000; Graham et al., 2002). Also, it is a 
precondition of successful OHSM and one of the key features of a high reliability 
organisation (Reason, 1997; HSE, 2000; Kuhn and Youngberg, 2002). This sub-section 
reviews and discusses the literature on workplace safety reporting that dominates upward 
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communication process in an OHSMS.  
 
Usually, safety reporting is conducted based on a management system and this has 
implications for the outcome of OHSM. First, the design of reporting procedures is crucial. 
If it was designed improperly, it would present a distorted view of the extent of 
non-compliance or violation (Nichols, 1997). Second, a reporting system is likely to break 
down in the absence of feedback. Therefore, feedback mechanisms must be built into it 
both to promote the morale of a reporter and facilitate problem solving. Third and 
commonly, a safety report is ‘the key trigger for a thorough-going incident investigation’ 
(Hopkins, 2000, p.58). The reporting may lead to a root cause analysis so that contributing 
factors can be identified. Fourth, in order to ensure a reporting system works properly, 
confidentiality or immunity from responsibilities is needed to prevent detriment to a 
reporter (ibid). Examples in US aviation industry showed significant influences in terms of 
whether immunity from prosecution to pilots was given or not (see Hopkins, 2000). The 
four points identified in the literature are essential for the operationalisation of any 
reporting systems. They help us to understand and explain the effectiveness and efficiency 
of reporting system practices.  
 
In the context of shipping, section 2.5.1 mentions that safety reporting mainly includes 
‘non-conformities, accidents and hazardous situations’. Non-conformity is defined as ‘an 
observed situation where objective evidence indicates the non-fulfilment of a specified 
requirement (IMO, 2002b). An accident is defined as an occurrence involving personal 
injury or casualty, damage to property, environment, a ship or its cargo (Anderson, 2003); 
while a hazardous situation is defined as a sequence of events and/or conditions that could 
have resulted in loss (ibid). All of these should be reported to shore management by crew 
onboard ships. Furthermore, they should be ‘investigated and analysed with the objective of 
improving safety and pollution prevention’ (section 9.1, ISM Code) (IMO, 2002b). 
 
One of the major research findings from many industries showed that ‘under-reporting’ of 
safety-related events was omnipresent (Oltedal and McArthur, 2011). The analysis of the 
Piper Alpha accident from the British offshore oil and gas industry showed that the safety 
reporting system itself was incoherent. A reporter could mean a whistleblower, and failures 
to follow reporting procedures were endemic and normal (Wright, 1994). To a great extent, 
the problem of under-reporting is also echoed by the findings in the shipping industry given 
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the limited literature sources. For example, the ten year study (1997-2007) of maritime 
casualty/accident databases from the Lloyd’s Register Fair Play (LRFP) and Norwegian 
Maritime Directorate (NMD) showed that more than sixty percent of the total accidents 
were under-reported (Psarros et al., 2010). In general the literature suggested that 
under-reporting is a ‘considerable problem’ in this industry, and ‘a culture of 
under-reporting’ of safety related occurrences is prevalent (Nielsen and Roberts, 1999; IMO, 
2008b; Ellis et al., 2010; Bhattacharya, 2011). The under-reporting undermined normal and 
effective operations of the established safety management system, as was stated by Oltedal 
and McArthur (2011): 
A fundamental pillar of safety management is that information reported into the 
system is reliable and reflects the actual situation in working operations. Thus, 
under-reporting of safety related events constitutes a major threat to the efficiency 
and utility of a safety management system (ibid, p.331). 
  
Although safety reporting is particularly important for the OHSM, the significant 
under-reporting problem can undermine the outcome of the OHSM. This study conducted 
in the Chinese chemical shipping industry provides further evidence of current safety 
reporting, the factors that influence this reporting and its effects on OHSM practice in the 
shipping industry.   
 
Employee Consultation 
Apart from safety reporting, employee consultation is another important component of an 
effective OHSMS. Employee Consultation is a key term embracing OHSM-related 
activities (Walters and Nichols, 2007). In the UK and many other countries, every employer 
has a duty to consult employees and their health and safety representatives. Employers 
should provide adequate information, listen to what employees and their representatives 
have to say on health and safety issues and respond (ibid, p.18). Employees or their 
representatives should be consulted in advance by management with regard to the 
arrangements of certain significant health and safety related activities (Walters and Jensen, 
2000; Akerlind et al., 2007). Kamp and Blansch (2000, p.419) argue that employees should 
have opportunities to ‘present their views and experiences, ideas and criticisms, and must 
receive feedback from management’. It is impossible to imagine a company ‘with adequate 
safety and health standards but without any real say of the workers in OHSM’ (Zwetsloot, 
2000, p.406). In general, employee consultation ensures their ‘right to know’ in relation to 
OHSM (Walters and Frick, 2000). It is achieved through their communication with 
management so as to enable participation in the decision making process of OHSM. 
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Employee consultation is regarded as a bottom-up strategy for organisational change (Shaw 
and Blewett, 2000). It can also promote co-operation between management and employee 
to ensure the health and safety at work of the employees (Walters and Nichols, 2007). 
 
Employee consultation can be achieved in many ways. The literature suggests that there are 
diverse forms of employee consultation in relation to the OHSM (Walters and Frick, 2000). 
In many cases, employee consultations are prioritised when there is a recognised trade 
union. Usually, it is conducted by communication with the representatives of that union. 
The role of trade unions in OHSM in upward communication is further examined in the 
next section. However, in situations where there is no trade union recognised for collective 
bargaining purposes, employee consultations can be achieved by direct communication 
with employees or groups of them (Walters, and Nichols, 2007). 
 
Given the positive role of effective employee consultations, the research also shows that 
sometimes employees are instructed to act rather than consulted and encouraged to 
participate in any meaningful way’ (Gunningham and Johnstone, 2000, p.145). Bornstein 
and Hart (2010) identified the ‘ambiguous’ role of employee consultation for enhancing 
OHSM outcomes in situations of reduced external regulatory oversight. They argued that, 
given employees’ accredited participatory role, it might only produce an appearance of 
effectiveness; in reality the ability of employees or their representatives to raise 
controversial issues was inhibited. In contrast with the land based situation, research and 
information on employee consultation in the shipping industry is far more limited. This is 
true globally and especially so in China where the research is very limited on the nature or 
level of employee consultation in the Chinese shipping industry. This study makes a 
contribution to the assessment of the level of employee consultation in this industry in the 
Chinese context.  
 
In section 2.5.2, some common measures used for management control were illustrated. 
Meanwhile, the application of those measures can be interwoven with employee reporting 
and consultation. Through examining employee practices of safety reporting and 
consultation (in this study it is the ship’s crew), factors influencing upward communication 
are identified. Also, the influences of upward communication on the consequences of 
OHSM are also explored.  
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2.5.4 The Role of Trade Unions  
The role of employee consultation was just discussed. Employee consultation cannot 
function effectively in the absence of support from ‘organised labour’ (Walters, 2005). In 
essence, a trade union serves this purpose. Frick et al. (2000) said trade unions are 
‘essential’ to guarantee certain level of genuine worker participation. They are regarded as 
the ‘only developed possibility for the support of worker autonomy’, without which it 
would be hard to regulate management performance and achieve effective OHSM (Walters 
and Frick, 2000, p.65). Dwyer (1991) saw trade unions as a means of combating 
authoritarianism. Quinlan and Mayhew (2000) recognised that trade unions made an 
important contribution to maintaining OHS standards in many developed nations. Popma 
(2009) found that trade unions’ involvement can help the development of risk assessment 
tools.  
 
In general, the role of trade unions has been regarded as the most powerful countervailing 
force to confront short-term profit, bureaucratism and poor OHSM in most western 
literature (Gunningham and Johnstone, 1999). The evidence also shows that OHSM is more 
successful when workers are represented and unions provide autonomous representation 
and support for it (Walters and Nichols, 2007). However, the research in the international 
shipping industry showed that this industry suffers from lack of trade union support at the 
shipboard level and at the level of collective bargaining with employers (Sampson and 
Thomas, 2003; Kahveci and Nichols, 2006; Bhattacharya, 2012).  
 
In China, the role of trade unions shows significant variation from their western 
counterparts. The All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) in China is the largest 
trade union in the world. The statistics released by The People’s Daily (1 May 2011), one of 
the main official public media in China, showed that the total membership in trade unions 
reached 239 million. According to Chen (2009), the ACFTU has a formal government 
status. Qiao (2010) noted that the ACFTU is operating under the national umbrella and only 
acting as an apparatus to align labour demands with national interests. However, Taylor 
(2003) argued it is hardly a workers organisation given the fact of its minimal role in 
worker representation and labour relations adjustments. In general, Qiao (2010, p.29) 
identified that ‘almost none of the industrial actions in contemporary China is initiated or 
organised by the Chinese trade unions’.  
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At the organisational level, a trade union is formally part of the ACFTU. Its major role is to 
assist its affiliated organisation to facilitate production output as well as OHSM. 
Additionally, it is committed to assisting management to provide collective welfare services 
for workers, organising spare-time cultural or technical activities for them such as 
professional training and recreational services. Given its active influences on workers, 
fundamental problems are also identified in the literature. A trade union in China is 
subordinated to organisational management. Its assumed power is not derived from 
organised labour (Chen, 2009). Independent unions are not allowed to be organised freely 
at workers’ will (Ding et al., 2002). This structural arrangement ‘creates a formidable 
obstacle to their representative function…If they (unions) are seen to be at odds with 
management and seek to redress abuses, they could face retaliation and harassment from 
the enterprise’ (Chen, 2003a, p.1017). The empirical study made by Ding et al. (2002) 
showed that unions in state-owned enterprises are more influential than in other kinds of 
firms. It was found that in many non-state enterprises, the union’s role is even more limited 
and some did not even have a union organisation. Based on the analysis of the data set 
originating from a national survey in the Chinese manufacturing industry carried out by 
ACFTU, Chen and Chan (2004) found that the input of trade unions does have a positive 
impact on the protection of the workers’ OHS. However, their conclusions were based on a 
large volume of statistical data with questionable reliability. Further, their study lacks 
qualitative engagement with the organisational context. In this sense their study failed to 
produce convincing evidence for their findings.   
 
The above mentioned organisation of trade unions applies in the Chinese shipping industry. 
Under this background, the worker’s upward communication can be mediated by the 
‘specific’ role of trade unions in China. The review of literature on the role of trade unions 
and its relations to OHSM in western world as well as in China can help us understand the 
role of a trade union in upward communication in improving OHSM practice onboard ships 
in the Chinese context. They will be further addressed in the data and discussion chapters of 
this thesis. 
 
2.5.5 Implications for the Study (I) 
The main focus of this study is an analysis of the communication between shore 
management and ship’s crew in the Chinese chemical shipping industry. In the beginning of 
section 2.5, it was stated that the meaning of communication is broad and there is a need to 
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define what is communicated between these parties in terms of the specific research area. 
The wide definition of communication is used based on findings in the literature. Relevant 
OHSM issues in relation to both downward management communication and upward 
employee communication have been examined. The responsibilities and obligations of both 
management and employee identified the key subjects of communication between them in 
relation to OHSM.  
  
The role of management in downward communication was examined first. From the 
management perspective, the analysis of the literature identified two purposes for 
management’s downward communication with employees, i.e., communication for 
organisational support and communication for management control. In the context of 
shipping it raises a question about the relationship between management's support and 
control roles in communications between shore and ships. An answer to this general 
question can be illuminated by examining answers to the following detailed questions: 
1) How effective is shore to ship communication for organisational support?  
2) How effective is shore to ship communication for management control? 
3) In which way does shore to ship communication influence shipboard OHSM in both 
situations? 
 
In a comparable sense this time from the employees’ perspective, two purposes of 
communication were identified, i.e., communication for safety reporting and employee 
consultation on OHSM-related issues. This leads to a question about how safety reporting 
and employee consultation can be affected in practice. For the latter, in consideration of the 
wide coverage of employee consultation on OHSM-related issues and in order to narrow 
down the topic in this study, the examination of employee consultation was achieved by 
focusing on crew’s safety suggestions for the improvement of shipboard OHSM in response 
to company’s safety policy. The examination also includes the role of shipboard trade union 
units in improving OHSM. Thus, the detailed research questions in relation to this subject 
matter are: 
4) How effective is ship to shore communication for safety reporting? 
5) How effective is ship to shore communication for safety suggestions? 
6) What are the immediate factors affecting ship to shore communication in both 
situations? 
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Since communication involves two parties, both management and crew’s perspectives are 
examined. Moreover, the study also addresses the role of shore-ship communication as a 
whole in relation to OHSM. Thus, the study further examines: 
7) What are the underlying factors affecting shore-ship communication? 
 
As stated, this main research question was shaped within the framework of OHSM. The 
study will also lead to a general assessment on how OHSM can be affected as a 
consequence of shore-ship communication. Thus, there is a need to review OHSM-related 
literature and discuss its findings in relation to the shipping industry in general and its 
unique situation in China.  
 
2.6 OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT IN THE 
CONTEXT OF SHIPPING 
As stated in Chapter 1, this study explores how communication affects OHSM in two 
Chinese chemical shipping companies. It is therefore important to know the development 
and current practices of OHSM in the shipping industry. This section includes a brief 
overview on the OHSM strategy applied in the international shipping industry, a 
comparative assessment of the ISM Code, and a brief introduction to major aspects of 
OHSMSs that are relevant to this study. Finally implications of the literature discussion for 
this study will be presented.  
 
2.6.1 OHSM Strategy in the Shipping and Its Relevance with Communication  
The shipping industry had been self-regulating for a long time. By tradition, ships were 
subject to the laws, rules and regulations of their own flag states and in the countries where 
they sailed in the past. There was a lack of multilateral harmonisation and uniform 
standards. The regulation of the maritime world was very late (Perrow, 1999). Although the 
IMO adopted a considerable number of legal instruments intended to improve maritime 
safety, the major focus lay on the technical issues rather than human factors.  
 
It was widely acknowledged that the Herald of Free Enterprise accident catalysed the 
move towards a systematic OHSM strategy in the international shipping industry. In 1987, 
the capsizing of a UK registered passenger ferry in the English Channel, the Herald of Free 
Enterprise, ironically caused a loss of almost two hundred lives. Although the immediate 
causes of the accident were errors on the part of ship’s officers and crew, the in-depth 
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inquiry showed that the cardinal faults lay in the shore management of the company (see 
Reason, 2005, p.58). The accident investigation team examined the shore-ship 
communication process and found that one of the major problems pointed to serious lapses 
by the shore-based management (HMSO, 1987). Based on that analysis, Goulielmos and 
Goulielmos (2005, p.490) concluded that ‘long established mis-communication patterns 
and problematic misconceived dialogues between management and ship officers did not 
allow for an adaptation to changing parameters’. This was seen as a major characteristic of 
‘organisational decline’ and ‘closed systems’ (ibid). These studies highlighted the unique 
role of shore-ship communication in OHSM in the shipping context.  
 
The sinking of the ship and follow-up investigation result raised noticeable concerns in the 
international maritime community following the accident. It directly led to the introduction 
of the ISM Code in 1998 and marked a ‘turning point’ for the industry. Before the 
introduction of the Code, there had been some positive developments on regulating OHSM 
through a system based approach in the shipping industry from developed countries such as 
UK as well as from international industrial bodies such as the International Chamber of 
Shipping/International Shipping Federation (ICS/ISF); however, they were not well 
organised lacking an international influence.  
 
The introduction of the Code marked a ‘turning point’ for the industry. It brought about a 
fundamental change to the way in which OHSM was previously conducted (Anderson, 
2003). The IMO, a specialised agency of the United Nations (UN), required every 
contracting member to implement the Code by enacting corresponding mandatory 
standards to regulate OHSM in its shipping industry (IMO, 20007). The philosophy 
underpinning the Code is to require shipping managers and seafarers to transform their 
traditional operational practice into a regulated system-based approach in order to better 
manage OHS issues and reduce harm to persons, ships and the environment (Anderson, 
2003; Bailey, 2006). All shipping companies around the world subject to the Code were 
required to establish mandated forms of safety management systems. According to the 
Code, an OHSMS should consist of some essential elements contained in the Code. The 
overall functional requirements of the system are: 
‘a safety and environmental protection policy, instructions and procedures to 
ensure safe operation of ships and protection of the environment in compliance 
with relevant international and flag state legislation, defined levels of authority and 
lines of communication between, and amongst, shore and shipboard personnel, 
procedures for reporting accidents and non conformities with the provisions of this 
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Code, procedures to prepare for and respond to emergency situations; and 
procedures for internal audits and management reviews’ (IMO, 2007, p.4).  
 
On the one hand, these requirements imply the importance of lines of communication 
between different hierarchies in a shipping organisation for OHSM practice. In section 2.5, 
I addressed the role of management-employee communication in OHSM. In the context of 
shipping shore-ship communication plays an essential role in the operation of a 
management system. These requirements suggest the importance of establishing a sound 
OHSMS. Although a good management system is said to be a competitive advantage, the 
real effect can be complex in terms of the nature of this multinational and multifaceted 
industry employing a globalised labour force (Anderson, 2003). After the implementation 
of the Code, some authors have claimed its positive role in improving OHSM in the 
international shipping industry (IMO, 2005; Celik, 2009), but there is a lack of firm 
evidence from empirical studies to support their views. Given the very limited sources 
available in the maritime literature (as stated in Chapter 1) previous studies on the safety 
management in the maritime industry were mainly conducted in questionnaire-based 
surveys (Anderson, 2003; IMO, 2005). They ‘failed to expose the underlying concerns’ and 
‘reach any firm conclusion’, and ‘further in-depth qualitative research’ was recommended 
(Bhattacharya, 2009, p.4).  
 
As a contracting member of the IMO, China was obliged to implement the mandated 
international standards enacted by the IMO. The Ministry of Communications and the 
China Maritime Safety Administration (MSA), its affiliated official department dedicated to 
maritime affairs in China, are responsible for ensuring the adequate implementation of the 
Code. Circular 96 (465) was the first official document requiring maritime organisations 
involved to fully comply with the Code. Following the implementation of the ISM Code, 
the National Safety Management (NSM) Code was enacted by the Ministry of 
Communications in 2001. Since then, fundamental changes have been made in the Chinese 
shipping industry. As stated, one of the most significant impacts on a shipping company is 
the establishment of a safety management system. The search of two major Chinese 
databases, the CNKI and CQVIP, showed that the articles available about the 
implementation of the ISM Code mainly addressed theoretical or technical issues integrated 
with personal views and suggestions. The lack of empirical studies is evident in terms of 
operationalisation of OHSMSs in the Chinese context. Thus, few previous empirical studies 
along with the different national situation also suggest the need for ongoing studies in this 
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industry. 
 
2.6.2 A Comparative Assessment of the ISM Code 
The ISM Code is a late comer to the already established tradition of movement towards 
OHSM in regulation of OHS in different parts of the world. In particular it followed the 
practice of regulated self-regulation (Gunningham and Johnstone, 1999; Bruhn, 2010, p.11) 
or enforced self-regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992, p.101) to OHSM which have 
been identified in responses to the failures of self-regulation since 1970s. The Safety Case 
approach, first introduced in the UK in 1984, was such a prototype (Cullen, 1990; 
Gunningham and Johnstone, 1999; Hutter, 2001). At the supranational level a typical 
example is the adoption of the EU Framework Directive in 1989 (Gunningham, 2007). This 
approach encouraged the establishment of an ‘inbuilt management system’ (Gunningham 
and Johnstone, 1999, p.39). It is regarded as ‘a central strategy’ to cope with poor 
workplace health and safety issues (Frick and Wren, 2000).  
  
In essence the introduction of the ISM Code is nothing particularly unique. It shares the 
features of many of the regulatory standards for OHSM, particularly of those in western 
world countries. The development of the ISM Code incorporated major elements 
originating from the ICS/ISF voluntary guidelines on ship safety management, the UK 
Merchant Shipping Guidance Notes M.1188, and ISO standards for quality management 
(Bhattacharya, 2009). In consideration of their relevance to this study, the role of employers 
and employees in relation to general regulatory requirements and those included in the ISM 
Code are addressed next.  
  
It is widely accepted in many regulatory standards that responsibility for ensuring OHS 
rests primarily with employers. It extends to all types of workplaces and work activities. In 
most regulatory standards the employers’ obligation to provide a safe working environment 
for their employees has been unanimously confirmed (Zwetsloot, 2000; Hutter, 2001). If 
employers take full responsibility for creating a healthy and safe environment, it helps in 
the creation of a positive workplace atmosphere (HSE, 1997).  
 
Meanwhile, the competence of employers in the delivery of OHSM was also highlighted. 
The effectiveness in implementing OHSM can be compromised by employers’ tardy 
compliance and their limited ability in managing OHS (Frick and Wren, 2000; Frick et al., 
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2000; Hutter, 2001). In the ISM Code the role of a Company in OHSM was particularly 
addressed (the Company was defined as ‘the owner of the ship or any other organisation or 
person such as the manager, or the bareboat charterer, who has assumed the responsibility 
for operation of the ship from the shipowner’) (IMO, 2002b). The Company should 
‘provide for safety practices in ship operation and safety working environment’; ‘establish 
safeguards against all identified risks’; and ‘continuously improve safety management 
skills of personnel ashore and aboard ships’ (ibid). It can be seen from the quoted text of the 
Code that the importance of the responsibility of employers for health and safety 
management in the shipping context was unequivocally stated. Their responsibility for 
shipboard OHSM would be delivered via communication with the crew. This point will also 
be examined later in this study. In addition, according to the Code, a company’s safety 
management practice is subject to regular audit/inspection conducted by the maritime 
administration of each country. If a company failed to meet the OHSM standards as 
required by both the Code and the national regulatory requirements, the company will bear 
corresponding legal responsibilities and could face penalties or even suspension of the 
Document of Compliance issued by its administration.  
 
The role of employees in OSHM has been widely discussed in examinations of various 
regulatory schemes. In particular the role of worker participation in the process of OHSM 
was considered essential in a participative management approach. Wagner (1994) 
interpreted such participation in decision making as a process of sharing influence among 
people in different hierarchical positions. Some empirical studies have shown that 
participative decision making can improve an employee’s job satisfaction and mental health 
(Schwarz, 1989; Lam et al., 2002) even though such a relation might be nonlinear and 
dependent on situations and individuals (Cotton, 1995). Worker participation has been 
prescribed in national regulations in EU countries, Canada and Australia. In the UK, the 
Health and Safety at Work Act (1974), the Safety Representatives and Safety Committees 
Regulations (1977), and the Health and Safety (Consultation with Employees) Regulations 
(1996) have clearly elaborated the role of employees. Worker participation is also assured 
in certain mandatory forms of OHSMSs, for example, that required by the EU Framework 
Directive. It is a ‘legal requirement’ for all employees in EU countries to participate – not 
just be informed about – in workplace OHSM issues that affect them (HSE, 1997). The 
ultimate aim is to create a ‘receptive culture’ in OHSM (Walters and Frick, 2000). In terms 
of seafarer participation in the shipping context, the Code shows a significant gap in this 
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respect. The Code only specifies that the Company should ensure that ‘each ship is manned 
with qualified seafarers’, and that they should ‘have an adequate understanding’ of the 
management system, and ‘communicate effectively’ in relation to OHSM (IMO, 2002b). 
The text of the Code shows that it does not contain an element of employee involvement in 
OHSM specifically and explicitly. The Code limits the role of seafarers to merely adhering 
to various operational procedures set by the employer (Bhattacharya, 2009). It does not 
state the need for the involvement of seafarers in organisational decision making processes 
in relation to crew’s OHS. Also, it does not mention any required features of health and 
safety representatives or safety committees (ibid, 2009).  
 
Worker participation in the OHSM has a link to the notion of ‘democratic dialogue’ in 
society and the idea of ‘workplace democracy’ (Walters and Frick, 2000; Shaw and Blewett, 
2000). The discussion of employee safety reporting and consultation in section 2.5.3 also 
highlight the need for worker participation. In general, worker participation can be 
categorised into two main forms: individual participation and participation by collective 
representatives (Walters and Frick, 2000). For the latter a trade union is one of the typical 
collective forms of worker participation. This point was addressed in section 2.5.4. Worker 
participation serves two purposes: to achieve the goals of the OHSM and, as well, to assure 
workers interests (ibid). The level of worker participation and influence is fundamental to 
the effects of OHSM (Frick et al., 2000; Walters, 2004). Quinlan and Mayhew (2000, p.184) 
argue that most systematic approaches to OHSM require a higher level of employee’s 
involvement and collaboration. Strong worker participation has beneficial consequences for 
work efficiency and workplace health and safety (Akerlind et al., 2007). Also, it is a feature 
of enterprises with lower injury rates (Shaw and Blewett, 2000, p.662). Generally speaking, 
workers should be encouraged to fully participate in the process of OHSM. In contrast, the 
maritime industry places very little focus on the benefits of seafarers’ participation 
(Bhattacharya, 2009 and 2012).  
 
The limited literature review here shows that worker participation in Chinese factories is 
comparatively lower than those in their western counterparts. Brown (2007) identified 
some major factors that affect worker participation as a result of his study of Chinese 
factories: 
a) Lack of political will and/or inadequate allocation of resources by executive 
management; 
b) A command and control management approach that prohibits ceding any authority 
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and power to non-management employees; 
c) Opposition from the government-controlled national union and management-led 
workplace unions; 
d) Opposition from first-line supervisors and department managers due to their 
skewed concern of time lost and production speed as a result of OHS activities 
(ibid, p.256).  
 
Although the findings were drawn from the study in factories, to a great extent, the analysis 
can apply to shipping companies given the identity of the Chinese social context and 
similarity of Chinese management philosophy. Sections 2.5.3 and 2.6.1 above noted that 
there was a lack of empirical studies on seafarer consultation and the outcome of the 
implementation of the ISM Code in the Chinese shipping industry. Despite the differences, 
the findings about worker participation levels in Chinese factories do shed some light on 
the level of seafarer participation in the Chinese shipping industry. 
 
The discussion of the role of employers and employees in OHSM can help readers 
understand both downward and upward communication in relation to OHSM activities. A 
general assessment of the ISM Code showed some similar features in terms of the role of 
an organisation's management in OHSM, but there is a lack of clear-cut statements in terms 
of the role of employee involvement and participation in OHSM. The review of the 
literature in land-based industries addressed the importance of worker participation in 
management-employee communication (interaction). However, to date it remains uncertain 
how the features of the Code influence shore-ship communication as well as the outcome of 
shipboard OHSM. This study is an opportunity to examine the effectiveness of 
shore-to-ship communication as well as the level of seafarer participation in ship-to-shore 
communication in the Chinese shipping industry. The study can shed some light on the 
improvement of communication between shore management and ship’s crew for better 
OHSM following the implementation of the ISM Code.  
 
2.6.3 System Based Approach to OHSM and Its Application in Shipping 
Section 2.6.1 stated that a mandated form of management system shall be established in 
response to the requirement of the ISM Code. From the functional requirements of the 
management system as stated in the Code, it is not difficult to understand that the essence 
of the Code is to call for a system based approach to OHSM in the international shipping 
industry.  
 
A system based approach to OHSM can be traced back as early as the 1920s in the Western 
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Electric Company in the US, and the later risk management systems in the1960s and 1970s 
(Bennett and Foster, 2007). Gunningham and Johnstone (1999) identified that OHSMSs 
were embedded in the generic management philosophy of Total Quality Management 
(TQM). This has developed since the1980s in which the management of OHS is one of 
TQM's major objectives. They also argued that a system based approach to OHSM can be 
defined as a safety management system in many circumstances. In essence, it is an integral 
part of an integrated TQM system, and a ‘specific application of the generic TQM model’ 
(Wokutch and VanSandt, 2000, p.370). Furthermore, Gunningham and Johnstone (1999) 
pointed out that some other modern management philosophies such as Quality Assurance 
(QA), Just-In-Time (JIT), Lean Production and Agile Production also contribute to the 
development of an OHSMS.  
 
From Chapter 1 we have seen increasing adoption of OHSMSs across organisations, 
industries and countries since the 1980s. Even in countries where formal OHSMSs are not 
mandated by their OHS legislation, it is common that establishing and maintaining such a 
system is required by most jurisdictions (Nichols and Tucker, 2000). It is regarded as ‘a 
central strategy to detect and abate workplace hazards, and reduce ill health at work’ (Frick 
and Wren, 2000, p.17). Its adoption allows an organisation to go beyond compliance with 
minimum legal standards. This is seen as the ‘promise’ of an OHSMS. It ‘encourages 
enterprises to do better than minimum standards through a combination of systematic 
management practice and high level commitment to a safety culture’ (Gunningham and 
Johnstone, 2000, p.135). These descriptions give explanations for the requirement to have 
an OHSMS in place in a shipping company prescribed by the Code. In section 4.3, I will 
detail the basic information of the management systems established in the two companies 
selected for my study. However, there is a need to briefly review and discuss the major 
aspects of OHSMSs that have implications for my study of the Chinese shipping industry.  
 
Irrespective of the differences between management systems, it is essential that a written 
statement of the OHSM policy should be given at the beginning of any OHSMS imitative. 
The word 'policy' here means ‘the general intentions, approach and objectives – the vision – 
of an organisation and the criteria and principles upon which it bases its action’ (HSE, 1997, 
p.6). It is mainly set up by top management, and should reflect the values/beliefs of the 
members who produce and implement it in an organisation (Tam et al., 2004). An effective 
OHSM policy sets a clear direction for members to follow, and it is not about ‘lip service’ 
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given by management, but their ‘genuine commitment to action’ (HSE, 2000, p.6). The 
importance of OHSM policy is indubitable. Tam et al. (2004) argued that the policy affects 
organisational safety performance and OHSM practice. It is also one of the contributing 
causes of workplace incidents/accidents (Fang et al., 2004). In general, the ultimate goal is 
to maintain specified OHSM standards and achieve expected outcomes.  
 
An OHSM policy is brief, concise and abstract, and it is usually reflected by concrete 
OHSM objectives. In association with the objectives, OHS indicators were widely used in 
many shore-based industries for indicating and measuring whether the objectives were met 
or not (Cox and Cox, 1996; Buchanan and Huczynski, 1997; HSE, 2000; Wokutch and 
VanSandt; 2000; Balka and Freilich, 2008). In other words, OHS indicators are commonly 
used for measuring the effectiveness of an OHSMS. The use of indicators has been claimed 
to be effective in terms of their role in controlling negative events, since they are easily 
measured and serve as important evidence for rewards and penalties of employee’s 
behaviours (Wokutch and VanSandt, 2000). Based on the indicators, it is easy to establish 
observable cause-effect relationship between unsafe practice and the negative events (ibid). 
Armstrong and Armstrong (2008) supported the use of indicators for OHSM, since they can 
provide valuable data for cross time and cross department comparisons of the effectiveness 
of OHSM issues, which lead to better forms of work organisation. Wadsworth and Smith 
(2009, p.21) stated that this practice can potentially ‘raise the profile’ of health and safety 
management for an organisation. Thus, it could be seen that OHS indicators reflect the 
extent to which an OHSM policy is achieved in practice.  
 
In addition, the OHSM literature shows that one of the significant roles of an OHSMS is its 
function of continuous improvement (HSE, 1997, p.13). It means that the in-built internal 
management process within a system should lead to continuous improvement on OHS 
performance in response to emerging workplace health and safety problems. Many authors 
such as Shaw and Blewett (2000, p.468), Frick and Wren (2000, p.24), Guningham (2007, 
p.7) and Psarros et al. (2010) argued that the essential value of a management system is that 
the system is situated in a status of ‘continuous improvement’. Gunningham and Johnstone 
(2000, p.144) supported the view that it has a potential of stimulating ‘self-organisation’ 
and ‘self-regulation’ of OHS activities, and can realise ‘internal self-critical reflection and 
continuous improvement’. With reference to the management principles of OHSAS 18001, 
Bennett and Foster (2007, p.38) argued that an OHSMS, in essence, is a ‘dynamic system’ 
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rather than a ‘static one’. Thus, an organisation can be more responsive to the concerns of 
OHS issues (Gunningham, 2007).  
 
While the positive role of continuous improvement for a management system was 
confirmed in the extant literature, it remains meaningful to examine how it works in reality 
and what are the outcomes. The examination in the international shipping industry showed 
that a similar pattern was followed in the development of an OHSMS. For example, OHS 
indicators have been commonly used by shipping companies for the measuring the 
achievement of OHSMSs (see section 4.3.1 and 4.3.2). Although the main focus of this 
study is shore-ship communication, it will eventually lead to a general assessment on the 
effectiveness of OHSM. This empirical study hopes to contribute by revealing the situation 
in the Chinese chemical shipping industry. 
 
2.6.4 Implications for the Study (II) 
Since this study examines not only shore-ship communication, but also how such 
communication influences shipboard OHSM in the Chinese chemical shipping industry, the 
review and discussion of the literature in this section serves the latter purpose. Apart from 
the research questions presented in section 2.5.5, some further questions are raised by the 
literature in this section.  
 
OHSM strategies have evolved over centuries, and the regulation of the international 
shipping industry – the introduction of the ISM Code – was based on well-established 
traditions in regulating OHS in other land bases workplaces. The Code brought about a 
significant transformation of this industry. Given that the Code resembles many other 
regulatory standards, an in-depth examination showed that it only addressed the obligations 
of employers, but failed to address the right of employees and their participation in decision 
making process in relation to OHSM. Very likely, this could lead to the unbalanced 
communication between shore management and ship’s crew. In addition communications 
are basically conducted within the framework of the mandated OHSMS in the shipping 
industry. Accordingly, the communication is also likely to influence the operations of the 
management system. Based on these implications in the reviewed literature, further 
research questions can be raised following those in section 2.5.5: 
8) How does shore-ship communication influence shipboard OHSM? 
9) How does shore-ship communication affect crew’s OHS? 
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Following comprehensive discussions and presentation of research findings, the study will 
finally address: 
10) What are the implications of shore-ship communication for effective OHSM? 
11) What are the implications of this study for current maritime regulatory strategies? 
 
Overall, this study aims to make a contribution to the theories of organisational 
communication, system-based OHSM in the Chinese context and regulatory approaches in 
both the international and Chinese shipping industry.  
 
2.7 DOING RESEARCH IN CHINA 
Since the research was conducted in China, this section introduces the OHSM status in 
China, Chinese culture and its influence on the workplace, and the development of the 
Chinese seafarers’ labour market. This will help readers understand local contextual 
knowledge in relation to the research question.  
 
2.7.1 OHSM Status in China 
Section 2.6.3 notes that there more organisations have adopted OHSMSs in developing 
countries. However, the adoption of OHSMSs does not mean that traditional OHS problems, 
such as those originating from chemical, physical and biological hazards, have disappeared. 
A number of new OHS problems during the past decade have emerged as a consequence of 
the impact of economic liberalism. This started in major advanced economies and has 
intensified from the global mobility of productive activity (Walters, 2005). Problems 
include, but are not limited to, occupational overuse syndrome and psychosocial effects 
(Gunningham and Johnstone, 1999), deteriorating psychosocial work environments (Baird, 
2005) and new epidemics in different regions of the world (Walters, 2005). OHS problems 
tend to be more severe in rapidly industrialising countries such as China (Zhi et al., 2000; 
Gao and Sun, 2004).  
 
The journey of industrialisation started after the birth of New China in 1949. However, it 
was accelerated in the late 1970s when China started its reform policy and opened up China 
to the world. This thirty years of development has transformed China from a centrally 
planned economic system to a socialist market system (Zhi et al., 2000; Chen, 2003b), and 
becoming the workshop of the world (Brown and O’Rourke, 2003; Brown, 2007; Chen and 
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Chan, 2010). According to National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC, 2008), the annual 
increase of GDP has been on average of 9.8 per cent over the last thirty years. Meanwhile, 
the rapid development of the economy has contributed to deepened reform policies and 
fundamental industrial transformation. Along with the expansion of state-owned enterprises, 
private enterprises, rural collective and foreign invested companies have also flourished 
(Chen, 2003b).  
 
The quick development of industrialised production was also accompanied by significant 
OHS problems. In 1996, more than 30 million people were engaged in hazardous 
occupations, accounting for about 30 percent of industrial workforce in China (Chen, 
2003b). The official statistics in 2005 showed that over 16 million enterprises used toxic 
and hazardous materials and 200 million workers were involved in hazardous jobs (Chen 
and Chan, 2010). There was no evidence to show that their OHS was well managed. During 
the 1990s, there was an average of 100,000 fatalities per annum from industrial accidents. 
This number is almost 4 times more than those of developed countries (Liu et al., 2005).  
 
In addition, occupational health is also a significant problem in China. In the 1980s, major 
occupational health problems included ‘occupational lung disease, industrial chemical 
poisoning, pesticide poisoning, heavy metal poisoning, physical hazards, and occupational 
cancer’ (Christiani, 1984, p.59). In recent years, traditional health problems such as 
respiratory disease in China have by no means disappeared (Walters, 2005). The increasing 
involvement of new occupational hazards such as psychosocial pressures, ergonomic and 
physiological problems, exposure to radiation and chemical toxic agents, caused new types 
of OHS problems such as disorders to the central nervous system, circulation, immune 
system, and reproductive systems, and diseases such as tuberculosis, diabetes, hypertension, 
heart disease, cerebrovascular disease, and even some tumours (Gao and Sun, 2004). 
Apparently, workers fatalities, injuries and occupational health problems pose a serious 
negative impact to sustainable economic and social development in China.  
 
The discussion in section 2.6 concludes that regulatory action is essential for dealing with 
OHS problems. As early as 1956, China published the first compendium of industrial 
hygiene standards, The Tentative Hygiene Standards for Industrial Enterprises (1956), to 
regulate workplace OHS issues. After 1979, other OHSM guidelines were developed in 
consideration of local practices and experience. The rapid industrial development in the 
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1980s and 1990s was accompanied by alarming reports of fatalities, injuries and diseases, 
which suggest a need for reinforcements to legal measures to protect workers' OHS (Chen, 
2003b). In 2002, two new laws were implemented in China: The Prevention and Control of 
Occupational Diseases Law (2002) and The Production Safety Law (2002). In the same 
year, other relevant laws and regulations were also launched, such as The Regulations on 
Safe Management of Dangerous Chemicals (2nd revision), The Regulations on Labour 
Protection for Using Toxic Substances in Workplace (2002), and The Occupational Disease 
Control Law (2002). China has also ratified the workplace health and safety conventions 
developed by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) such as The Occupational Safety 
and Health Convention (155), Safety and Health in Construction (167), and The Chemicals 
Convention (170) (Brown, 2007). In general, these rules have played a significant role in 
safeguarding workplace OHSM in various industries in China.  
 
Given the assumed positive role of those laws and regulations in relation to OHSM, the 
literature shows that the outcomes of their implementation were generally unsatisfactorily. 
Brown (2007) commented that government enforcement and employer compliance were 
highly variable and generally poor. One of the fundamental problems affecting the 
implementation was that local governments failed to balance the need for capital 
investment with the maintenance of OHS standards. For the purpose of attracting foreign 
investments, local governments tended to ‘turn a blind eye’ to health and safety problems 
(Chen, 2003b, p.369). Pringle (2003) noticed a local practice in terms of the 
implementation of the three simultaneous (OHS) measures specified in The Production 
Safety law. This requirement involved strong coordination between those responsible for 
planning, construction and supervisory management. In practice, local governments were 
interested in attracting investors and did not want to complicate procedures for them, as a 
result of which the maintenance of OHS standards was compromised. The lack of 
enforcement from official departments partially contributed to the recurrence of OHS 
problems, slow advances in OHS and appalling OHS records (Christiani, 1984; Chen, 
2003b). In general, workplace safety in China was impeded by the absence of rigour and 
the failure of implementation (see Pringle, 2003).  
 
Moreover, serious OHS problems can also be associated with the top-down management 
approach towards workplace safety (Pringle, 2003; Chen and Chan, 2004). The effect of 
this approach was further reinforced by obstacles to worker participation and the weak 
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collective bargaining powers with employers (as discussed in sections 2.5.3 and 2.5.4). In a 
more general sense, Su (2003, p.303) summarised some significant challenges to OHSM in 
China: ‘lack of work safety awareness, backward infrastructure, and loopholes in 
management as well as strict supervision resulted in a continuing cycle of accidents and a 
serious prevalence of occupational diseases, which caused great losses in terms of both 
lives and assets’. 
 
These longstanding OHS problems have not been improved in recent years. Reports on 
occupational injuries, diseases and unsafe working conditions are often seen in both 
Chinese and foreign media, particularly in mining and in labour-intensive manufacturing 
sectors (Chen and Chan, 2010). This produces a picture that there is a lack of effective 
OHSM in many industries in China. Some western scholars note that the fast economic 
development in China was shaping ‘an explosive growth of hazardous industries and unsafe 
workplaces and enormous challenges in occupational health problems’ (see Chen, 2003b, 
p.369).  
 
The literature mentioned above mainly addressed OHS and its management problems in 
land-based industries. The literature search shows that little attention has been given to the 
Chinese shipping industry. Although national laws and regulations have equal impact on 
OHSM in the shipping industry, the systematic OHSM was not achieved until the 
introduction of the ISM Code in 1998. The situation on the implementation of the Code in 
China was given in section 2.6.1. In general, the literature about the OHS status in China 
presented in this section provides general background information about this study. 
Particularly, certain legal requirements need to be considered when a shipping company 
develops and revises its own OHSMS. This section helps readers to understand the local 
context of OHSM in the implementation of international standards such as the ISM Code in 
the Chinese shipping industry.  
 
2.7.2 Chinese Culture and Its Influence on Workplaces 
Hofstede (1980) found that national cultures have significant influence on people in 
organisations. The studies made in the international shipping industry showed that seafarers 
from different ethnic origins have diversified values, communication styles and 
organisational behaviour (Havold, 2005). Research findings from Kahveci and Sampson 
(2001), Hetherington et al. (2006), Bailey et al. (2006 and 2007) showed similar results. 
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Thus, the influence of cultural traits on seafarer work relationships should not be neglected. 
Filipino seafarers, for example, constitute almost one third of the international seafaring 
work force. The study made by Sampson (2003) showed that Filipino seafarers appear to be 
more ‘cosmopolitan’ in nature and active in social interaction. Filipino senior officers 
favoured friends, relatives or seafarers from their own region on board ship with the 
expectation of increasing friendly relationships and reducing loneliness (Sampson and Zhao, 
2003, p.35). Since this study was conducted in China, key features of the Chinese culture 
and its influence on work relations are briefly introduced in this section.  
 
Chinese culture has mainly been moulded by three philosophical traditions – 
‘Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism’ (Fang, 1999, p.26). Briefly, Confucianism deals 
with human relationships, Taoism deals with life in harmony with nature, and Buddhism 
deals with people’s immortality. However, the essence of traditional Chinese culture resides 
in the philosophical school of Confucianism (Shi and Westwood, 2000). Confucianism 
involves six core values: ‘a) moral cultivation, b) importance of interpersonal relationships, 
c) family orientation, d) respect for age and hierarchy, e) avoidance of conflict and need for 
harmony, and f) concept of face’ (Fang, 1999, p.109). Rooted in these values, the concepts 
of ‘diligence’, ‘thrift’, ‘practicality’, ‘conservatism’ and ‘obedience’ were regarded as the 
five most important characteristics of Chinese society according to a survey result (Beijing 
Review, 1988).  
 
One common feature of Chinese culture the Chinese respect for hierarchy and authority. 
This respect stems from the Confucian’s concept of li (rite or propriety). It plays an 
important role in human relations in order to maintain a person’s hierarchical position in the 
society (Lu, 1991). Secondly, the Chinese tend to have a strong sense of collectivism and 
group orientation (Fang, 1999). Under such a cultural tradition, the collective moral 
judgement is usually treated as the formal behavioural standard and incentive. The family is 
usually regarded as a basic unit of the society. A boundary of a family or a work unit is seen 
as a centre of social activities, within which its members should keep harmonious 
relationship. Third, the concept of face is seen as a unique feature in the Chinese culture 
(Lu, 1991; Fang, 1999). Face-work in Chinese society is seen as an instrument to promote 
harmony within a group or family. Typically, in a particular group (unit), the positive sides 
are encouraged to be exposed to outsiders while the negative sides should not be brought to 
the public. Fourth, the importance of personal relationship (Guanxi) is also highly valued as 
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a unique concept in Chinese culture. Personal relationships broadly mean having 
connections or a special relationship with important or influential people (Porter, 1996; 
Fang, 1999). The persons who are said to have Guanxi usually share one or more important 
characteristics. Birth-place, lineage, personal friendship, working together are some of the 
examples that help shape such relationships. Personal relationships constitute an 
interpersonal network in which social exchanges are shaped and reciprocated.  
 
The Chinese cultural features have significant influence on ‘Chinese management practice’ 
and ‘specific management-related issues’ in contemporary Chinese society (Shi and 
Westwood, 2000, p.191). An empirical survey among Chinese managers was conducted by 
Yang and Zheng (1989), which found that traditional Chinese culture persisted in modern 
enterprises. Tang and Ward (2003) found that Chinese managers hold a deep conception of 
collectivism in organisations. They viewed challenge as a collective endeavour rather than 
an individual one. Redding and Ng (1982) noted that the concept of face plays a role in 
social relationships in the context of organisational behaviour. They found that 
directors/managers in organisations in mainland China behaved as official-bureaucrats 
rather than business men. In addition, a large power distance was also found to exist 
between superiors and inferiors within an organisation in China, as a result of which the 
concentration of authority was high in hierarchy (Hofstede, 1991). Lu’s study (1991) 
showed that the Chinese cultural traditions tend to lead managers of organisations to adopt 
a centralised organisational structure and decision-making processes. This was echoed in 
studies by Lan (1999) and Schlevogt (2002) emphasising that a strong personal influence 
from top management was perceived with a propensity for decision-making processes to be 
centralised.  
 
It is understandable that the Chinese national culture penetrates into all levels of 
organisations, and organisational communication is equally influenced by cultural elements. 
The literature mentioned above may help to explain organisational communication 
behaviour from the Chinese cultural perspective.  
 
2.7.3 The Development of Chinese Seafarers Labour Market 
The literature suggests that globalisation has had a profound impact on international 
seafarers’ labour market. Accordingly, it has had certain effect on the Chinese seafarers’ 
labour market. Just before the 1990s, almost all the Chinese seafarers were permanent 
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employees of state-owned shipping enterprises. Since then, the uniform mode of 
employment has been broken and Chinese seafarers are no longer homogeneous, but 
increasingly heterogeneous in terms of their employment, working conditions and 
professional perspectives (Wu et al., 2006). A new seafaring group termed 'agency-owned 
seafarers' has emerged into both the domestic and global labour markets (Wu, 2004, p.69).  
 
By tradition, state-owned seafarers are those who are permanently employed by a 
state-owned enterprise with a long-term contract, while agency-owned seafarers are those 
employed by a crew agency with a flexible contract period and terms. The major difference 
is that the former mainly work for their own company’s vessels, while the latter are entirely 
dependent on the domestic or international labour market. Moreover, state-owned seafarers 
have better social welfare benefits, while agency-owned seafarers have much less. However, 
agency-owned seafarers usually receive higher salary offers that might offset the shortage 
of welfare benefits.  
 
Crew agencies have developed rapidly and become a major alternative channel for 
free-lance seafarers’ employment in domestic and international labour market, although 
state-owned enterprises are still the major employers for Chinese seafarers (Wu, 2004). On 
the one hand, a consideration of the different employment modes of seafarers' employment 
terms has an impact on this research topic. On the other hand, the grown of precarious 
employment can potentially affect communication between shore management and ship’s 
crew, particularly crew’s upward communication., the level and quality of crew’s 
participation, and even the operation of the OHSMS in a company. Therefore, the changing 
pattern of Chinese seafarers’ labour market suggests the value of conducting this empirical 
study.  
 
2.8 SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION 
It was stated at the beginning of this thesis that the broad aim of this study is to explore the 
role of shore-ship communication and its influence on OHSM. This review shows that the 
current literature on communication mainly addresses its connection with safety 
performance and safe working environment, and did not situate communication into the 
framework of organisational OHSM. This shows the point of doing empirical research. 
Further, the dominant questionnaire-based surveys applied in the research on 
communication suggest the need for a qualitative examination, since social factors and 
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social relations behind the communication can be thoroughly investigated by the proposed 
method. 
 
It was stated in section 2.5 that communication is complex and omnipresent in 
organisational contexts. Among all directions of organisational communication, the one 
between management and employee was identified as a key link that can significantly 
influence OHSM (also see Chapter 1). As a key means implementing an OHSMS, 
communication between the two is thus a good focus to examine outcomes of 
organisational OHSM. The analysis of the literature further identified the key aspects of 
management-employee communication in relation to OHSM from both perspectives. The 
identification helps delimit the subject matters which are feasible for this study.  
 
Systems-based OHSM has been popular since late 1980s in both developed and developing 
countries. It originated from the evolution of OHSM strategies, as a result of which 
OHSMSs adopted by organisations have been increasing. Although the increased adoption 
of an OHSMS has led to both advocacy and criticism, they should not be the sole reason for 
rejecting adoption. Further, the complex outcomes suggest ongoing studies are necessary, 
particularly in different national and industrial contexts. The comprehensive review of 
OHSM literature in general and the case in the shipping industry has provided a sound 
contextual rationale for this study. 
 
The study was conducted in the Chinese chemical shipping industry. This industry was 
significantly influenced by the introduction of the ISM Code in 1998. A mandated OHSMS 
was required to be established in all shipping companies subject to its terms among the 
contracting members of the IMO. As a developing country, China has made significant 
maritime regulatory adaptations to fully comply with the Code. However, few empirical 
studies have been made in terms of its implementation and their outcomes in the Chinese 
context. Dwyer (2000) argued that many developing countries were simply importers of 
standardised international regulations, and there might be a risk of mismatch. This offers an 
opportunity to examine whether there are such mismatches existing in the Chinese shipping 
industry. To better inform this study, the Chinese contextual background relating to this 
study was introduced in section 2.7. The study chose chemical shipping sector in 
consideration of its particular importance for OHSM and the growing share in global and 
Chinese shipping industry.  
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In this chapter the relevant literature in relation to this research project has been extensively 
reviewed and discussed. Based on this, the chapter also presented multiple, detailed 
research questions following the discussion of the literature in each of the major sections. 
Following the review of the literature on management-employee communication in section 
2.5, a series of questions relating to examine the effectiveness of shore-ship communication 
and identify immediate factors that influence such communication were raised. Following 
the review of the literature on OHSM in the context of shipping in section 2.6, several 
questions about how shore-ship communication influences shipboard OHSM practice and 
crew’s OHS were identified. In addition, the study will also attempt to explore the 
implications of shore-ship communication for effective OHSM as well as current regulatory 
strategy. Having discussed the literature and the detailed research questions, I will present 
my research design in relation to this study and the real experiences in my field work in the 
next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
A methodology is a general approach to studying a research topic (Silverman, 2005). It 
establishes how one will go about studying specific phenomenon. This chapter provides a 
detailed description of the methodology designed and applied for this study. It begins with a 
discussion of the methods used for the data collection, which is followed by a systematic 
account of the data collection process in the field. Next is a description of the ways the 
collected data was processed. Finally, ethical considerations relevant to this study are given 
at the end of this chapter.  
  
3.2 DOING QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
The research in social sciences highlighted two research methods, i.e., qualitative and 
quantitative ones. Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the 
world. It uses a naturalistic approach that seeks to understand phenomena in 
context-specific settings (Patton, 2001, p.39). It consists of a set of interpretive, material 
practices that make the world visible (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Atkinson, Coffey and 
Delamont, 2003). The approach needs a researcher’s close involvement and can lead to a 
deep understanding of possible relationship, causes, effects and dynamic processes from 
qualitative descriptions (Burns, 2000). This practice transforms the world and turns the 
world into a series of representations. However, because of the subjective nature of 
qualitative data, this approach has been criticised for lacking adequate validity (Bernard, 
1994). Also, the researcher’s presence could have a noticeable effect on the subject matters 
of the study.  
 
In contrast, quantitative research delimits social phenomena into measurable facts or 
common categories that can be applied to all of the subjects (Winter, 2000). It describes, 
tests and examines causal relationships between variables (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). 
Summarised from the literature (Bryman, 1988; Bernard, 1994; Carr, 1994), the major 
strengths of the quantitative research are its precision, variable controlling (through design 
and sampling), causality statement and allowance for sophisticated statistical analysis. 
However, this approach cannot interpret people’s experiences and cannot construct their 
own meanings. Potentially, the study could lead to findings that have little consequence 
given the difficulties in controlling for all variables.  
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The gaps in knowledge identified in the literature review for this research topic, argued for 
a qualitative study of the specific OHSM and communication issues in the shipping 
industry. This approach can provide an in-depth understanding of the social implications of 
these issues. However, the use of a quantitative approach (a tailor-made questionnaire 
survey for example) may be desirable as a complementary technique to improve the 
precision of the qualitative data. Previous studies have shown the desirability of integrating 
quantitative and qualitative research methods, which could be helpful for improving the 
validity of the research (Bryman, 1988; Bamberger, 2000; Bryman, 2006). Unfortunately, 
the role of this approach would be rather limited when applied onboard ship where the 
sampling is insufficient for a valid quantitative study. The number of possible responses 
(the sample is the crew on a ship) is always limited (20 crew on average); thus useful 
results would prove unlikely in consideration of the scale of this study. For this reason, the 
use of a quantitative study was discarded.  
 
Qualitative research methods are the actual techniques and procedures used to collect data. 
In this study, the methods used for data collection are mainly interviews and observation. 
On the one hand, this choice was made in consideration of my research topic. This 
consideration, justified by Silverman (2005), states that the choice of research methods 
should be dictated by the research problem, rather than the unchallenged superiority of one 
kind of strategy. On the other hand, it has been argued that use of the ‘detailed interviewing 
and observation’ could ‘gets closer to the actor’s perspective’ and that they ‘provide a rich 
description of the social world’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000, pp.10-11). In addition, 
complementary techniques such as informal talks were also applied where appropriate for 
data collection. In general, the purpose of choosing a combination of the research methods 
is to be able to get a better understanding of what immediate and underlying factors 
influence shore-ship communication and how this communication influences OHSM 
practice onboard ships. The following sections briefly describe and discuss how they are 
used for data collection.  
  
3.2.1 Semi-structured Interview 
As was noted in the literature review, the qualitative interview is one of the most common 
and powerful techniques for research in the social sciences. The use of interviews to 
acquire information is so extensive today that it has been said that we live in an interview 
society (Silverman, 2004). Qualitative interviews are based on ordinary conversation, 
 51 
however with an emphasis on researchers asking questions and listening, and respondents 
answering. Warren (2001, p.83) notes that ‘the purpose of most qualitative interviewing is 
to derive interpretations from respondent talk.’ As a consequence, qualitative researchers 
tend to rely on interviews as a basic method for data gathering.  
  
This study relies on one of the most common qualitative interview approaches – the 
semi-structured interview. May (2002) suggests that semi-structured interviews offer 
opportunities for people to answer more on their own terms than during standardised 
interviews. Semi-structured interviews are a useful method for obtaining clarification and 
elaboration on answers provided by participants. Prior to my field work, an open-ended and 
flexible interview schedule was designed and tested. Interview questions were divided into 
topic areas in which questions were supported by prompt words and phrases. The intention 
was to ensure that key elements of the questions were fully answered by interviewees. The 
interviews were conducted both in shore companies selected for the study as well as 
onboard their ships. The detailed interview questions are attached in the Appendix 3 and 4. 
  
Significantly, this research method is based on the assumption that responses from the 
interviewees will be trustworthy and accurate, and have no hidden motives or intentions to 
mislead on the part of interviewees (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996; Silverman, 2004). In 
reality, this assumption is not always correct. The low reliability of this method has been 
identified as owing to its subjective nature (Silverman, 1993). This weakness should remind 
those using semi-structured interviews to be wary of negative influences on the authenticity 
and quality of the data the interviews yield. In addition to qualitative interview, field 
observations served as another powerful tool for data collection. Observations can reinforce 
and supplement the quality of the data gathered from interviews. It will be discussed next.  
  
3.2.2 Field Observation 
The primary goal of field observation is the observation of ‘events’ (Atkinson and Coffey, 
2001). In a sense, many social scientists are observers of human activities and the physical 
settings where such activities occur. It is believed that ‘the sociological understanding of a 
given social world is optimised by the deployment of participation and observation’ (ibid, 
p.804). Silverman (1993, p.36) proposed five stages of observation, ‘beginning research, 
writing field notes, looking as well as listening, testing hypotheses, making broader links’. 
One of the prominent advantages of field observation is that it can help to check 
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truthfulness, identify discrepancies, and discover potential distortions, which are less likely 
to be discovered by other qualitative research methods (Gold, 1997). One part of my field 
work was conducted onboard ships, and I spent some days on each of the ships. Thus, it 
was a good opportunity for me to conduct field observations.  
  
Given the advantages of field observation, Denzin and Lincoln (2000) note that it is not 
without difficulties. On the one hand, its focus on the present may blind an observer to 
important events that occurred before his/her entry on the scene; on the other hand, 
informants in a social setting may be entirely unrepresentative of the less open participants. 
Further, the possibility of ‘observer bias’ remains, which prompted me to caution about 
drawing conclusions from my onboard observations mainly focused on crew’s OHSM 
related events, which included, but were not limited to, 1) shipboard bridge and engine 
room activities; 2) cargo operations and maintenance onboard; 3) safety related 
meetings/drills; and 4) signage or posters for safe operation. Data generated from the 
observation of these activities enriched and complemented the interview data.   
  
3.2.3 Complementary Techniques 
Apart from the two major methods described above, during my research voyages onboard 
ships, I also had opportunity to talk with the crew in their working time or free time. I was 
seafarer in my early career and had some years working experience on board ships. My 
experience helped me establish good conversations with them over a wide range of issues 
in relation to seafarer’s life at sea. Moreover, although I worked on several types of ships, I 
had never had experience on chemical tankers. It became an interesting topic between us 
and I raised a number of questions in relation to chemical operations. Many crew showed 
their willingness to answer my questions. Implicitly or explicitly, I raised some points that 
were closely related to my research topic. I found that some of the responses could be used 
as data for my research. These observations were recorded into my field notes. In addition, 
some of the written materials/records relating to OHSM were copied whenever I found 
them useful. Thus, informal talks and document analysis served as two additional and 
complementary techniques for collecting pertinent information.  
  
3.3 THE PILOT STUDY AND PREPARATORY WORK 
Once the design of research methods was completed, I began my field work. My 
supervisors had suggested the need to conduct a pilot study. Pilot studies are viewed as 
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good practice in the literature and before conducting substantial fieldwork for any research 
project. I started my pilot study at the end of July 2009 when I left Cardiff for China. I gave 
myself three major tasks: to conduct a pilot study to test the interview questions; to identify 
suitable companies for the study; and to obtain credentials enabling me to sail onboard. I 
completed all the pilot study work by the end of October 2009.  
  
3.3.1 The Pilot Study 
The pilot study was conducted from August to November 2009 in China. Interviewees were 
initially located using my personal relationship network. By using a ‘snow ball’ technique, 
more interviewees were located and a sufficient number obtained to begin the pilot. 
Telephone appointments were made prior to interviewing and I travelled around local 
regions within Jiangsu Province. Meeting points were usually at public places such as tea 
houses or offices, and in a few cases invitations to seafarers' homes.  
  
The pilot study involved interviewing 6 seafarers, most of whom worked on chemical 
tankers. The interviewees included two captains (One is from a large shipping company in 
China; another from a large petrochemical shipping company with 8 years of experience on 
chemical tankers), one second officer (Oil tanker), one second engineer (both worked on oil 
tankers and chemical tankers) and two ratings (one on oil tankers, another on chemical 
tankers). The pilot study was conducted and guided by a designed semi-structured 
interview schedule. The interview schedule was designed to cover major aspects of the 
organisational communication process. Each time I finished an interview, I asked for 
suggestions to improve the questions and the way of asking them. Also, I reflected on the 
questions and answers and made corresponding changes. As a result, the interview schedule 
was revised three times throughout the pilot study.  
  
During the pilot study, I had many experiences that proved useful for my forthcoming 
fieldwork. I was able to test all the first-version interview questions. As a result, the 
coverage of the interview questions was further narrowed down; certain repetitive, 
redundant and impractical questions were revised and prompts designed for the questions 
were improved.  
  
A second discovery was that some techniques could be used to obtain richer data during an 
interview. During the pilot interview, I paid attention to the interviewee’s narratives, but 
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very rarely used techniques to encourage the interviewee to elaborate his responses. While 
it was good to help me understand the background information and key activities involved 
in interviewees’ story-telling, the focus on specific aspects that could generate robust data 
was weakened. After a few interviews, I noticed this deficiency, and learned to use prompts 
and polite interruption techniques to lead interviewees, as recommended by my supervisors.  
  
A third discovery was the importance of building rapport with interviewees. In the 
beginning I thought I only wanted their answers. I came to notice a ‘distance’ between us 
by the way interviewees answered my questions. After a few interviews, each time before 
an interview, I spent a few minutes chatting with the interviewee about family, colleagues, 
personal experiences or even recent weather. I also highlighted my experience as a seafarer 
and lecturer in a maritime college in China. This helped relieve interviewee’s anxiousness 
and tension, and established a rapport between us. I found that the subsequent interviewees 
showed more willingness to answer my questions and gave more details about their 
experiences.  
  
3.3.2 Company Identification, Justification and Access Negotiation 
The proposed fieldwork aimed to make investigations of two chemical shipping companies 
in China. The identification of the chemical tanker companies took me some time and effort, 
since it involved not only access to the companies, but also the justification of my choice 
for the study.  
  
On one occasion during the literature review, I discovered a paper presented at the 
Shenzhen International Maritime Forum in 2008, written by Yuan and Fei (2008) both from 
a regional MSA in China. In this paper, all of the major Chinese chemical shipping 
enterprises were listed. I was delighted by this find, and I visited all of their websites in 
order to better understand the nature of their business. Considering my research topic, I 
thought that it would be appropriate to choose two of them which shared similar features. 
As a result two companies (C1 and C2) were prioritised as my first choices. The basic 
information showed that the types and number of their chemical tanker ships and their 
trading routes were similar. The research further showed that both companies shared a 
similar organisational structure and scale of operation. Detailed information regarding these 
two companies is given in section 4.3. As a result of this information search, a strong desire 
emerged – to choose these two companies as cases for my study. I made initial contact with 
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some of my colleagues in NT shipping college in China asking for their advice, since the 
college is one of the major Chinese maritime education and training service providers. My 
college principals and faculty have wide contacts in the Chinese shipping industry and 
fundamental progress was made on my return to China.  
  
My request for assistance in contacting these two companies was presented to one of the 
senior leaders of the college where I used to work. One clue I had was that he was the most 
appropriate person to contact C1 for me. After he learned about my work and request, he 
kindly agreed that he would be responsible for contacting C1, mentioning that the college 
had established cooperation relationship with C1 for seafarers’ education and training for 
many years. There would not be any problems in requesting permission to investigate C1 
operations. As for C2, he was not familiar with it. Although the college has established 
wide cooperation relationships with many shipping companies in China, its connections 
with chemical shipping companies was limited, partly because it is a specialised sector 
which is comparatively less familiar than other sectors such as container and bulk shipping 
enterprises.  
  
Another day, I approached another senior leader of the college. I read some information on 
the website of C2 and found that this company had a cooperation programme with a 
maritime academy from inland China. I had been told that this leader had close contact with 
the academy and that it was possible to contact C2 via the academy. I explained my 
situation and asked him for help with this contact. He replied me that he knew the academy 
very well, but that it was not necessary to contact the school - ‘we could visit the company 
directly’. I was encouraged by his words. One week later, I was contact by the director of 
the presidential office of the college asking for detailed information about C2. I provided 
them with material published on C2’s website and other contact details. On the same day I 
was informed by the director that this leader would have a business trip to the city where 
C2 was located, and that he would also visit C2. I was invited to join his team for this visit.  
  
A week later we started our journey. Before our visit an official appointment was made by 
the college to meet with the general manager of C2. On arrival the senior leader of the 
college stated two purposes of our visit. One was to seek the potential possibility of 
cooperation between the two organisations, since the college, as one of the major maritime 
education and training institutions in the region, could provide strong human resource 
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support to the company. Then, the college leader frankly stated the second purpose, which 
was about my field work for writing a PhD thesis. The general manager stated that it was 
rare to meet outsiders, but visitors from educational institutions were an exception. During 
the meeting, he did not say much, but he showed a willingness to have further discussions 
in due course. As for my field work, the director asked me how I knew about his company 
and what I planned to do in his company. I explained my findings in the literature and 
briefly talked about my research topic and field work plan. He encouraged me and stated 
that it was a good topic. However, about my field plan to sail with ships, he showed 
concern about boarding certificates and personal medical and safety issues. I assured him 
that I would be fully responsible for all those issues and his company would not be held 
responsible for any of them. He concluded that a kind of contract could be signed to 
address these issues before getting onboard their ships.  
 
I agreed to draft a written contract regarding those issues concerned for his approval. In 
addition, I made two key points about my fieldwork. One was that the conduct of the 
fieldwork was approved and monitored by the Cardiff ethical committee, and that field 
work conducted by Cardiff students would not incur any obvious or potential harm to the 
company or individuals, nor would subsequent written work. The second point concerned 
my credibility and suitability - as a maritime lecturer at the college, I had already taught 
many maritime-related subjects, such as maritime English and maritime communications. I 
also had a second officer’s Certificate of Competence (CoC) for ocean going ships. I could 
even provide some voluntary services to the crew when I did my fieldwork onboard. 
Eventually, the general manager nodded and said ‘should be no problem’. After the visit 
that day, a dinner meal was arranged with an official from the regional MSA. At dinner the 
visit to C2 was mentioned. Very surprisingly, we were told that the general manager of C2 
was one of this official's good friends! The official said that he would give the general 
manager a call to re-assure him about my field work arrangement. My long lasting worries 
about the possibility of ever doing my field work were much relieved.    
 
I understood the importance of maintaining such relationships. I wrote an email to the 
general manager, expressing my appreciation to him and mentioned the name of his friend, 
the official from the regional MSA. I told him that as soon as I completed my pilot study 
and my supervisors were satisfied with it, I would contact him again to make arrangements 
for the field work. The next morning I received his modest reply, ‘Welcome Doctor Xue to 
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visit his company to deliver my expertise at anytime’.  
  
After I returned from the visit to C2, I was told by the leader who agreed to contact C1 for 
me that the C1 had agreed to assist my field work. I was asked to produce a written report 
about my research topic as well as my field work plans in the company (described in 
section 3.4). Thus, negotiations for access to the two companies were successfully 
completed.  
  
Many of the researchers I met expressed their difficulties in negotiating access for their 
field work. In my experience it seemed relatively easy. This was due in part, to my special 
status as a PhD student at the Seafarers International Research Centre (SIRC) in Cardiff 
University as well as having worked as a maritime lecturer in a shipping college in China. 
Teachers are well respected in the Chinese Society. I brought forward the issue to senior 
leaders at the college. In the first case, it could be seen that the senior leader’s direct 
relationship with C1 was the key, and this added weight to the power of negotiation. 
However, in the second case with C2, the senior leader, as a ‘legal person’, was more 
powerful and credible in the negotiation process than me as a ‘natural person’, since he 
spoke for a public organisation. Moreover, indirect relationships also helped in the success 
of negotiation. C2 was connected by way of a third party – the inland maritime academy. In 
both cases direct and indirect relationships played a key part in the negotiation process. The 
importance of relationships (Guanxi), as one of the key characteristics of Chinese culture, 
has been widely addressed in the literature (see section 2.7.2). My negotiation process for 
the access of my field work reinforced my understanding of it in the academic context.  
  
3.3.3 The Acquisition of Credentials 
Since I had decided to study the chemical shipping industry, sailing with chemical tankers 
was unavoidable. To be allowed to sail, obtaining certain credentials is essential. The first 
qualification I needed to get is the Seaman’s Book, similar to a citizen’s passport. The Book 
is only valid for three years. An application is made to the China MSA and it usually takes 
about two months to get it. When I was in China in August 2009, I made an application in 
the name of the staff of the NT shipping college, which made it easier to get administrative 
approval, since the application was made by an organisation rather than an individual. A 
second necessary qualification is seafarer’s basic professional training which includes four 
items: basic safety, advanced fire fighting, proficiency in life raft and proficiency in 
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medical care. Luckily, had I received this training early in my career and the training 
certificates were still valid. A third necessary qualification is dedicated to the requirement 
for those working for chemical shipping. Chemical shipping is a specialised shipping sector; 
accordingly, special training must be given to those working on chemical tankers to meet 
requirements of both international conventions and Chinese national regulations. The 
training includes two separate and inter-related programmes: chemical tanker safety 
knowledge and chemical cargo safety operations. For me, as a researcher who would not be 
involved in shipboard operations, I needed to take only one programme, i.e., chemical 
tanker safety knowledge training. It was a seven-day intensive training programme. I 
travelled to the training centre and participated in the programme in early October 2009. 
The training concluded with a formal assessment (a computer based theoretical one and a 
practical operational one) supervised by officials from the regional China MSA. One month 
after the assessment, I was informed I had passed the assessment and a CoC was sent. Apart 
from this certificate, two other certificates were required - a seafarer’s service history 
record book (issued by China MSA) and a health examination certificate. By the end of 
November 2009, I had obtained all the credentials necessary for me to sail at sea.  
  
3.3.4 Outcome of the Pilot Study 
From the pilot study, I learned some good techniques on how to conduct interviews. The 
successful identification of and access to the companies and acquisition of credentials 
ensured the follow-up arrangements of forthcoming field work. In general, it seemed that 
my pilot study had met the expected level of research. True, some issues needed to be 
clarified and more focused to ensure the quality of the forthcoming field work. Face-to-face 
meetings with my supervisors were necessary for the assessment on the outcome of my 
pilot study. I returned to Cardiff in Mid-November 2009. Face-to-face and email 
supervision were arranged on a weekly basis. My interview schedule was revised and 
certain re-orientations were considered. As a result, a detailed fieldwork plan was produced. 
The time frame and key time nodes for completing each part of work were estimated. 
Eventually, field work plans were presented to and agreed upon by my supervisors. Their 
comments and suggestions about the interview techniques, research methods and data 
handling were valuable and constructive, which reinforced my confidence for undertaking 
this project.  
  
3.4 IN THE FIELD  
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In Mid-December 2009, I returned to China for the field work. As stated in my plan, the 
field work involved visits to two companies as well as sailing voyages on 4 ships (2 ships 
from each company). The major steps that I followed are detailed in the following. This 
section summarises my fieldwork spanning from Mid-December 2009 to early May in 2010. 
The field work was completed in line with my fieldwork plan.  
  
3.4.1 Field Work on Shore 
Since the two companies had agreed to host my field work, I contacted them directly on my 
return to China. I started with C1 and was asked by the company to write a written report 
on my research topic, a general description about what I intended to do in the company’s 
office as well as onboard their ships. I produced a two-page written report which included 
all the aspects in my fieldwork plan. The report covered five points. The first was about my 
research topic and the methods I planned to use to collect data. The second was about 
ethical issues. Confidentiality and anonymity were guaranteed. I stressed that this was 
academic research and had nothing to do with sensitive topics such as politics, corporate 
economics or details about the company's commence and trade. The third was that I would 
be responsible for all credentials needed for me to sail. The fourth was that I would be 
responsible for all travelling and accommodation costs during company/ship visit. The final 
point was that I emphasised my previous work experience as a second officer onboard and 
as a lecturer at NT Shipping College. I added that I would provide voluntary technical 
assistance to crew onboard. 
  
This statement was faxed to C1. Later, I was told that they needed a stamped official letter 
from the college, since sailing at sea could be risky, according to the contact person in C1. I 
understood that the key issue was about my personal health and safety. I separately drafted 
a personal statement. I said that, as a formally registered student in Cardiff University, I had 
medical and travel insurance and the company would exempt all responsibilities in this 
regard. I signed the statement and presented it to the college. The college agreed to write a 
letter of recommendation for my field work. After the two documents were sent to C1, I 
received permission for my field work in the company as well as onboard its ships.  
  
I also contacted C2 and sent another copy of all the documents to C2. For C2, they were 
particularly concerned about my personal health and safety onboard their ships. My wife 
was asked by C2 to give signature on my personal statement in order to indicate my 
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family’s support.   
  
In early January 2010 my fieldwork arrangements for both companies were secured shortly 
after I started my visit to C1. First I arranged to see the vice general manager in charge of 
safety production and fleet management for the company. I briefed him what I planned to 
do and he was fully supportive, since my plans had already been approved by the top 
manager of the company. Before the interviews, I drafted an interview plan and the 
interviewees were selected from relevant departments. Times and dates for the interviews 
were also discussed. My supervisors suggested I do 2 interviews a day.  
 
At the beginning of each interview, I presented the interviewee with an information sheet 
(see Appendix 1). The content was mainly taken from the written report described at the 
beginning of this section. I underscored my identity as a PhD student at Cardiff University, 
as well as a lecturer at the NT shipping college in China. My use of my identity as a teacher 
gave me a lot of convenience – teachers are widely respected by the general public in the 
Chinese culture. During the interviews, I did notice their respectful attitude. Also, the 
experiences drawn from my pilot study (stated in sub-section 3.3.1) were applied, and I 
found they helped in managing interviews. In total, I interviewed 7 people which included: 
1 vice general manager in charge of safety; 2 from the marine affairs department (1 head; 1 
guide captain); 2 from the marine engineering department (1 head; 1 guide chief engineer); 
1 from the quality and safety department (superintendent); and 1 from the crew department 
(vice head).  
 
The interviews were conducted according to the interview guide for shore management (see 
Appendix 2). The interviewees’ detailed information is provided in Appendix 4. Apart from 
interviewing shore management, some of my time in C1 was spent reading the company's 
OHSM manuals. I took notes when I read them, since these documents are treated as 
company secrets and I was not able to make photocopies. In total I spent five days at C1's 
shore operations centre, as indicated in my plan. At the end of my visit arrangements for 
sailing with two chemical tankers were considered. To avoid an unnecessarily long-stay on 
a particular ship, my supervisors had suggested using regional trading ships.  
  
After my interviews at C1, I visited C2's shore operations the following week. Although the 
two companies share a similar organisational structure, one major difference is that the 
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safety and quality department for C2 managed both marine affairs and the quality system 
management (see details in section 4.3). Again, I spent 5 days working there and followed 
similar interview and research procedures. I interviewed 7 people, at C2 including: 1 vice 
general manager in charge of safety; 3 from the safety and quality department (1 head; 1 
marine affairs manager and 1 general captain for the fleet); 2 from the marine engineering 
department (1 head; 1 general chief engineer for the fleet); 1 from the crew department 
(vice head). The interview guide and interviewees’ information are given in Appendix 2 and 
4, respectively. Although the fieldwork in the company was sometimes interrupted by 
customer visits, temporary schedule changes, telephone calls and internal meetings, etc., I 
followed the planned schedule. Again, the visit concluded with a discussion about 
arrangements for sailing on two C2 tanker ships after completing sailing with C1.  
  
My field work in the two companies was completed within the planned time frame. A 
preliminary impression of the shore interviewees’ accounts was that their communication 
with ship’s crew was good. However, as stated in the introductory chapter, the major focus 
of this research lies in examining how communication affects shipboard OHSM practices. 
Thus, the data collected from crew onboard ships is crucial to my account.  
  
3.4.2 Field Work onboard Ships 
A ship will be sailing at sea most of the time, hence careful planning is necessary to board a 
ship. To avoid a long-wait, I gave the contact persons in both companies early notice – 
three to four weeks before planning to board their ships. I left matters to the companies to 
identify an appropriate vessel for me. The contact for boarding each next ship was made as 
soon as the time for boarding one ship was fixed. In so doing so, my waiting times for ships 
were shortened. I began my first voyage not long after my field work in C2. Proposed days 
for sailing on each of the four ships were about 7-14 days; however it was impossible to 
guarantee a ship’s sailing schedules in practice. Although there were some external 
disturbances such as berth queuing, (bad) weather conditions and machinery failures (all 
noted in my field notes), the planned sailing schedules were not much affected – my four 
voyages are summarised in the table below (Table 1). Particulars of the ships I sailed on in 
both companies are also illustrated (see Table 2). The cargoes carried on the four ships 
during my sailing voyages were all either toxic, corrosive or/and explosive [indicated on 
the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDSiv) provided by cargo importers/exporters/owners].  
                                                        
iv
 MSDS: It is a form like data sheet indicating the properties of a particular chemical, its risk to people and 
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Table 1: Sailing Voyages 
 
 
 
COMPANY 1 COMPANY 2 
Ship 1 Ship 2 Ship 3 Ship 4 
Port of Departure Changzhou, 
China 
Qingdao, 
China 
Jiangyin, 
China 
Changsu, China 
Cargo Carried  Phenol P-Xlene Ethene Diol / 
Port of Call Daesan,  
South Korea 
Dalian, China  Mailiao, Taiwan 
Region 
Cargo Carried Phenylethylene P-Xlene  Dichloroethane 
Port of Destination Shanghai, 
China 
Qingdao, 
China 
Quanzhou, 
China 
Jiangyin, China 
Date of Embarkment 1 February 1 March 20 March 8 April 
Date of Disembarkment 12 February 7 March 26 March 24 April 
Total Days onboard 13 8 7 17 
Total days of Sailing 45 
 
 Table 2: Ships’ Particulars 
 
 COMPANY 1 COMPANY 2 
 SHIP 1 SHIP 2 SHIP 3 SHIP 4 
Length overall 90M 
Approximately 
135M 
Approximately 
95M 
Approximately 
100M 
Approximately 
Dead Weight 
Tonnage   
3,700T 
Approximately 
12,400T 
Approximately 
3,900 T 
Approximately 
3,600 T 
Approximately 
Number of Tanks 5P+5S 4P+4S 4P+4S 4P+4S 
Cargo Tank 
Coating 
316L Steel Epoxy Resin Zinc Silicate Zinc Silicate 
Main Sailing 
Areas 
China, 
Northeast and 
Southeast Asia 
China, Southeast 
Asia and Middle 
East 
China, 
Northeast and 
Southeast Asia  
China, 
Northeast and 
Southeast Asia  
IMO Category IMO I IMO II IMO II IMO II 
                                                                                                                                                                        
environment that serves the need of workplace safety. 
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Year Built Mid 2000s Late 1990s Late 2000s Mid 2000s 
Ship’s 
Nationality 
Chinese Chinese Chinese Flag of 
Convenience 
Crew’s 
Nationality 
Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese 
Number of Crew About 15 About 20 About 16 About 18 
 
I understood that collecting quality data while at sea was most important. I also understood 
that I should not neglect my relationships with the crew aboard. During the first two to 
three days, I did nothing about data collection, a suggestion from my supervisors; instead, I 
asked for a set of overalls and a safety helmet from the bosun to participate with the crew at 
their labouring activities whenever appropriate. Meanwhile, I tried to meet and familiarise 
with all people onboard and memorised their names. The purpose was simple - to establish 
a good rapport with them. My previous pilot study experience told me that I could not 
collect quality data without the crew’s recognition and cooperation. Later, this practice was 
confirmed by many of the crew. They were kind to me and willing to talk with me; some 
even praised me.  
  
My main mission onboard was to interview crew. The planned sample number of crew for 
the interview on each ship was between 10 and 12 crew members. When I started locating 
the crew for interviews, each individual’s background was considered. For example, cadets 
were not considered for interviews. Also, when a rating/motorman was available for 
interview, the most experienced persons were prioritised. One senior engineer (2nd 
engineer) on one of the ships was not interviewed, since he had been onboard for less than 
a month and knew little about the company.  
  
Interviews onboard ships were conducted in either the crew cabin or sometimes in my 
cabin during their off-duty time. Before an interview, I showed the interviewee an 
information sheet, the content of which was mainly the same as that used in shore interview. 
My previous interview experience (from both the pilot study and shore visits) helped me 
improve the quality of interview data. In total I conducted 47 interviews on board four 
ships. The interview guide for crew is given in Appendix 3; crew interviewees’ information 
is listed in Appendix 5.  
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Apart from interviewing, I also observed some OHSM-related activities onboard. Since I 
was not assigned to scheduled work tasks, I was free to move between different 
departments and locations on the ships. This freedom gave me opportunities to visit 
wherever I thought useful, to sense data intentionally and unintentionally. For convenience 
of observation, I sometimes participated in the crew’s work. I helped with mooring and 
unmooring; partial cargo operations; cargo hold washing; cargo floor mopping; and keeping 
watch on the bridge. I needed to see the way of doing things and understand the congruence 
and departure between what was notionally required and what actually happened. Moreover, 
I tried to establish connections between observed data of sailor behaviours and shore-ship 
communication. Generally speaking, my participation in crew’s work indicated that my stay 
onboard was not only ‘eating and playing’, but actually sharing their work and experiences. 
When I joined them as a green hand on their chemical tankers, I had many questions to ask. 
Although they often called me ‘teacher’, I modestly called them ‘master’. Shared work and 
mutual respect allowed me to get into the scene in a natural way without disturbance to 
their daily working habits/practices.  
 
Since my study is related to communication and its relation with shipboard OHSM practice, 
I paid special attention to crew’s OHSM practices onboard. As a result, I observed some of 
the OHSM consequences on each of the ships. For examples, onboard Ship 1, the strong 
ink-like toxic smell of phenol was pervasive in the ship’s accommodation area [this almost 
made me faint on S1 C1 (Field Notes, 8 February 2010)]. I was told by the crew that 
similar situations occurred from time to time, and were unavoidable. Onboard Ship 2, the 
ratings conducted risky operations without effective OHS protection in place during the 
process of cargo (p-xylene) sample-taking on the main deck for the purpose of conducting a 
cargo survey (Field Notes, 4 March 2010). Onboard Ship 3 in the cold early spring the 
bosun only wore a cotton hat rather than the proscribed safety helmet during the ship’s 
mooring work (Field Notes, 24 March 2010). Onboard Ship 4, I participated in the cargo 
tank washing process and observed that ratings and bosuns were all under-protected with 
anti-chemical gloves and safety helmets (Field Notes, 9 April 2010). There were other 
examples recorded in my long field notes and not all are listed here in detail. In general, my 
impression on the outcome of OHSM practice on the four ships was discouraging. More 
evidence will be presented in the data chapters.  
 
Informal talks with crew also contributed to my data set. The long stay in the onboard 
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community gave me many opportunities to chat with whomever I met at their leisure time 
in either the crew’s cabin or in the lounge room. Sometimes, it made contact during the 
crew’s working hours, for example, at officers' watch keeping duty on the bridge. Another 
good occasion for informal talks was right after a formal interview. As soon as the 
interview was finished and the recording stopped, interviewees often added a bit more to 
their previous answers or made general comments about my research questions.  
  
While onboard ship, I kept a field diary on a daily basis and noted whatever I saw, heard, 
and felt during the day. The longer I stayed on one ship, the longer the field diary would run. 
The field diary was organised in chronological order and was easily retrieved. My field 
notes amounted to 21,000 words. Information from my field observations and data that 
emerged from informal talks with the crew provided a major contribution to this thesis. 
  
Last but not least, I read some of the OHSM documents onboard and copied some of them 
for potential future use. Written documents related to the practices I had observed were 
prioritised.  
  
To sum up, the research methods used onboard ships were multifaceted. They included 
interviews, observations, informal talks and document collection and analysis. My field 
diary was an important resource for reflecting on the data collected from observation and 
informal talks.  
 
During my field work, email was the major channel for communication with my 
supervisors. Before each time of sailing, the supervisors were informed and I prepared a 
brief introduction to the sailing voyage. At the end of each voyage when I sent a fieldwork 
report which usually included a general description of the voyage, a transcription sample, a 
full set of field notes (field diary), and a few personal/fieldwork pictures. By doing so, my 
supervisors had a clear picture about what happened and what I had done on that particular 
ship. The two weeks after my last ship voyage I returned to Cardiff, which signified that my 
work had moved to the next step. In total the time span for my fieldwork was four months 
plus three weeks. I spent 45 days onboard 4 chemical tankers sailing in the western Asian 
Pacific region (also see table 2). 
  
3.5 DATA PROCESSING  
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When I finished my field work, I started systematically sorting through the data. The 
interview data accounted for the majority. In all, I performed 61 interviews. Most of the 
interviews were recorded [interviews with one superintendent (C1), one rating (S2 C1) and 
one fourth engineer (S4 C2) were noted down]. All of the interviews were conducted in 
Chinese. I transferred the recordings into a PC, and transcribed all the interviews into 
English while listening. This work was done whenever I had time - typically during the 
time waiting at home to board the next ship. There was a large volume of data which would 
involve significant costs if done by a translation agency. However, I found it helped me to 
better understand the data essential for its analysis and interpretation. In most cases, I found 
that the translation work was fine in terms of my English proficiency. However, the real 
problem for me lay in the translation of jargon and idioms. Whenever I confronted the 
problem, I marked it first in Chinese. If a quote was selected for use, and I could not find 
the answer from dictionary, I consulted my Chinese colleagues in the SIRC. By doing so, 
the possibility of data bias could be kept to the minimum.   
  
As for the field notes which carried data from field observations and informal talks, I wrote 
them directly in English. Thus, they were ready for immediate data analysis. When the 
transcription was completed together with the field notes, I wrote a preliminary Word 
document of data analysis. I made marginal notes on the data most closely related to my 
research topic and highlighted it. Next, I made a second round of data analysis. All the 
interview data and field notes were coded with the aid of Nvivo 8.0 software, as a result of 
which 1,058 tree nodes and 33 free notes were generated. Categorisation of the codes was 
also made according to their position within set subject areas. Next, the difference between 
the data collected from shore management and ship’s crew was considered. Eventually, a 
tree structure category was produced. In general, this way of organising the data set 
facilitated a better understanding and identification of the main themes that were to this 
research.  
 
3.6 ETHICAL ISSUES 
In the beginning of section 3.4, the ethical issues for this research were briefly mentioned. 
Researchers need to consider the ethical implications of their work and be alert to them 
(Bulmer, 2001). Ethical issues in social research are not always clear-cut, but the key lies in 
the preservation of confidentiality and the privacy of people involved (Homan, 1991). Thus, 
researchers have to take account of principles such as respect for privacy and the likelihood 
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of damaging consequences of the use of their research methods (Oliver, 2003).  
  
Rees (1991) suggests that it is important to consider ethical problems at the early stages of 
the research project. As early as the end of 2008 when I completed the first draft of the 
literature review and methodology chapters, my research plan and ethical considerations 
was approved by the Cardiff university research ethics committee prior to beginning field 
work. Before the commencement of the first interview, I made a clear statement about the 
ethical principles that regulate and guide all the research activities (as described in section 
3.4). Anonymity and confidentiality were guaranteed to the interviewee before I asked for 
their permission for voice recording. Since this study was conducted in organisational 
context, any future publications relating to this study could make the organisations 
vulnerable if their identities were not well preserved. The organisations could also be 
disadvantaged as a result of publicity regarding their work practices. Homan (1991) noted 
that anonymisation is an important principle to maintain when reports are disseminated, 
decreasing the likelihood of being identified. In all, I am fully aware that it is important to 
protect interviewees as well as their organisations from any harm that could result from this 
research. I can ensure that my research meets the ethical guidelines of Cardiff University. 
 
3.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter elaborated the qualitative research methods applied in this study and explained 
why they were adopted in this research context. It detailed some preparatory work prior to 
my field work. A pilot study was conducted in the local setting in Jiangsu Province of 
China prior to my real field work. The experience gained from the pilot study significantly 
contributed to the quality of my field work data. During the period of my pilot study, the 
two companies selected for the study were identified and justified. Meanwhile, the process 
of access negotiation was detailed. The preparatory work also included the acquisition of 
credentials that were essential for the acceptance of my sailing with a chemical ship. 
Among them, the chemical tanker safety knowledge training certificate was highlighted, 
which was granted by my participation in a seven-day programme in a recognised regional 
maritime training centre for seafarers working in specialised ships such as oil and chemical 
tankers. 
  
Following the description of the preparatory work, this chapter detailed the periods of my 
field work in the shore offices of the two companies, as well as on four of their ships. It 
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explained how the research methods were applied and what the outcomes were in the field. 
As a result, a good quantity of data was collected from different sources (mainly qualitative 
interviews and shipboard observations). Lengthy field notes were taken throughout my trips. 
This chapter also described how the data was processed and categorised with the aid of 
computer software for qualitative studies. At the end of this chapter, considerations of 
ethical issues were explained about the whole period of my field work.  
  
As noted in Chapter 1, this study was conducted in two chemical shipping companies in 
China. The following chapter will review relevant literature about the chemical industry 
and introduce basic information about the two companies.  
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CHAPTER 4 INTRODUCTION TO THE CHEMICAL SHIPPING AND 
THE CASES FOR THE STUDY 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces the chemical shipping industry in international and Chinese context 
and will provide details of the situation in the two companies studied. Its purpose is to 
provide essential, contextual information for the study.  
 
4.2 INTRODUCTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHEMICAL SHIPPING 
This section begins with an introduction to chemical ships, the global and Chinese chemical 
fleet as well as the major industrial players that influence the international chemical 
industry. A brief account of the pattern of chemical trading in the world and its impact on 
the development of the chemical industry in China is also presented since recent changes 
have significant implications for the chemical shipping industry in China.  
 
4.2.1 Types of Chemical Tankers 
Ships are regarded as ‘technically sophisticated, high value assets’ (ICS and ISF, 2008). 
Chemical tankers are special, in that the average technical standards and prices per vessel 
are much higher than for others such as general cargo and container ships. Chemical 
tankers are one type of specialised ship used for carrying dangerous cargo. In a broad sense, 
a chemical tanker may be defined as ‘a tanker of greater sophistication than conventional 
petroleum products tankers and able to carry a range of petrochemicals and non-petroleum 
liquid cargoes’ (Drewry Shipping Consultants, 1983, p.1). Given the complex chemical 
trade and diversity of ship sizes and types, a modern chemical tanker should be able to 
carry ‘a wide range of petrochemicals, vegetable, fish and animal oils, carbohydrate 
derivatives such as molasses, inorganic acids and coal tar products’ (ibid, p.1). Particularly, 
cargoes with corrosive, inflammable, reactive, explosive, toxic or volatile natures should be 
able to be carried without posing any danger to the crew, the environment or give rise to 
any cross-contamination during the loading or unloading of cargoes (Arslan and Er, 2008).  
 
Chemical tankers can be divided into three different basic types in relation to their cost and 
complexity – ‘chemical carriers, specialised chemical carriers and product/chemical 
carriers’ (Drewry Shipping Consultants, 1999, p.93). From the regulatory perspective, IMO 
has also classified chemical tankers into three categories: i.e., IMO I, IMO II and IMO III 
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chemical tankers. An IMO I tanker is designed for carrying most dangerous cargoes with 
high level of toxicity, inflammability, corrosiveness and reactivity. Generally, special 
stainless steel material is used for building cargo tanks to prevent chemical reactions 
between cargoes and the tank. Accordingly, the building cost is much higher, almost double 
that of other types of chemical ships with coated cargo tanks. However, not all of the cargo 
tanks in chemical ships use stainless steel material. An IMO II tanker carries less hazardous 
materials and IMO III tankers the least hazardous cargoes. The technical requirements for 
materials used for the cargo tank are accordingly lower in IMO III tankers than for IMO II 
vessels. Alternatively, metallic (such as epoxy resin, zinc silicate and phenolic resin) or 
non-metallic materials (such as natural rubber, polyvinyl chloride, and glass fibre 
reinforced plastic) can be used for coating the surface of soft steel cargo tanks. In principle, 
when considering carriage of a specific cargo, the physical and chemical features of the 
cargo should be incompatible with that of the material used for the tank coating. This is one 
of the key factors that needs to be considered when accepting cargoes for transportation.    
  
The above-mentioned categorisation of chemical ships is not based on sizes, but on type. In 
terms of size chemical tankers can be classified into three categories： 
 Small-sized chemical tanker 
Tonnage: 150~3,000 Dead Weight Tonnage (DWT)  
Sailing Routes: Generally used for inland or coastal waters.   
 Medium-sized chemical tanker 
Tonnage: 3,001~10,000 DWT 
  Sailing Routes: Generally used for sailing from China to Japan, Southeast Asia, or 
Australia.  
 Large-sized chemical tanker 
Tonnage: above 10,001 DWT  
Sailing Routes: These ships can be used for global voyages.  
 
This categorisation is different from those for oil tankers, which are generally larger. The 
tonnage of a chemical tanker is almost ten times smaller than that of oil tankers in terms of 
its absolute tonnage measurement. As described in section 3.4.2, among the four ships I 
sailed, three are medium-sized ships, and one from C2 is a large-sized ship. There are other 
ways of categorising chemical tankers in the literature, however, for the purpose of this 
study, I need not go further. 
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4.2.2 The Development of the Global Chemical Fleet 
There is a broad rule of thumb which suggests that ‘trade expands at roughly 1.5 times the 
growth in the world economy’ (Drewry Shipping Consultants, 1999, p.35). As a part of the 
total international logistics chains, ships carry about 90 percent of the total world trade 
volume (Stopford, 1997). Before and during World War II, most liquid chemicals were 
shipped in barrels, drums or small tanks. Demand for chemicals grew rapidly during the 
1950s and the petrochemical industry began to expand. This dictated a fundamental change 
in transport methods (Drewry Shipping Consultants, 1981). Liquid chemicals were not 
carried in bulk at sea until the mid-1950s. The first ocean-going specialist bulk liquid 
chemical carrier, the ‘Marine Dow-Chem’ (17,205 DWT) was built in 1954 (Drewry 
Shipping Consultants, 1983, p.1). In 1958, there were only 4 owners operating 9 chemical 
tankers totalling 43,000 tons deadweight. By the end of 1982, the fleet of large chemical 
tankers amounted to 275 vessels totalling 7 million DWT (ibid, 1983); by the end of 1998, 
the chemical tanker fleet comprised ‘over 1,497 vessels of 20.847 million DWT’ (Drewry 
Shipping Consultants, 1999, p.5). At that time, the largest independent owners controlled 
around two-thirds of the deep-sea chemical fleet. These included Stolt-Nielsen, 
Odfjell-Seachem, Jo Tankers, and Mitsui OSK Lines (Tokyo Marine) (Drewry Shipping 
Consultants, 1999). In recent years, according to statistics from Drewry Shipping 
Consultants (2006), the total number of chemical carriers was 2,831, totalling 55.61 million 
DWT (Table 3). In terms of the chemical carrier charter market, based on a survey by 
Drewry Shipping Consultants (1999), it was estimated that around 50% of all chemical 
movements are covered by contracts of affreightment, while 35-40% were covered by the 
spot market
v
. The remainder was made up from other charter arrangements and cargoes 
moved in tonnage controlled by exporters or importers. Although these figures represent the 
overall distribution, of course, there are regional variations, as well as variations based on 
different types of chemicals.  
 
The escalation of the growth of chemical tankers reflects the increasing demand for 
chemical transport in the world. According to Dale (2008), the chemical tanker shipping 
sector enjoyed very good years between 2003 and 2007, and the 'China factor' has made a 
significant contribution to this achievement.  
 
                                                        
v
 Spot market means a market in which goods such as grain or crude oil are bought and sold for cash and 
delivered without delay. 
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Table 3: A Survey of the World Chemical Tankers Fleet 
 
Ship’s Type 
1000~ 
5000t 
5000~ 
10,000t 
10,000~ 
20,000t 
20,000~ 
30,000t 
30,000~ 
40,000t 
40,000 above Total 
No. 
Total 
DWT 
No. 
Total 
DWT 
No. 
Total 
DWT 
No. 
Total 
DWT 
No. 
Total 
DWT 
No. 
Total 
DWT 
No. 
Total 
DWT 
IMO 2 222 701 283 2134 299 4540 56 1376 89 3151 61 2762 1010 14664 
IMO 2 CPP
vi
 18 54 8 57 4 56 1 21 7 226 0 0 38 414 
IMO 2/3 66 208 122 936 81 1158 43 1097 49 1760 17 691 378 5850 
IMO 2/3 CPP 6 14 12 76 0 0 0 0 6 228 0 0 24 318 
IMO 3 DH
vii
 51 200 42 290 17 239 3 82 28 973 62 2890 203 4674 
IMO 3 DH CPP 7 26 22 158 19 295 13 367 132 4818 225 10324 418 15988 
IMO 3 Non DH 79 221 89 606 32 504 18 503 4 143 10 449 232 2426 
IMO 3 Non DH CPP 22 56 30 202 14 190 13 367 9 313 14 622 102 1750 
Non IMO 100 265 74 514 49 760 30 861 80 2808 93 4318 426 9526 
Total 571 1745 682 4973 515 7742 177 4674 404 14420 482 22056 2831 55610 
Note: Total DWT is in thousands of DWT 
Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants (2006) Chemical Carriers. 
 
4.2.3 Major Players 
Apart from the global chemical fleet, there are other major players in this industry, which 
significantly influence the development of global chemical shipping. These international 
and industry associations play key roles in formulating international maritime standards and 
industrial guidelines, which are crucial for the healthy and sustainable development of the 
industry.  
  
The IMO is a specialised agency of the UN. Founded in 1948, The IMO’s major task is to 
develop and maintain a comprehensive regulatory framework for shipping which covers 
safety, environmental concerns, legal matters, technical co-operation, maritime security and 
efficiency of shipping (IMO, 2008a). The IMO plays a leading role in contributing to the 
adoption of various international safety standards, typically, the adoption of the ISM Code 
described in section 2.6.1. The ISM Code is essential for officially ensuring the safety of 
life at sea and for preventing marine environment pollution. 
  
To be able to sail legally and globally, a ship needs to register with a particular country. The 
country becomes the Flag State of the ship. A Flag State is responsible for implementation 
of international standards adopted by the IMO and national maritime laws and regulations 
among all of its ships. Thus, the maritime administration of the State needs to make regular 
                                                        
vi
 Clean Petroleum Products 
vii
 Double Hull 
 73 
safety inspections of its ships to verify that ships are in compliance with various standards, 
rules and regulations. It is called Flag State Control (FSC). 
  
In some cases a Flag State might fail to fulfil its commitment to strict implementation, as a 
result of which some ships degrade to substandard ships sailing in an unsafe condition. This 
problem is addressed by the Port State Control (PSC). A PSC is a scheme organised on a 
regional basis for surveillance of ships calling at a country's port. The maritime 
administration of that country is entitled to conduct safety inspections on those ships, since 
an unseaworthy ship sailing through coastal waters of any country can pose dangers to life, 
property and the marine ecological environment. The purpose of PSC is to verify that ships 
meet various international conventions or agreements and that ship conditions are not 
hazardous to crew’s health and safety (see Cariou et al., 2008).  
  
Apart from official organisations, the review of the literature showed that supply chains 
also have significant influences on OHSM. Research from the UK food processing industry 
shows both direct and indirect supply chain pressures can impact on health and safety 
regimes within each factory, and supply chains play contradictory (both positive and 
negative) roles in relation to health and safety (Lloyd and James, 2008, p.726). Supply 
chains are hierarchical with uneven distributions of power within them. On the one hand, 
they provide potential for dominant actors to influence the behaviour of others in the 
business relationships (Walters, Bhattacharya and Xue, 2011, p.68). On the other hand, they 
are powerful and growing influences on the nature of working conditions and the work 
environment (ibid, p.71). The role of the major actors in the supply chains should not be 
neglected. In this study, the supply chains involve the following organisations that are of 
significant influence in terms of the health and safety management of this industry: the 
International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO); the 
International Parcel Tankers Association (IPTA); the Chemical Distribution Institute (CDI); 
and the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF). In this sub-section, the CDI 
and the OCIMF are introduced, since they are the major industrial actors and have direct 
impact on chemical shipping and were often mentioned by the interviewees during my 
fieldwork.  
  
The CDI was founded in 1994 and is an independent, non-profit organisation funded by the 
chemical industry. Its aim is to ensure the development and the preservation of an 
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inspection system for risk assessment concerning transport and storage of chemical cargoes 
(CDI, 2008). The CDI-Marine Scheme was particularly designed to improve the safety and 
quality performance of chemical shipping. The Scheme provides reports on the world 
chemical fleet and more than 600 ship owners and 3,000 chemical tankers participate (ibid, 
2008). If a ship has a CDI-Marine Scheme report, it will be entered into the database of the 
European Quality Shipping Information System (EQUASIS). PSC authorities and shippers 
can also access the database to verify previous inspection records on CDI enrolled ships. 
Although the CDI is not an official organisation, passing its inspections is increasingly 
acknowledged as a mark of a ship’s self-identity symbolising both good OHSM in the 
company as well as onboard their ships. In this sense passing CDI’s inspections has become 
more and more attractive for many shipping companies, particularly for middle- or 
small-sized firms.  
  
The OCIMF also has a significant impact on chemical shipping. Founded in 1970 in 
London, the OCIMF is an oil/chemical industry’s voluntary organisation set up in response 
to public concern over tanker quality and safety standards. As of May 2010, there were 81 
members that covered major international petrochemical corporations. The Ship Inspection 
Report Programme (SIRE) was one of the most significant initiatives introduced to improve 
safe operation. The Programme is featured by the following inspection protocols: 1) Vessel 
Inspection Questionnaire (VIQ); 2) Barges Inspection Questionnaire (BIQ); 3) Uniform 
SIRE Inspection Report; 4) Vessels Particulars Questionnaire (VPQ); 5) Barge Particulars 
Questionnaire (BPQ); 6) SIRE Enhanced Report Manager (WebSERM) (OCIMF, 2010). 
Based on the inspection standards listed above, the system has created a large database in 
which the latest information about oil/chemical tanker inspections is recorded. In 2009, the 
database stored over 22,500 reports on over 8,000 vessels that received inspections. The 
data is of significant value for members of the Forum as well as other interested parties in 
this industry. SIRE information is available to maritime administrations of port/flag states. 
This system is unique in its contribution to providing a high level of transparency in terms 
of the status of ship’s management and maintenance.  
 
As the major actors in the supply chains in the chemical shipping industry, the inspections 
and audits conducted by CDI and OCIMF have significant impacts on the OHSM practices 
of trading companies. For example, if a company fails an oil major inspection, the oil major 
will not allow the ships of the company to transport its cargo. The consequences are that, on 
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the one hand, this could potentially improve the OHSM of the companies and play a 
constructive role in delivering best practices in safety standards to achieve safer shipping. 
On the other hand, it could also lead to a coalition of interest between managers and 
employees to disguise health and safety issues because of the threat of loss of contracts 
from major customers such as the oil majors in this study.  
 
The relevance of these organisations for the ship operators and crews in the present study 
will be discussed in the following data chapters and discussion chapter.  
 
4.2.4 The Pattern of Chemical Trading and Its Impact on China 
It has been well recognised that the structure of trade is influenced by the shift in location 
of the world's production capacity. Over the past several decades in parallel with the 
development of the world economy, there have emerged new trends in trading patterns and 
the global mobility of production (Held et al., 1999). The pattern of exporting /importing 
products from one country to another has been shifting away from raw materials to more 
refined products since the 1960s (O’Brien et al., 2000). In the chemical industry the 
increasing distribution of chemicals to underdeveloped and developing countries partly 
provide an explanation for this new trend of development. In particular new investments in 
chemical manufacturing have been shifting from the west to the east of the world in recent 
years (Yuan and Fei, 2008). According to Yuan and Fei (2008), one such shift was to the 
Middle East region with its easy access to rich and cheap resources; another was to the 
booming Asia market with its tremendous demand and huge growth potential. Particularly 
notable was the shift towards the markets in India and China (ibid). These changes in the 
trading patterns have a significant influence on the relocation and redistribution of chemical 
production. A brief introduction to the development of the Chinese chemical industry will 
help us to understand the situation behind the development of the chemical shipping in 
China.  
 
Since the 1970s when China opened up to the outside world, a fundamental transformation 
occurred, making China one of the world's fastest-growing economies. To a great extent, its 
remarkable growth has relied on chemicals – major upstream products for manufacturing – 
and overseas markets. According to a report made by ExxonMobil (2007), chemical 
demand in China was increasingly robust, and it will account for about 25 percent of the 
global demand for key commodity petrochemicals by 2015.  
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The increasing demand for chemicals has facilitated the production of chemicals in China. 
The large-scale, state-owned enterprises play key roles in the supply of petrochemical 
products. Presently, there are four leading oil and petrochemical giants in China, i.e., China 
National Petroleum Corporation, China Petrochemical Group, China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation, and Sinochem Corporation. As part of China’s obligations to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), the chemical business in China has been deregulated over the past ten 
years. This has also encouraged foreign investor’s participation in Chinese chemical 
manufacturing sector. Apart from the state-owned companies mentioned above, foreign 
investors have participated widely in the petrochemical sector since 2001. The world's 
leading five energy corporations, BASF (Germany based), Dow (US based), ExxonMobil 
(US based), Shell (British-Netherlands based), and BP (UK based) have been more heavily 
involved in the chemical manufacturing industry. Statistics from the Shanghai Shipping 
Exchange (SSE, 2007) showed that the accumulative cargoes produced by recent new 
chemical projects have increased by more than 3 million tons in 2007, among which the 
majority were estimated to be from the newly launched, high-end petrochemical join 
ventures.  
  
Recent investments in chemical production in China were typically clustered in port cities 
where it was convenient for shipping. For example, China Petrochemical Group launched 
new plans to build ethylene plants in Tianjin, Zhenhai, and Guangzhou, and Nanjing 
(SINOPEC, 2008). Other large chemical joint ventures in China such as the BASF-Yangtse 
Ethylene project in Nanjing (2006), ExxonMobil’s investment in Quanzhou (2008) and 
Shell’s joint venture in Huizhou (2008) are all located in port cities. The relocation of 
chemical manufacturing bases also contributed to changes in the trading patterns in the 
region. In the past, about 70-80 percent of chemical products in China were imported from 
foreign countries; in recent years there appears to be more exports to other countries in the 
Asia region (Zhang, 2005).  
  
Chemical transportation by sea is directly related to chemical production worldwide. The 
rapid development of chemical production in eastern countries such as China has provided 
new opportunities for chemical tanker operators. The significant implications for the 
development of the chemical shipping industry in China are introduced in the following 
section. 
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4.2.5 The Chemical Shipping Sector in China 
The development of the chemical tanker fleet in China can be dated back to the early 1980s. 
Shanghai Shipping Agency, a state owned company, bought a 3,860 DWT chemical tanker 
from Japan in 1983, which set a precedent for chemical shipping in China. In the past 
decades, the development of chemical fleet has been growing slowly, partly because of the 
technological sophistication, high cost of these ships and fierce market competition which 
refrained Chinese ship owners from fast expansion of their chemical fleets. However, this 
situation had not been changed until chemical production in China started booming at the 
turn of the 21st century. The shift of petrochemical manufacturing bases to China has 
created tremendous demand for shipping since 2000 (Hu, 2008).  
  
Given the strong demand for chemical shipping, the growth of the chemical fleet in China 
was not significant. Although statistics showed that Chinese-controlled fleet has been 
expanded dramatically over the past decade (UNCTAD, 2007), the scale of the chemical 
fleet has been increasing slowly. The scale of the Chinese chemical tankers fleet is small in 
comparison with giant chemical tankers companies in Western Europe and America. The 
total number of chemical tankers is ‘173, amounting to 336,000 DWT’ and the average 
ship’s age is 12.7 years (CMSA, 2007, p.22). Besides, there were 79 newly-built chemical 
ships (330,000 DWT in total) to be launched by Chinese ship owners in the following year 
(ibid). These new ships are much bigger than the existing fleet in terms of its average DWT, 
probably owing to the market demand and ship owners’ considerations of economy of 
scale. 
  
Under the context of the growing demand for chemical shipping, in recent years the 
Chinese government launched a strategic plan with an aim that domestic cargoes be carried 
by China’s own national fleet. Meanwhile, some preferential policies were launched in 
order to facilitate the development of Chinese chemical fleet. One of the typical examples 
was that the Chinese government has removed the regulatory barrier to foreign investors, 
allowing them to co-establish joint ventures with Chinese chemical tanker companies. The 
only restriction is that the share invested by foreign parties should not exceed 50 percent of 
the overall investment (Zhang, 2005). Following this policy, there emerged new joint 
ventures in chemical shipping industries. Although there were some negative impacts on 
chemical shipping following the financial crisis in 2008, it seems that the continuous 
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increase of chemical production capacity will mean the continued expansion of the 
chemical tanker fleet in China in the long run.  
  
4.3 INTRODUCTION TO THE CASES 
In section 3.3.2, the choice of the two company cases was justified. This section introduces 
the two cases in order to better understand the parties involved in communication between 
shore departments and their ships. It is limited to a brief explanation of the company's basic 
information, its safety policy and objectives and its structure and functions relevant to the 
research topic.  
 
4.3.1 Company 1 
Company 1 (C1) is affiliated to its Group Company. The Group Company is a listed 
company dedicated to oil and chemical transportation. In the Group Company, the there are 
three separate fleets: the fleet carrying ocean-going crude oil; fleet carrying international 
clean oil products; and the fleet carrying chemicals, liquefied gas, and asphalt. By the end 
of 2010, the Group Company owned about 50 vessels of various types with a total capacity 
of about 2 million DWT and annual carriage volume of more than 30 million tons.  
  
C1 was established in 1994 by its Group Company and a domestic petrochemical company 
located in the same region. Since 1997, when the Group Company was listed, the chemical 
fleet has been expanded significantly. It became the largest chemical tanker company in 
China in early 2000s. After that, C1 experienced several years of stagnation in its 
development owing to unexpected loss in its business. In 2006, C1 became a subsidiary 
fully controlled by the Group Company.  
  
The company has kept adjusting its fleet since its foundation. New ships were introduced 
while old ships were sold off. By the end of 2010, the company owned about 15 chemical 
tankers. There are two large size sister ships with a tonnage of more than 12,000 DWT and 
the rest are all medium size ships, with the smallest one about 3,000 DWT. The majority of 
its fleet is IMO type II tankers with cargo tank coating materials of epoxy resin, phenolic 
resin, or polyurethane so that ships meet the requirement for carrying different types of 
chemicals. The cargoes carried cover a wide range of categories, for example, those derived 
from aromatics, esters, acids and aldehydes. A few IMO I tankers with pure stainless steel 
cargo holds have been bought in recent years. These ships are able to carry extremely toxic 
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cargoes with highly demanding storage conditions such phenol, which I saw on S1 before 
my sailing began. Presently, the majority of the ships were built after 2000. The fleet was 
mainly registered with Chinese nationality, although a few were registered in Hong Kong. 
The major trading areas are in west Asia Pacific region. The two ships I sailed were 
registered in China and they mainly sailed in East and South East Asia. 
  
The Policy and Objectives of OHSM 
C1 set up an OHSMS when the company was founded. The system was independent from 
that of its Group Company. The system has been revised several times even since and the 
present version has been in operation since the end of 2008. The system was named as 
'Quality, Safety and Environment Management System' (QSEMS) in accordance with the 
ISM Code, NSM Code, ISO 9001:2000 and ISO14001:2004. In addition, the System 
considered the standards from OHSAS18001, TMSA (Tanker Management and Self 
Assessment Guide) and VIQ. The QSEMS is regarded as a statutory document in which the 
company’s OHSM policy, corresponding objectives and management commitment are 
clearly stated. The safety policy statement of the company is ‘Human Oriented, Quality 
Service, Environment Protection and Safety Ensurence’. In order to quantify and measure 
the achievements of the safety policy, the company accordingly laid down detailed 
objectives. They had a wide coverage which included its service quality, safety and 
environment protection, customers demand, scientific management and continuous 
improvement etc. All the objectives shall comply with the standards of international 
conventions, national legislations, and industrial guidelines. In line with each of these 
objectives, there is an affirmative statement or numerical value attached for the purpose of 
measurement and assessment. Key items are summarised in Table 4.  
 
Table 4: The Objectives of OHSM (C1) 
 
Management Objective 1) to provide safety practices and safe working environment for 
ship operation;  
2) to take preventive measures to deal with identified risks; and 
3) to continuously improve ship shore personnel’s safety 
management skills and safety and environment protection 
emergency reaction capability. 
Safety Objective No significant accidents, aiming at zero accidents and zero 
 80 
pollution.  
Environment Protection 
Objective 
All discharged liquids should meet the standard set in the 
MARPOLviii. 
Inspection Outcome 
Objective 
Rate of ship detention by PSC: zero; rate of passing oil majors 
inspection: 90%.  
Health Objective Rate of casualty is zero; work-related injury is no more than 
one.   
Customer Satisfaction 
Objective 
Less than two claims or complaints. 
The Ultimate Objective To achieve zero accidents, zero pollution through thorough 
implementation of the QSEMS; and 
To ensure safety at sea, prevent casualties, and avoid ocean 
environmental pollution and loss of property. 
 
According to the vice general manager in charge of safety, all the ships in C1 passed the 
inspection from at least one of the oil majors and international industrial organisations such 
as BP, Shell, and CDI. The company claims to have a sound organisational structure, and a 
group of experienced senior managers and professionals. The company has kept good 
records on safety, environment protection, and service quality. The company has never had 
some major ship damage or marine engine damage accidents, ocean pollution accidents and 
personnel casualties. Although the management did not provide me with the formal records 
in relation to the reported incidents, injuries compensation payments etc., an overall 
impression of my field work in the Company showed its strong commitment towards 
effective operation and continuous improvement of their QSEMS so as to achieve the 
quality, safety and environment protection objectives stated above.  
 
The Structure and Functions 
To better understand the structure of the company, its organisational chart is given below 
(Figure 2). To be noted, in consideration of its relevance, the financial department was 
omitted on the chart. Also, the business (cargo canvassing) department was not shown on 
the chart, since all the cargo canvassing work was done by its Group Company. The major 
responsibilities at each level are summarised hereafter.  
 
                                                        
viii
 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships 
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Figure 2: The Organisational Chart (C1) 
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The general manager presides over all work in the company. He is fully responsible for 
setting up the organisational structure and the function assignment for each of the sections 
(units). He takes the leading role in establishing, approving, implementing, and reviewing 
the QSEMS. He is the key person for providing efficient resources for the operation of the 
system, as well as for providing qualified personnel, a good work environment and needed 
training.  
 
Vice General Manager (Safety) 
The vice general manager (safety) is in charge of marine affairs, as well as safety 
management in the company. In this company, he is also the safety supervisor in-chief, 
equivalent to the designated person stipulated in the ISM Code and is the manager’s 
representative in the ISO9001:2000 and ISO14001:2004. He is responsible for monitoring 
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channels are open and clear; for providing ships with sufficient resources as well as shore 
support; and for making sure of the effectiveness of quality, safety and environment related 
management activities. He is the immediate leader of the safety and quality department and 
the marine affairs department.  
  
Vice General Manager (Marine Technical Affairs) 
The vice general manager is in charge of marine technical affairs for the company (ships). 
His responsibilities mainly include the organisation of ship’s maintenance and repair and 
the control of its quality. He is also responsible for monitoring whether the shore-based 
support to ships is in place. He is the immediate leader of the marine engineering 
department.   
 
Safety Supervisor in-Chief 
The safety supervisor in-chief is responsible for safety management of ships as well as 
shore officers. As mentioned, the vice general manager in charge of safety also plays this 
role in OHSM. He is responsible for establishing communication channels between 
company’s senior management and the ships; for organising ship visits and safety 
inspections; for ensuring resources and personnel in place in safety and anti-pollution 
activities; for responding and verifying major non-compliance events, for internal and 
external audits; for organising investigations into accidents and near miss cases; and for 
verifying the effectiveness of corrective and improvement measures. 
  
Safety and Quality Department 
The department takes the major role in drafting and revising the QSEMS; for designing the 
ship-shore QSEMS monitoring inspection syllabus and checklist; for organising company’s 
ship-shore internal and external audit; for safety information collection and dissemination 
to ships; for locating crew responsibilities for non-compliance, accidents, and near miss 
cases; for organising cause analysis and verifying effectiveness of follow-up measures; and 
for investigating and analysing customer claims and levels of satisfaction.  
  
Marine Affairs Department 
The marine affairs department is responsible for the safety on deck department onboard 
ships. The department is responsible for organising guide captains to inspect, supervise and 
instruct crew’s shipboard safe operation, as well as cargo safety operations (including 
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awareness of cargo features, cargo tank washing quality, risk assessment, and the use of 
safe working protective devices etc.); for providing support to safety related problems 
onboard ships; for contacting and coordinating oil majors inspections; for participating in 
incident investigations; and for evaluating captains’ and officer’s work and making 
suggestions about crew arrangements.  
  
Marine Engineering Department 
The marine engineering department is responsible for organising chief engineers to conduct 
safety inspections and supervision onboard; for auditing ship’s maintenance plans and 
arranging ship repairs; for monitoring the supply of ship’s spare parts onboard and giving 
sufficient resource support; for giving guidance to ships for receiving external inspections 
from port states or oil majors; for participating in the investigation into marine 
engine/electrical apparatus damages, pollution incidents/accidents, near misses, and giving 
remedial measures; for analysing ship’s fuel consumption data and proposing fuel 
consumption saving rewards to crew; for appraising engineers' performance and giving 
suggestions about engineer officers' arrangement on a ship.  
  
Crew Department 
The crew department is responsible for making out annual crew demand/supply reports, 
and drafting crew service contracts; for drafting plans for crew leasing, dispatchment, 
promotion, training (including on-the-job training), as well as their performance 
evaluations; for implementing crew salary distribution policies and auditing crew’s 
boarding wages; for workplace safety management, onboard medicine arrangements and 
supply, crew alcohol and drug tests, and crew shore leave.  
  
Service Department 
The service department is responsible for the company’s daily administrative, logistic and 
safeguarding issues. Typically, the department is responsible for dealing with the so-called 
‘red-headed document’ (the administrative order). To some extent, the role of this 
department is like the secretariat of the company. The department is also responsible for 
doing work-related statistics; for drafting the company annual work plan; for procurement 
of ship’s supplies and spare parts; and for performance appraisals of shore-based staff and 
salary issues.  
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Crew 
The seafarer’s branch company of the Group Company was in charge of selection, 
recruitment and management of all the seafarers for manning the whole fleet. According to 
the crew manager, C1 did not directly recruit seafarers from the seafarer’s labour market. 
The seafarer’s branch company was responsible for the supply of a fixed amount of 
seafarers to C1 as a package deal. Therefore, C1 did not need to sign any contracts with the 
crew. The supply of the crew depended on annual estimation of the demand for its fleet. 
Currently the number was about 300. C1 had independent power over routine crew 
management. Based on the company’s crew management rules, the average working period 
onboard was between 6 and 9 months. In C1, the crew team was comparatively stable. The 
company tries to fix individual crew members on a particular ship, if that individual’s work 
performance was positively appraised by the company. Some of the crew did not change 
ship and have been working together for several years.  
  
In terms of their responsibilities in OHSM, each of the crew has corresponding 
responsibility to comply with operational instructions and procedures as stated in the 
OHSMS. In general, crew are obliged to report to shore management whatever occurs 
onboard ship that has implications for OHSM. In particular, the crew should collect and 
report safety related problems to shore management according to reporting procedures. In 
addition, for the purpose of continuous improvement of the safety management, crew 
should be consulted to get their participation into the process of OHSM.  
  
4.3.2 Company 2 
Company 2 (C2) is one of the subsidiaries of its Mother Company. Apart from C2, the 
Mother Company also owns one ship-building company and one ship-repairing company 
located in the same region. The Mother Company was co-founded by a few strategic 
investors. C2 was established in 2004 when its first ship was launched. Most of the ships in 
the company were built by the shipbuilding subsidiary of the Mother Company. The 
average age of the fleet in C2 was rather new. The smallest ship is about 2,000 DWT, while 
the biggest one is about 15,000 DWT. At the end of 2010, there were about 15 chemical 
tankers in operation totalling over 74 thousand tons (DWT). The middle-sized ships were 
placed in western Asia Pacific region, while a few large-sized ships were operated globally. 
All the ships belong to IMO type II chemical tankers. There were several tankers with 
stainless tank holds, while the rest were coated with either zinc silicate or epoxy resin. 
 85 
There are several ships registered with foreign nationalities and the rest are all registered 
under Chinese nationality.  
  
The company has stable cooperation with some of the major international well-known 
petrochemical companies. A majority of its ships passed external inspections from oil 
majors such as BASF, Shell, BP, Exxon-Mobil, Lucite and Dow Chemical. A few of their 
ships have passed the CDI inspections at higher scores. The Company is said to have a 
leading position in this specialised industry in China. Although the company experienced a 
short downturn period in the chemical shipping market in 2008, it has been out of the 
shadow of the financial crisis since 2009.   
  
The Policy and Objectives of OHSM 
The company had an OHSM system in place since its establishment. The company has 
passed the ISM as well as NSM verification since its foundation. The management system 
was named as Quality and Safety Management System (QSMS). It was asserted that C2 
dealt with OHSM on its fleet seriously with an aim to provide the best services to its 
customers. Its OHSM policy statement is: ‘Safety, Health, Environment Protection and 
Servicing’. In order to better and thoroughly implement this policy, the qualifications of the 
shore personnel at managerial positions were particularly considered. The majority of the 
managers and superintendents in the company are experienced captains or engineers, or had 
experience working on the ships of the company. Guided by this policy, the company 
promised to provide ships with safe practices and a safe working environment. On the basis 
of its normalised, programmed, documented and professionalised management, the 
company pledged to ensure personal OHS, safety of ships and properties, and to comply 
with statutory requirements, customers' demands and industrial standards (such as oil 
majors and CDI). The company agreed to motivate its staff, to promote sea-shore personnel 
safety management skills, including their contingency reactions for ship’s safety and 
environment protection. Similar to C1, this company broke down its general policy 
statement into quantified annual objectives. The objectives are extensions to the original 
statement. These objectives are illustrated in Table 5.  
 
Table 5: The Objectives of OHSM (C2) 
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Health Index The personal casualty rate: LTIF
ix
<=2.0; TRCF
x
<=4.0; 
Safety and Environment 
Protection Index 
Average Loss: no occurrence of average level accidents; 
minor incidents <= 2/Annum 
Machine Damage: no occurrence of average level accidents, 
minor incidents <= 2/Annum 
 
Environment Protection 
Index 
All the discharge operations should comply with the 
MARPOL and IBC Code
xi
, No occurrence of average level 
pollution accidents, minor incidents<= 2/Annum 
Cargo Damage Index Cargo damage/short landing incident rate <= 2 (times/total 
voyages) 
Safety Inspection Index PSC/FSC inspection detention rate: zero; industrial inspection 
pass rate: ≥90% 
Customer Satisfaction 
level 
≥90% 
 
As explained by a senior manager in the company, safe shipping and customers' demands 
were the two pillars that underpinned the company’s subsistence and development. On the 
one hand, the company would try its best to support ships with good working conditions 
and environment, so that ships could operate at reasonable speeds and fuel consumption 
levels. On the other hand, the company would ensure punctuality, accuracy, and quality of 
cargo delivery service to meet the needs of its customers. The company would implement 
the QSMS policy and objectives through work process monitoring, internal audits and 
management reviews. The company aimed to be one of the most excellent, professional, 
chemical shipping service providers in order to forge a state-of-the-art brand in the Chinese 
chemical shipping industry.  
  
The Structure and Functions 
The organisational chart in C2 is shown below (See Figure 3). The key functions of this 
organisational structure is summarised in the following paragraphs. In consideration of its 
lack of relevance, the financial department is omitted. 
                                                        
ix
 Lost Time Injury Frequency 
x
 Total Recordable Case Frequency 
xi International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships carrying Dangerous Chemicals in 
Bulk 
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Figure 3: The Organisational Chart (C2) 
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The general manager has the decisive power to determine the organisational structure, 
position set-up, staff salary grades and annual rewards. He is the key to establish, 
implement and maintain the OHSMS. He is responsible for providing sufficient resources 
and shore-based support to the various departments and ships to guarantee the safety of life, 
property and marine environment and also audits and approves each ship’s charter party 
and crew leasing contracts. He is obliged to require relevant departments and ships to 
investigate and analyse non-compliance items, incidents/accidents and near misses. In case 
of emergencies, he becomes the general commander of the emergency group.  
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The vice general manager also takes the role of a designated person as stipulated in the ISM. 
He is directly responsible to establish, monitor, audit, appraise, review and improve the 
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and carry out ship visits when necessary. He is the decisive person for the establishment of 
a crew team which services the company’s fleet. He implements the company’s crew 
reward and punishment schemes. He is fully responsible for marine affairs safety 
management and ensures measures for passing PSC/FSC and industrial inspections, such as 
the oil majors inspections and certifications of compliance. He is the immediate leader of 
the safety and quality department and the crew department.   
  
Safety and Quality Department 
The safety and quality department is responsible for organising and implementing annual 
internal audit plans and receiving external audits; for coordinating with the marine 
engineering department to supervise ship maintenance work and conduct safety inspections 
onboard ships; for tracing ship sailing routes and position, and auditing ships reports and 
giving feedback; for collecting and disseminating safety information to ships; for providing 
ships with technical assistance and necessary resources on marine affairs. The department 
is obliged to ensure that ships can pass PSC/FSC safety inspections and various industrial 
inspections. The department is required to participate in the investigation of 
non-compliance, accidents and near misses cases. Also, the department is required to 
participate in the process of crew selection and their performance appraisals.  
  
Crew Department 
The crew department is responsible for exploring the crew market and for maintaining good 
relations with crew agencies; for crew interviewing, recruitment, training and their 
performance appraisals. The department is required to recruit competent crew and arrange 
necessary training to ensure they can adapt to the company’s management system. The 
department is also responsible for implementing the scheme for rewarding good performers 
and punishing bad ones; for crew work attendance statistics, salary, bonus and medicine 
supply. The department has the right to dismiss contracts with crew when evidence of 
incompetency (or fault) is confirmed.  
  
Marine Engineering Department 
The marine engineering department is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the 
management system in the engine room department of a ship; for ship visits in 
collaboration with the safety and quality department; for assessing ship’s reports and giving 
feedback about them; for providing sufficient resources and shore based support to ships; 
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for the arrangement of ship repair and fleet maintenance work; for purchasing and 
supplying consumables to ships; for ensuring ships pass PSC/FSC and industrial 
organisation’s inspections; and for taking necessary measures to control environment 
pollution and the risk of marine engine accidents. The department is required to participate 
in the process of ship engineers’ selection and giving them proper training and performance 
appraisals.  
  
Business Department 
The business department is obliged to carry out surveys on the international and national 
chemical trade market and is also responsible for the development and maintenance of 
clients. The department gives guidance for ship cargo handling, tank washing and 
procedure monitoring; for business negotiations with the charterer, contract review and 
implementation; for risk control in the business management in cases of short landing, 
freight rate disputes, demurrage and bill of lading issues; for giving responses to cargo 
owner’s consultations and complaints to provide satisfactory services to customers; and for 
selecting competent agencies and other related service-providing contractors in foreign or 
domestic ports.  
  
Crew 
In C2, the crew department is in charge of crew recruitment from the domestic seafaring 
labour market as well as their routine management. According to interview data with the 
crew manager, there are from 250 to 300 crew registered and working for the company, 
among whom about 15 percent of them are directly employed by the company. This portion 
of the crew have longer contract terms (usually 3 or 5 years) with the company. Some of 
them can even buy internal shares and receive annual dividends from the company. For the 
recruitment of the crew with short-term contracts, on the one hand, the company outsources 
a package deal to manning agencies; on the other hand, the company also directly recruits 
individual free lance seafarers from the labour market. Some of them are introduced by 
those who have worked in the company before; some by crews own voluntary contacts, and 
some by internet advertising. For the short-term contract crew, they work on a one-off 
contract. The contract term is usually 6±2 months for officers/engineers, 10±2 months for 
ratings.  
  
In terms of crew’s responsibilities in relation to OHSM, it is found that there is no 
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significant difference from those stated in the end of section 4.3.1. Thus, they will not be 
repeated here.   
 
4.3.3 A General Assessment 
This brief introduction to the two companies shows that they share many similarities. Both 
companies established OHSMSs in response to the requirements of the ISM Code. They 
shared some common features in terms of their policy and objectives of OHSM. Both 
companies had a clear, concise and indubitable safety policy, which was further quantified 
by a list of indices or concrete criteria. While their policies and objectives were 
unquestionable, a careful examination showed that the OHSM objectives entail a strong 
incident/safety focus rather than a health exposure emphasis. Given the nature of the 
industry being studied there are potentially considerable health risks for the crew in a 
pervasive, chemical environment. In this regard, the over-emphasis on safety rather than 
employees’ occupational health was similarly acknowledged in the OHSM literature, this 
being symptomatic of many OHSMSs (Hale et al., 1998; Gunningham and Johnstone, 1999; 
Bornstein and Hart, 2010). The consequence is that the observance of operational 
procedures outweighs the care for occupational health, and may undermine the real value of 
OHSM (Haines, 1997).  
 
Both companies have established steady relationships with several multinational chemical 
producers such as BP, Shell and BASF as described in section 4.2.4. Their business and the 
number and size of ships are also comparable. In both companies the shore managers and 
superintendents were mainly ex-captains or ex-chief engineers. They were chosen to work 
in shore offices, since they were exceptional and experienced in their professional areas. 
  
Given that many similarities can be found in both companies, there are some noticeable 
differences. The history of C1 was longer than C2. C1 was supported by a state-owned 
Group, and C2 was formed by several strategic investors. But, these differences had little 
effect in terms of the focus of this research. Although the organisational charts are 
structured slightly differently, a detailed examination shows that they share many common 
features. In terms of crew’s employment, the crew in C1 were mainly supplied from the 
seafarers’ branch company of its Group Company, while the crew in C2 were mainly 
employed from the Chinese seafarers’ labour market, such as those from crewing agencies. 
This difference will be considered in the data chapters.  
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In general, the introduction and comparison of the two companies help us understand the 
typical organisation structures present in the chemical shipping industry. The chapter gives 
a sketch of the major departments of shore management that communicate with a ship’s 
departments and crew. Designated person(s) acting as a communication link between senior 
management and ship’s crew, as specified by the ISM Code, were identified. This 
introduction to their responsibilities help us locate where major issues of communication 
between shore management and ship’s crew might arise, the main focus of this study.  
  
4.4 SUMMARY  
This chapter first reviewed the literature about the chemical shipping industry. The review 
included the types of chemical tankers, the development of the chemical fleet in global as 
well as domestic Chinese markets. To better understand chemical shipping, the major 
industrial players and the pattern shift of chemical trading were also noted. Following the 
review of the chemical shipping literature, this chapter also introduced the basic facts of the 
two companies selected for my study. The introduction included both companies' basic 
information, policy and objectives of OHSM, and their structure and functions. Since the 
main focus of this study is shore-ship communication, the introduction to the 
responsibilities of both shore departments and officials and crew give an understanding of 
the roles managers and crew are responsible for in their communications relating to OHSM. 
Following the introduction of the two cases, a general assessment on the differences and 
similarities of both companies was given. They are useful for explaining the different 
perceptions of the crew in the two companies in terms of their communication of OHSM 
matters. On the whole, the introduction of this chapter helps readers understand the 
industrial and corporate background of this study.  
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CHAPTER 5 (SHORE-TO-SHIP) COMMUNICATION FOR WORK 
SUPPORT 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research aims to explore the role of shore-ship communication in influencing shipboard 
OHSM in the two chemical shipping companies. In section 2.5, the main purposes of 
management-employee communication in relation to OHSM are clearly stated. For the 
management, the main purpose of communication with employees is for the provision of 
organisational support to employees as well as management control over workplace OHSM. 
For employees, the main purpose of communication with the management was safety 
reporting as well as employee consultation. The following four data chapters will present the 
preliminary findings of the study on shore-ship communication for those purposes in the 
Chinese chemical shipping industry.  
 
First, in order to achieve the objectives of organisational OHSM, one of the major 
responsibilities for the shore management is to communicate crew in order to provide 
adequate work support to a ship’s crew. The extent to which such support has been given can 
be perceived by the communication between the shore management and the ship’s crew (see 
sections 2.5 and 4.3). This chapter first examines the shore management’s perception of its 
support for the crews of its ships. Then, the crew’s perceptions of the same support are 
presented, thus allowing for a discussion of the overall impact of the management’s support 
on the crew and their shipboard OHSM practice.  
 
5.2 THE MANAGEMENT  
Communication for the purpose of providing work support is indispensable between the 
shore management and the ship’s crew and helpful for shaping a safer working place on 
board a ship where the continual occurrence of a variety of maritime risks is considered 
normal (Anderson, 2003). From the perspective of the shore management in both companies, 
the communication for such a support played a key role in ensuring a ship’s normal operation 
and in maintaining good OHSM practice. In this regard, management providing crews with 
support and its responsibilities in solving shipboard problems are presented in this section. 
Following this, different types of support are identified and briefly outlined.   
 
5.2.1 Operational Support 
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As discussed in the literature chapter (section 2.5.2), organisational support plays a key role 
in safeguarding OHSM in routine workplace activities. The communication for such a 
purpose is closely related to employees’ safety performance. In general, much of the 
literature suggested a potential positive impact of organisational support on the workplace’s 
OHSM.  
 
In a ship’s routine operational management, managers and superintendents from marine 
affairs, marine engineering and the quality and safety departments of the companies were the 
persons who communicated most often with crews. Their activities in this respect are 
highlighted in the data, particularly that of the superintendents as the immediate persons to 
contact crews. The superintendents in both companies were called by a dedicated name. In 
C1, a marine affairs superintendent was called ‘Guide Captain’ and a marine engineering 
superintendent was called ‘Guide Chief Engineer’, so they were called by the generic term 
‘the Guide’. In C2, they were called ‘General Captain’ and ‘General Chief Engineer’ 
respectively. The interviews with the shore management showed that they were ready to 
assist crews whatever and whenever support was needed:  
If we could not give them (crews) support and ships did not need [it], then the 
Guides (captains/chief engineers) would lose the significance of existence. (Marine 
Affairs Superintendent, C1)  
 
As mentioned in section 4.3, most of the superintendents in both companies had had several 
years of sea experience before they took office jobs. Usually, they were ex-mariners, such as 
captains or chief engineers. They were selected as members of the management according to 
their recognised competence. In this sense, they were qualified to provide support to a ship’s 
crew. For example, a superintendent commented: 
Relatively speaking, the Guides’ competences are high in the company. They could 
assist crews to identify and solve safety problems on board. It’s good for promoting 
safe production. (Marine Engineering Superintendent, C1) 
 
This support had significant implications for a ship’s safe operation. The concern for safety 
in the chemical shipping industry made special sense given the dangerous nature of the 
chemical cargoes. In both companies, there were dedicated persons responsible for guiding 
crews regarding the management operation of chemical cargoes. A manager talked about this 
special role in the following way:  
The person taking this role is very professional. He has worked on chemical tankers 
for more than ten years. His role is also valued by the company. It is the highlight in 
the highlighted areas. We fully support his work. (Marine Engineering Manager, 
C2)  
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In addition, as described in section 4.2.3, chemical tankers receive regular external 
inspection from oil majors such as BASF, BP, Lucide and Shell. These inspection standards 
are very high. If a ship cannot pass their inspection, they would not let the ship carry their 
cargoes. Thus, passing such an inspection was crucial for companies’ ‘business’ as well as 
for their ‘reputation’, a fact which was repeatedly mentioned by many interviewees. When a 
formal inspection was scheduled, the management in both companies would usually visit the 
ship to be inspected. For instance, a marine affairs superintendent said: 
It is to give guidance. Each year, there would be several oil majors’ inspections. 
Before an inspection, we would visit the ship. Something new would have emerged 
each year…new norms or regulations…We would tell crew the latest requirements 
from the oil majors, and tell them what to do in order to meet the requirements. 
(Marine Affairs Superintendent, C1)  
 
Apart from the ship visit, a manager or superintendent might sail with a ship for a voyage. In 
general, the data suggested that the role of shore support was very important for a ship’s safe 
operation and the oil majors’ inspection. In the literature, some different kinds of support in 
organisational context were discussed by Osca et al. (2005), among which the role of 
supervisory support was highlighted. This study showed a similar situation. The supervisory 
support was an easy and inexpensive way of improving an employee’s work environment 
(ibid, p.292). From the management perspective in both companies, the study showed 
definite positive organisational commitment to OHSM on board their ships and they thought 
their support was indispensable.  
 
5.2.2 Problem Solving 
More specifically, it was found that the communication for shore support was centred on 
solving problems for ships’ crews. It is understandable that problems can occur frequently in 
an organisation and they can emerge repeatedly in routine operational activities in the 
process of organisational production. The shipping industry is no exception in this regard, as 
ships operate in a harsh and perilous working and natural environment (Bloor et al., 2000). 
Although front line employees were in the best position to identify workplace problems, 
apparently, there would be some safety-related problems that crew could not deal with 
properly alone. The identified problems usually needed to be solved with the management’s 
support. In such circumstances, the role of the management in problem solving was 
prominent. As Eraut et al. (1998) argue, the development of skills for problem solving was 
based on a full understanding of the production process within an organisation. Therefore, 
managers or superintendents in both companies should have been in a position where they 
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had a better understanding of their organisations, than available to the crews of their ships. 
Their asserted competence and their control of various resources were essential for dealing 
with workplace problems. The problem solving could give a crew ‘a sense of safety’ or 
‘logistic guarantee’, as expressed by some shore interviewees. A manager detailed its role:    
The communication could solve a crew’s work-related difficulties… difficulties 
with the implementation of new requirements from oil majors, the scarcity of 
equipment, spare parts and supplies... The communication for giving a ship support 
is significant. (Safety and Quality Manager, C2)  
 
Furthermore, the impact of problem solving could go beyond a problem itself. In a wider 
sense, it could affect the interest of all parties involved. A superintendent explained:  
It (communication) helps to solve a problem. If a problem is solved properly and 
smoothly, the ship’s schedule can be guaranteed. It is good for personal safety, the 
ship’s safety, the company and also cargo owners. If a ship’s (sailing) schedule were 
delayed because of equipment (failure) or crew capability, cargo owners would have 
a bad impression of our company. They would doubt our company’s good credit. 
(Quality and Safety Superintendent, C1)  
 
In general, a strong management commitment towards problem solving could be perceived 
from the data. This could be illustrated by a senior manager’s account: 
Whether the support to ships was in place … whether the crew’s demand for 
information, spare parts or materials was supplied in time … we would solve them 
(problems) as quickly as time allowed. (Vice General Manager, C1)  
 
During my sailing trip on S1 C1, I witnessed a major equipment failure. The cargo pump in 
starboard cargo tank suddenly broke when discharging phenol in a domestic port in China. 
When it was reported to the company, several managers and superintendents visited the ship 
that same evening:  
The pump engine in Cargo tank No 5 could not be started. The emergency plan was 
worked out after their visit. About 9pm in the evening all of the visitors came to the 
main deck. The senior officers/engineers were all on the scene. All the crew wore 
yellow overalls, while the superintendents wore white overalls. One of the 
superintendents played the role of a commander. An external cargo pipe was 
equipped with an external emergence pump. It was used to connect the tank on 
starboard side and the one on port side. By doing so the cargo in the starboard tank 
could be pumped into the port tank and then discharged through the manifold. The 
bosun and duty ratings were the main operators. The captain stood aside and the 
chief officer joined the team to fix the pipe in place with us. I also joined the team 
for several hours. The workload was significant, and it took several hours to 
complete the work. (Field Notes, S1 C1, 4 February 2010) 
 
Eventually, the problem was fixed temporarily and the delay to the ship’s schedule was 
reduced to a minimum. A marine affairs superintendent (C1) described this as a typical 
example of ‘communication for decision making and problem solving’.  
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Apart from the observed management’s commitment towards problem solving, a few 
managers also showed an open and tolerant attitude towards problems that emerged on board 
ships. For example, a manager said:   
If they (the crew) were to raise some problems, we would give them a response. 
Even if their queries were unfounded or they made unreasonable demands, we 
would also give them an explanation. In this way, we try to keep the ships in good 
technical condition. (Safety and Quality Manager, C2)  
 
From the data, it could be seen that communication for problem solving played a significant 
role in shipboard safety management in order to ensure a crew’s safe working practice on 
board.  
 
5.2.3 Types of Support 
In general, the coverage of an organisation’s support was wide. In this study, evidence from 
the interviews highlighted three areas of support in shore-to-ship communication, namely, 
technical support, safety information support and material resource support, which all had 
implications for OHSM. They will be briefly introduced in the following paragraphs.  
 
The technical support aimed to deal with ship’s technical problems. These could be technical 
barriers in relation to main/auxiliary engines, deck machinery, cargo handling or tank 
washing; problems with the implementation of new industrial standards or regulations issued 
by industrial bodies, such as maritime authorities or oil majors; or some doubts about the 
operationalisation of the safety management system or sheltering in adverse weathers such as 
a typhoon. Basically, the management’s knowledge and experience played a significant role 
in promoting ship’s safety management. As mentioned by some interviewees from both 
shore and ships, their competences were relatively higher and many problems onboard were 
more likely to be identified by them.  
 
The safety information support was the provision of safety information to the crew which 
was critical to shipboard OHSM. In both companies, there were dedicated persons in charge 
of collecting and distributing safety information to ships. The safety-related information was 
collected mainly via external and internal sources. The external information was issued 
mostly by external bodies, such as the maritime administrations, PSC or oil majors. For 
example, during the period of my field work, there was a dedicated focus on life boat safety 
for PSC inspection. Some related documents were sent onboard. The internal information 
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was collected from the company’s fleet. Where there was a ship visit, some hard copies were 
provided for distribution among the crew. As soon as a ship received them, they would be 
dispatched to the crew members concerned. If addressed to all of the crew, they would be 
posted in the ship’s public areas, such as the canteen, lounge or even the smoking room. The 
purpose was to keep everyone informed about the visit. Also, during the monthly safety 
production meetings, some of the information would be learnt collectively. 
 
The material resource support was the provision of the necessary materials for ships’ normal 
operations and for crews’ OHS protection. They included, but were not limited to, some basic 
operational tools, crew members’ labour protection articles, regular consumables and 
important spare parts. On some occasions where technical assistance failed, support would 
involve the renewal or replacement of ‘hardware’ parts. Also, daily consumables needed to 
be duly supplied on board ships. A typical example was the consumption of fuel oil or 
lubricant oil which was also a major concern of the shore management. It was evident that the 
material support for ships was essential and indispensable in order to ensure their normal 
operation and management.  
 
As mentioned before, the support was achieved through communication between shore 
management and a ship’s crew. In general, the communication for the provision of the 
support in the three areas played a critical role in ensuring successful OHSM, without which 
a ship could not sail safely and efficiently.  
 
5.3 THE CREW 
Having presented the management’s perspective on providing crews with shore support, I 
will shift the focus to crews to examine how they perceive the shore support and what are the 
implications for shipboard OHSM. The previous section identified three types of shore 
support to crews: technical support, safety information support and material resource support. 
These will be examined in turn from a crew’s perspective. The examination will also include 
the role of the superintendents as well as the oil majors’ inspections in the context of 
chemical shipping.  
 
5.3.1 Technical Support 
The technical support was usually delivered by technical-based communication or ship-visit 
interaction. Mostly, it happened on the occasions of the management’s ship visit. This 
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sub-section examines a crew’s response to the technical support given by the shore 
management. 
 
Safety Education 
Usually, the management’s technical support in both companies was provided by managers, 
particularly by the superintendents. Their positive role was confirmed by many crew 
members since they were very familiar with the latest maritime policies, such as the revised 
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention and the oil majors’ inspection syllabus, such as 
VIQ. They understood well many safety-related problems that had occurred on other ships 
belonging to their company. Some crew referred to them as ‘elite’ as they had ‘profound 
expertise’ or ‘unique competence’. For example, a junior officer described the role of a 
superintendent as follows:  
He could be a superintendent, which means he is very professional. Regarding some 
deficiencies, we might not be able to identify them. He would know once he came. 
He would have experienced various inspections many times. He would rely on his 
experience to tell us. (3O, S1 C1) 
 
In other words, if they were incompetent, they might be guided by others – they could not 
stay long in this position to manage ships. The role of superintendents in maintaining 
effective OHSM was also mentioned in Bhattacharya’s study (2009). Their seafaring 
background was helpful for them to deal with an organisation’s health and safety issues (ibid, 
p.160).  
 
The role of technical support was seen most clearly during ship visits by managers or 
superintendents: 
He brought some cases to us; these included new safety standards, good safety 
practices from other ships etc. He would communicate with us and teach us. 
Although they would come for an inspection, they would teach us something new. 
(CO, S1 C1)  
 
A superintendent’s role in ‘guiding’ a crew was particularly highlighted in the shipment of 
extremely toxic chemical cargoes, which was observed during my field work on S1 C1. The 
ship was discharging phenol when I was on board. This chemical is extremely toxic and 
corrosive; it is also extremely expensive. It would be catastrophic if there were any cargo 
damage (pollution). The ship had undergone a recent crew change. During the cargo 
operation, a superintendent visited the ship. He was accompanied by a bosun who had 
worked on this ship before. My field notes detailed my observation of their work:  
The bosun came onboard together with the Guide captain to give assistance to the 
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ship (particularly cargo) operation. In the evening I shared a cabin with the bosun. 
He was very busy the whole evening and could not have a talk with me. He came 
back to the cabin at 0.30am. At about 6am the next morning somebody knocked at 
the door and the bosun was out again. Later I had a short talk with him during 
breakfast time. He said he had worked on this ship for more than one year. He 
knows this ship very well and the new crew members (bosun and ratings) could not 
act in the ways he could. Also, because this cargo was extremely toxic, the company 
asked him to visit the ship and give assistance. He and the Guide captain left the ship 
later when they saw that everything was working properly. (Field Notes, S1 C1, 3/4 
February 2010). 
 
Several days later during the voyage when I interviewed a rating on board and asked how 
their visit could help, he replied:  
We learned some (experience). For example, it is easy for the phenol to be solidified 
and crystallised. In order to ensure the valve does not freeze, a special adjusting 
washer needs to be fitted. The warming bypass system should also be checked in 
advance. If there were a sand hole (in it), it would be catastrophic. (Rating, S1 C1)  
 
Some crew members referred to such technical support as ‘safety education’, by which the 
knowledge and practice could be transferred to the crew during a ship visit. The role of safety 
education was also highlighted in the literature. In the Chinese construction industry, 
research has shown that safety education contributes to workplace safety management (Fang 
et al., 2004). The research conducted by Aksorn and Hadikusumo (2008) revealed that safety 
education was one of the critical successful factors that influenced safety programme 
performance in Thai construction projects. Similarly, this study showed the importance of 
on-site safety education on board ships since many crew members agreed that 
self-identification of the problems with their work was difficult. Instead, the problems could 
be more easily identified by a superintendent in the light of their well-established 
professional knowledge and skills. In this sense, a superintendent’s guidance could have a 
helpful impact on a crew’s operational practice on board. For example, a junior officer said: 
We are used to our own way of working. The problem is that we never think our 
practice is wrong and never have doubts about it. If he (a superintendent) came, he 
could point out what was wrong. The problem might be found out by external 
inspectors if it still existed. Certainly, it is good for us and we can change to the right 
way. (3O, S1 C1)  
 
Apart from those examples described by officers, a few ratings also offered some similar 
examples, particularly for those with limited sea experience. During a ship visit, a 
superintendent would be able to observe a crew’s work in situ, and there would be a chance to 
improve the crew’s working practices: 
In the mooring operation, I used to put a mooring line on a bollard in a clockwise 
direction, but the superintendent told me to do it in an anti-clockwise direction. (By 
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doing so), it would cause less tension, and would be less likely to hurt operators. I 
had never thought about that before. (Boson, S4 C2) 
  
Furthermore, some crew members, though not many, commented that they would consult 
with a superintendent if they were not clear about some professional knowledge. This was 
especially true in consideration of a wide range of chemical products to be carried by 
chemical tankers. In addition, most chemical cargoes have different physical and chemical 
features, and it is impossible for crew members to be familiar with all of them. In such a case, 
a superintendent would be the right person to consult:  
Last time, the cargo was PX (pxylene). Its solidifying point is 13.3 degrees Celsius, 
while the environmental temperature was around zero. I was very concerned about 
the ship’s warming system. I asked the superintendent, and he told me (how to deal 
with it). (CO, S2 C1)  
 
Regarding daily routines, there were not many doubts about when the superintendent would 
need to be consulted; however, a superintendent’s role became prominent in dealing with 
‘new problems’, ‘extraordinary conditions’, or ‘new regulations’, as illustrated by some crew 
members. Given this positive role, not all crew members were satisfied, as will be discussed 
next.  
 
Limited Supporting Role  
The study also found that, for some crew members, the communication with the management 
did not help much in their work. First of all, some crew members thought that ships were very 
varied; the ‘particularity’ of each ship’s work environment might be unfamiliar to a 
superintendent. In this sense, it could reduce the management’s supporting role. For example, 
as one senior engineer put it: 
Except in the case of a superintendent having worked on this ship before and being 
very familiar with this ship … otherwise, he has to listen. In practice, all the work is 
done by this ship’s crew. (2E, S3 C2) 
 
Some crew members also thought that even if a superintendent’s technical support helped, it 
could not extend to each position across the shipboard hierarchy. Besides, some senior crew 
members with some years of sea experience thought they did not need a superintendent’s 
technical support. For example, a senior engineer said: 
If you expect them (superintendents) to solve any particular technical problems, it is 
useless. Mainly, it depends on our own (knowledge). I have been a chief engineer 
for six years. It’s very rare that shipboard practical problems have been solved by a 
superintendent. (CE, S2 C1)  
 
Furthermore, some crew members were very confident about their competence in problem 
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solving. They thought they could meet the challenges of various technical problems. Thus, 
they thought the company’s support was of little use, and they would not ‘bother them’ much. 
For example, a second engineer said: 
For me, they (superintendents) are useless for helping my work. If I can solve (a 
problem), I do not need their guidance; if I cannot, they would not be able to work it 
out either. (2E, S1 C1)  
 
It emerged from the data that the crew’s experience and competence could play an important 
part in shipboard OHSM. In the literature, the crew’s experience and competence were seen 
as part of their professionalism, which further contributes to the safety culture in a shipping 
organisation (IMO, 2002b). In this sense, the company’s supporting role was limited given 
the crew’s professionalism. Meanwhile, some crew members also commented on what kind 
of support was really ‘useful’: 
We need them (superintendents) to harmonise work … the types of spare parts, the 
information and technical documents ... All these should be provided by them. We 
do not have any channel to obtain them. I think this is most helpful for us. (2E, S2 
C1) 
 
Among the various kinds of support that were thought helpful, the arrangement of 
technicians for repair work, the provision of safety information, and the supply of materials 
or spare parts were highlighted by crews. The data presented in this sub-section showed that 
the role of communication for technical support was limited. Some crew members felt that 
they were educated by the management of the company, particularly during a ship visit. For 
some others, the role of the management remained weak. What most crew members 
emphasised were the various logistic services provided by company’s management. They 
were termed a crew’s ‘real need’, which will be discussed below.  
 
5.3.2 Safety Information Support  
One of the major duties for the management was to provide safety information support to 
crews on board. Such support was achieved mainly through technology-based 
communication modes, such as email or telex. In general, safety information played a unique 
role in ensuring a ship’s routine safe operation and management. Its role became more 
prominent within the onboard environment, where information accessibility was still ‘limited 
and occlusive’ (Marine Engineering Superintendent, C1), given the availability of modern 
maritime communication technology. Therefore, a shipping company needed to provide its 
ships with fully updated safety information. The purpose was to equip crews with specific 
safety knowledge, as a result of which crews’ OHSM capability could be improved. This type 
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of safety information support has been equally highlighted in other safety critical industries, 
such as health care (Amery, 1999) and road transport (Torrent-Moreno and Mittag, 2009) 
where it is seen as crucial for the management of workplace health and safety activities. This 
section examines the role of communicating safety information in influencing a crew’s safe 
working practice. 
 
Learning Lessons  
The data suggested that a majority of crew members thought the safety information 
distributed by their company was very important for the ships’ safety management. Among 
the safety information, the role of negative events, particularly incident reports, in 
influencing shipboard OHSM was highlighted by many crew members:  
The negative cases are much more helpful than the rest. They really help us enhance 
our safety consciousness. We are reminded to avoid any reoccurrence of similar 
mistakes committed by others. It is (a kind of) promotion for safety. (3E, S2 C1)  
 
Three Chinese idioms were given by crew members to describe the role of these incident 
reports: 
Nip in the bud (of accident occurrence). They had this accident and we should be 
careful in our work. (Chief Motorman, S1 C1)  
 
The past should enlighten us in the future. It could remind us … next time you 
should not repeat this mistake again...The effect is significant. (3O, S3 C2) 
 
The alarm bell is always tolling … You think you are right, but in reality, there is a 
need to be reminded at regular intervals. (Captain, S3 C2)  
 
The impact of an incident was usually disruptive, destructive and negative (Choularton, 2001, 
p.61). Potential workplace risks could be converted into actual incidents or accidents in the 
absence of safety reminders. Particularly, the role of an incident report was highlighted by 
crew members of the same rank involved in similar duties. Some crew members stated that 
they usually assumed that a case would not happen, but it was the opposite in reality. Hence, 
safety reminders such as incident reports were thought necessary. For example, a rating told 
of his personal experience:  
There is a certain effect. For example, in the company’s safety circulars, there was 
one about a rating lashed by a spring line … Previously, I remember, when I heard 
the chirrup of tightening mooring lines, I would stand there without any movement. 
Now I know … I should not stand at danger-prone places. I should not stand in the 
loop of mooring lines. Otherwise my leg might be hurt. This has come from a 
bloody lesson. (Rating-1, S2 C1) 
 
Hence, in order to prevent any reoccurrence of similar incidents or accidents, it was essential 
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to learn from previous lessons. From the crew’s perspective, the role of safety information 
was therefore generally positive; it helped raise the crew’s safety awareness. Moreover, the 
data also revealed that safety information could help a crew to enhance their work inspection.  
 
Self-Inspection 
If the safety information addressed a specific problem, a dedicated onboard self-inspection 
would be arranged: 
On a ship, a small steel parcel was sucked into the supercharger, and it was damaged. 
This piece of information was disseminated to all other ships. The company 
required us to make a complete inspection. We did and found some problems. (3E, 
S2 C1)  
 
A senior officer also expressed a similar view:  
As soon as we received the information, we would conduct a thorough 
self-inspection. The problems that had happened on other ships might also exist on 
this ship. In ports, PSC officers were vetting. If the company did not send us the 
information, we would never know. (CO, S3 C2) 
 
In section 4.2.3, it was stated that the PSC inspection is a scheme set for conducting safety 
inspection on board ships. A ship might be detained by a PSC inspector where evidence 
proved that there was an apparent deficiency that could affect the ship’s safety. Safety 
information could help a crew prepare for a PSC inspection: 
(There was) a ship from Russia…The wire of a lifeboat had suddenly broken and 
three of the crew were killed…Lifeboat safety became a special focus for PSC 
inspections that year. The company management informed us to undertake a 
thorough inspection. On our ship, when a lifeboat on the starboard side was out 
ready for launching, the wire was found to have broken strands. The connecting 
chain had also rusted. We fixed the problem at once. If we’d kept using them, it was 
likely we’d have had an accident the next time. (CO, S2 C1) 
 
This was a typical example showing how safety information could guide a crew’s onboard 
self-inspection. Apart from the PSC inspection, chemical tankers also experienced 
inspections from oil majors. The inspection result on one ship could have safety implications 
for other ships: 
Now there are many oil majors’ inspections. If other ships had received an oil 
majors’ inspection recently, their inspection results would be sent to us. We would 
check and pay particular attention to their problems. If the company did not send us 
the information, how could we know? We are used to our established working 
practice and it is difficult for us to find problems. (3E, S1 C1) 
 
In section 5.2.1, the importance of the oil majors’ inspection for both companies has been 
clearly stated. This was also echoed by many crew. One quote was selected:  
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If a ship passed inspection, the ship was qualified to carry their (oil majors’) cargoes. 
This was commercial behaviour as well as safety behaviour. In nature, it promoted 
safety. (2O, S2 C1) 
 
Another engineer expressed a similar view: 
If a ship failed an oil major’s inspection, the company’s reputation would be 
negatively affected. This company’s ship could not pass the inspection; cargo 
owners would not trust you (the company). (CE, S4 C2) 
 
The oil majors inspection highlighted the need for crew to conduct self-inspections in 
accordance with the safety information sent to them. During my fieldwork on board, I was 
told by some crew members that self-inspection was particularly enhanced during the Beijing 
Olympic Games in 2008. There was much safety-related information sent on board, 
requesting crews to double their efforts to guarantee ‘absolute safety’. Moreover, this made 
particular sense in both companies in this study, since some of their ships had been built in 
the same shipyard and shared a similar ship-building structure; they were called ‘sister ships’. 
This was viewed as an advantage since it was very convenient for shipboard self-inspection 
and problem solving. 
 
Safety Knowledge  
Apart from its role in promoting safety inspections, the safety information could also help to 
facilitate a crew’s acquisition of safety knowledge. First and foremost, the importance of 
chemical cargo management cannot be overemphasised given its dangerous nature to 
humans and the environment. In both companies, a copy of the cargo MSDS would be sent 
on board a ship prior to each voyage. During my fieldwork on board four ships, a copy of the 
MSDS was seen in public places, such as the crew canteen or cargo control room. On the one 
hand, due to the complexity of chemical products, it would be impossible for a crew to know 
all their features; on the other, this knowledge is closely related to personal health and safety. 
Many crew members stated that they would try to learn some knowledge from the MSDS: 
Chemical tankers are different from other ships. They involve the carriage of 
thousands of chemicals and cargos whose characteristics are different from each 
other. Before loading any cargo, I would check the MSDS. Should an A-level 
anti-chemical overall or C-level overall be worn? How much is the cargo’s 
Threshold Limit Value (TLV) - 2 Part Per Million (PPM) or 100 PPM? Furthermore, 
is the cargo added with the inhibitor? How about temperature requirement in the 
tank?...These issues are all very important. (CO, S1 C1) 
 
On board the ships, the cargo operation and the management work were conducted mainly by 
personnel in the deck department. Those who were less involved, such as marine engineers, 
expressed an equal concern regarding the safety knowledge about chemical cargoes. For 
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example, a third engineer said: 
If it was the first time a cargo was being carried on this ship, and we did not know its 
physical and chemical features, I would have a look at it (MSDS). What information 
was there about this cargo? What was its risk? (3E, S4 C2)  
 
As a captain (S1 C1) noted, there is ‘no good thing from chemicals’. The data showed that 
crews had serious concerns about and even a fear of chemical goods. Apparently, chemical 
products can have a severe negative impact on a crew’s OHS. In general, the detailed 
information provided by the shore management helped crews understand chemicals and their 
potential risks in this study. Given the positive role of safety information in relation to 
operation of chemical cargoes, some crew expressed their view that they could potentially 
benefit more from it, if the safety information included in the MSDS could be simplified to 
become more understandable by all of the crew in consideration of the variety of their 
educational backgrounds and knowledge requirements. It was proved by Walters’ study of 
small enterprises in Europe that simplified versions of MSDS provided by the management 
could potentially benefit employees with a better understanding of chemical-related safety 
knowledge as well as the arrangements for OHS protection (Walters and Grodzki, 2006; 
Walters, 2006).  
  
Moreover, the safety information could also help refresh a crew’s safety knowledge. When a 
ship received the information, collective learning about the subject issues might be arranged 
during the monthly safety meeting among the crew. During the meeting, the section in the 
management system to which a safety problem was related would be consulted and 
informed:  
Last time, one company’s ship had a collision accident … the report was sent to this 
ship, and then there was a discussion among the officers on board; how to avoid 
collision ... what measures should be taken in order to avoid the accident … we 
examined the terms and principles in the safety management system. (3O, S4 C2)  
 
In general, the positive role of collective learning was confirmed by crews. However, the 
problem with the collective learning was that its arrangement could be compromised by 
hectic sailing schedules, which will be discussed in Chapter 6. Apart from collective learning, 
the research also showed that the information could equally facilitate a crew’s self learning. It 
was unavoidable that some vague or grey areas would exist among a crew’s understanding of 
the safety management system. A specific piece of information could help resolve any 
misunderstanding. For example, a chief officer told of his experience:  
On one ship, a gas pressure alarm problem in the cargo tanks was found. The set 
pressure for the alarm was 1400 millimetres of mercury height. When I read the 
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information, I felt that the alarm would be triggered at less than 10% of the standard 
value. Actually it should be more than 10%. I consulted the material, and I found I 
was wrong. (CO, S3 C2)  
 
Thus, it can be seen from the data that safety information can facilitate both collective and 
individual learning among crews. Matlay (2000, p.204) examined the role of learning 
activities in organisations and found that work-based individual learning and collective 
learning were an ‘important and necessary condition of sustainable competitive advantage’ 
and an essential feature of a learning organisation. Meanwhile, he argued that the style of 
management, employees’ mutual relations and their working conditions could have a 
significant impact on the organisation of learning. Harrison (2000) noted that learning at 
work was regarded as a product of internal competition, and of employees’ ambitions as well 
as corporate values. In my study, the data suggested that learning safety information can help 
reinforce a crew’s understanding of safety knowledge that contributes to OHSM on board 
ships.  
 
In this sub-section, the role of safety information sent by shore management was discussed. 
The study shows that the information could help promote a crew’s safety awareness, 
workplace self-inspection and safety knowledge learning. Although some crew members 
mentioned that, in some cases, some information was delayed or redundant, the contribution 
to a crew’s OHSM was generally acknowledged by the shore management as well as by the 
ship’s crew. Regardless of other influential factors, the study showed that communication for 
safety information support was generally positive. This was however less so in relation to 
communication to crews for material resource support which I examine next.  
 
5.3.3 Material Resource Support  
Given the importance of technical and informational support, the material resource support 
was also essential for ensuring a ship’s normal operation. The communication for such 
support was usually conducted in formal written mode if it was not urgent.  
 
Insufficient Supplies 
The discussion in section 5.2 showed a fairly strong commitment to OHSM in both 
companies. However, this required underpinning with the sufficient supply of material 
resources. From a crew’s perspective, the study showed that the crew’s request for the supply 
was not actively responded to by shore management. Many crew members in both companies 
commented that shore resource support was insufficient for ensuring shipboard OHSM. A 
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significant gap was seen between the shore supply of and the crew’s demand for material 
resources.  
 
The interviews with crew members collected some examples indicating the lack of material 
supplies from the companies. One was the supply of working tools. On a chemical tanker, an 
Ullage, Temperature and Interface (UTI)
xii
 is a basic tool for the measurement of cargo 
volume. The following story was told by a junior officer about the supply of this tool: 
According to the standard, a chemical tanker should have several UTIs. We had 
only one, and reported this to the company. They said it was ok. At the time, there 
was no inspection. Why should the company spend this money? Before the 
inspection, they borrowed a few from other ships. Afterwards they were returned. 
The tool is very costly. (2O, S1 C1)  
 
Another issue was the supply of consumable materials. It has been stated that passing 
external inspections was highlighted by both the shore management and the ships’ crews. In 
order to give the external inspectors a good impression of deck maintenance, a chief officer 
wanted to paint all the rusty areas on the main deck. He made an application to his company 
for the supply of paint: 
The spare paint on board was not sufficient and we made an application. But the 
managers were not on the spot and did not understand. They gave us feedback from 
a theoretical perspective. One litre of paint could cover xxx square meters (of deck 
area). They said they had supplied more than ten buckets before, and the ship could 
use them for many (square meters). Eventually, the supply was delayed. Regarding 
this issue, there was a misunderstanding between them and us. (CO, S2 C1) 
 
For the engine room department of a ship, a similar situation also existed in terms of the oil 
consumption of engines. The following example shows this:   
Generally, light oils such as diesel oil and lubricant oil, are more expensive. If the 
volume of consumption was higher than on other ships, the shore management 
would call the Chief Engineer. Why did this ship consume more? This ship’s main 
engine was designed for number 20 diesel oil. Now we use 1804S7. Its quality is bad. 
The corrosion of the cylinder ring, high pressure oil pump, and oil injectors is 
greater. It leads to more consumption of the lubricant oil. There is no way to control 
oil consumption in such a circumstance. It is a contradiction. (2E, S1 C1)  
 
In order to avoid a ‘questioning call’ from the management, crews showed their prudence in 
order to maintain oil consumption at a specified level. Similar evidence was also witnessed 
by me on S4 C2. There was even a dispute on the ‘time point’ of changing the oil (from heavy 
to fuel oil) between the marine engineering department and the deck department when the 
ship was approaching a port, since it involved the consumption of light oil – the more 
                                                        
xii UTI: A device used for measuring the height and temperature of liquid cargoes in a tank.  
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expensive one.   
 
Furthermore, some crew members also reported some equipment failures, and how their 
company was unwilling to arrange an immediate repair. Although the shore management was 
said to have been informed, they tended to ‘intentionally neglect’ those problems. For 
example, an underlying problem was mentioned when I interviewed a bosun in the cargo 
operation room on S3 C2: 
A: Like the software in the cargo control station (he pointed to it as he was speaking), 
the pressure detection indicator had a problem. The company knew that, but they did 
not arrange repair.  
Q: How would you deal with an inspection? 
A: We would bluff it out. The inspectors would not inspect each piece of equipment 
on board. If the problem was identified, the company would spend money to solve it. 
But if, luckily, the problem was not touched and the inspection was finished, the 
company would not need to spend the money. The attitude is to delay repairs as 
much as possible. (Bosun, S3 C2)  
 
The examples given above indicated a significant supply-demand gap between the shore 
management and ships’ crews in terms of shore material resource support. This could cause 
considerable inconvenience and an additional workload to crews. For example, a chief 
engineer explained:  
They (the company) do not want to spend more, but they want to earn the most. A 
contradiction would arise. The crew would be working hard. A heavy workload is 
imposed on the crew. The crew do what they should; they also do what they are not 
supposed to do. (CE, S3 C2)  
 
Thus, it could be seen that the lack of resource support on board could cause considerable 
problems in a crew’s routine working practices. Most significantly, it could have a direct 
impact on shipboard OHSM practice, which will be discussed next.   
 
Potential Impact on OHSM 
The previous sub-section showed that shore material support was far from what crews 
expected. Given a ship’s request for the supply of some materials was confirmed, there might 
be some other problems associated with it, such as the quality of products. For example, on a 
chemical tanker, there were plenty of tubes lying on its main deck. Bolts, nuts and iron rings 
were used for fixing those tubes. A bosun talked about his experience in the application for 
the supply of those small spare parts that were commonly used on board:  
The shore management supplied us with the non-national standard units. The quality 
was not good enough; this would affect our work. The national standard products … 
no matter what the natural environment was like … the wind and rain ... they would 
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not rust easily. But the steel content in non-national products was less. They would 
be rusty in a few months. Sea water corrosion would be significant. If they were 
rusted, we would not be able to dismantle them if there was a leakage – we would 
have to saw them off. (Bosun, S1 C1)  
 
The use of non-national standard products could potentially cause some problems with a 
crew’s shipboard OHSM. The problems could become severe in consideration of the 
dangerous features of chemical cargoes; this issue was repeatedly mentioned by crew 
members on all four ships. For example, a rating told of one situation: 
This ship often carries Benzene. It is explosive and inflammable. To wash the cargo 
tanks, the electrical conductivity of the pipes connecting tank washing machines 
should be good. On this ship, a few of them were found to have deteriorated. The 
ship’s leader requested new (pipes), but the shore management did not supply them. 
This would be a potential risk to us. (Rating, S3 C2)  
 
As a consequence, there was a possibility of leakage, and chemical toxicity could cause 
health and safety problems to the crew. A chief officer gave another more serious example. It 
was about his ship’s application for the supply of toxic gas test tubes which were specially 
used on chemical tankers for the measurement of the remaining gas density in cargo tanks: 
Generally, accidents are caused by the violation of the procedures. We acknowledge 
we should act entirely according to rules and regulations. In our company, the rule 
said that each time, after washing the cargo tanks, the remaining gas toxicity should 
be measured using a toxic gas test tube. The company supplied only one box of toxic 
gas test tubes: ten tubes in one box. The ship had ten cargo tanks, and it was not 
enough even for one single voyage. How could we test (gas toxicity) in the ballast 
water tanks, pump room tanks according to the requirements? Since oil majors had 
this requirement, the solution was to falsify the records. The company did not allow 
us to falsify the records, but the company did not supply enough tubes on board. 
What was I to do? I hear you ask. (CO, S2 C1) 
 
This example suggests that the lack of supply of the tubes made the crew’s compliance with 
operational procedures impossible. Also, the unmeasured air/gas composition in cargo tanks 
could pose a serious threat to those crew members who entered the tanks for final cleaning 
work. Furthermore, the crew had to falsify their work records in consideration of the 
compulsory requirements both from their company as well as the external inspectors. The 
sailing voyages on all four ships showed that, generally, this problem existed on ships in both 
companies. Crew members explained that a tube was very expensive and it could not be 
re-used. Therefore, their company could not supply many to ships.  
 
The study showed that there was a lack of sufficient material resource support from the shore 
management in both companies. In general, this could be attributed to the management’s 
concern regarding costs. The lack of material support could cause potential risks to shipboard 
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OHSM. The consequence was that crews’ work and their OHS were negatively affected.  
 
5.4 SUMMARY 
One major theme that emerged from the investigation of shore-to-ship communication was 
the purpose of providing shore support to ships. In this chapter, communication for such a 
purpose was examined in both companies. The perspectives both of the shore management 
and crews were considered. From the management’s perspective, the experience and 
competence of managers and superintendents, as illustrated in the data, were essential for 
providing such support. Also, the management’s commitment to OHSM could be seen from 
their attitudes towards problems raised by crews. On the whole, the shore interviews suggest 
that shore support to ships, particularly the supervisory support, was crucial for shipboard 
OHSM. The data also indicated that shore support could be categorised into three different 
and interrelated types: technical support, safety information support and material resource 
support. They were used to guide the data analysis in this chapter. As stated in Chapter 1, the 
study focused very much on the crews’ perspective. The findings are summarised below.  
 
Technical support was achieved mainly during a ship’s visit. Some crew members expressed 
the view that the management support was useful in terms of managers’ or superintendents’ 
knowledge and skills, which could help shape a crew’s good working practices. In this sense, 
it was a kind of ‘safety education’ for the crew, and the relationship between management 
and crew was similar to the long established traditional master-apprentice relationship 
(Smith, 1981). However, for some other crew members, the role of management’s technical 
support was rather limited. They believed that they could manage workplace technical 
problems with their knowledge and experience. Crew members who held this view were 
those who were more experienced and more confident about their current work. Considering 
the latter factor, the overall effect of technical support on a crew’s working practices was 
limited.  
 
Regarding the safety information support, this was achieved mainly by written 
communication. The occlusive and isolated shipboard environment justified the need for 
information support to be given via modern communication technology, such as satellite 
communication. Data were collected both from internal (in-house) sources and external 
sources, and covered a wide range of topics, such as the latest rules and regulations, special 
operation procedures, deficiency reports, and incident or accident reports. A majority of crew 
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members thought that safety information was very useful for promoting workplace safety. 
This information helped crews draw lessons from the past, promote shipboard self inspection 
and enhance their safety knowledge. To sum up, safety information could play a significant 
positive role in promoting a crew’s safety awareness. 
 
As for the material resource support, communication occurred whenever ships had a specific 
need. Although the operation of the ships required a wide range of material resources, the 
data do not reveal that there was a significant shortage of those needed for ensuring a ship’s 
seaworthiness. However, the evidence shows that the supply of material resources closely 
related to a crew’s OHSM practice on board ship was insufficient. The lack of supplies could 
be seen to range from tools and spare parts to consumables. The lack of material resources 
posed a potential threat to crews’ onboard OHSM. It could be explained by the management’s 
concern about costs, a view repeatedly expressed by many crew members in the interviews.  
 
To conclude, the examination of shore-to-ship communication for work support in this 
chapter showed both positive and negative outcomes of OHSM. The communication for 
providing management’s technical support was generally helpful. The communication for 
information support was the most useful. However, communication for material resource 
support was found to be insufficient and had a negative impact on shipboard OHSM practice. 
It has been widely argued in the literature that material resource support from management is 
essential for effective workplace OHSM. The evidence in my study showed that the lack of 
resource support from the management undermined the overall outcome of OHSM in both 
companies. To a great extent, it reflected the management ‘commitment’ to safety is more 
formal than real. In all, there was a mixed outcome regarding the study of communication for 
work support. Further discussions will be offered in Chapter 9.  
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CHAPTER 6 (SHORE-TO-SHIP) COMMUNICATION FOR 
MANAGEMENT CONTROL 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Another major focus in shore-to-ship communication was the control of ships’ operation and 
management. The main objective of this chapter is to examine the communication for 
management control and explore its impact on crews and their work. Data will be presented 
and analysed from the perspective of both management and crew. Given the fact that the 
communication for such a purpose is achieved through technological means or ship visit 
communication and the two means of communication lead to different results, the discussion 
will be structured to take into account the two scenarios.  
 
6.2 COMMUNICATION DURING SAILING 
When a ship is at sea, the shore-to-ship communication occurs mainly through GMDSS (see 
section 2.4). The communication usually happens between company 
managers/superintendents and senior officers, particularly a ship’s captain. In this section, 
such communication will be examined, and will be presented from both perspectives in terms 
of its impact on OHS.  
 
6.2.1 The Management  
From the management’s perspective, there was concern about whether a crew’s decision 
making in relation to OHSM was adequate. This will be detailed below.  
 
Crew’s Decisions Respected 
The data showed that communication for the purpose of supervising a ship’s safe operation 
was dominant in the top-down communication process, which allowed shore management to 
understand whether work orders or instructions were being properly implemented. The 
interviews with the management in both companies showed they believed that 
communication with crews was conducted in a moderately consultative way. For example, a 
marine engineering manager (C1) explicitly commented that the communication was never a 
‘single-way compulsory order’ conducted in ‘a top-down approach’. Instead, the 
management’s decisions were taken on the basis of ‘understanding the crew’s thoughts and 
their difficulties’ (ibid). A senior manager further explained: 
If there was a typhoon, a strong cold front or a rough sea, our analysis and 
 113 
judgement might be different from the crew’s observation. This could cause 
difficulties in implementing (orders). Then we had to telephone or email 
communication to make it feasible. (Vice General Manager, C2)  
 
A general expression of the management indicated that most major decisions were taken in 
consultation with ship’s crew, and the crew’s decision-making power was well respected by 
the management in both companies. A common reason for this given by them was that when 
a ship was at sea, the crew, as front-line workers, would have the best knowledge of the 
shipboard work environment. Also, in both companies, a captain-responsibility scheme was 
implemented as a result of the adoption of a mandated safety management system (IMO, 
2002b). Although a company’s management remained responsible for the safety supervision 
of ships, a captain was still the key person for ensuring his ship’s safety. With his professional 
knowledge and on-the-spot observation, a captain could make better and more reasonable 
decisions than could others:  
In general, if the company’s order is different from a captain’s decision, the 
captain’s decision is dominant. After all, the captain is on the spot. He knows (the 
real situation) much better than us. His decision tends to be more reasonable. 
(Marine Engineering Superintendent, C1)  
 
In a few cases, some shore interviewees, such as a marine engineering manager (C1), 
commented that senior crew members could make immediate decisions and ‘report to the 
company at a later stage’. In general, the management would not interfere in a crew’s 
decisions except when there was a ‘significant deviation’. The emerging data suggested that 
the management in both companies agreed that a captain’s independent decision-making 
power should be guaranteed, and not be restrained by any additional terms. A captain’s 
independent decision making was even encouraged by the shore management: 
When I was on board, I often encouraged the captain: whatever happens, you should 
have your own judgment and should not be affected by other external factors. 
(Marine Engineering Superintendent, C2) 
 
By and large, the shore interview data suggested that a ship leaders’ decision-making power 
was well respected. A crew’s participation in the major decision-making process was 
considered important by the management. The shore interviews showed that the practice in 
both companies was similar to the participative management approach, as widely discussed 
in the literature (Kearney and Hays, 1994; Kim, 2002). This approach aims to balance the 
involvement of both management and employees in terms of problem solving, decision 
making and information processing (Wagner, 1994). 
 
‘Approved’ Crew’s Decisions 
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Although some data showed that ship leaders’ decision making was well respected and 
should not be constrained by other factors, as proposed in the preceding paragraphs, in 
practice, the understanding of the decision-making power was interpreted conditionally. 
Some shore interviewees showed rather reserved attitudes in their understanding of ship 
leaders’ power, particularly a captain’s so-called absolute power, in terms in which it was 
stated in the safety management system. They stated that it was ambiguous, and should 
depend on the actual context in which an issue arose. A manager interpreted his 
understanding of a captain’s power as follows: 
Although the ISM Code specified this (absolute) power, understanding this 
statement would vary when there was conflict between safety production and profit. 
The communication technology has improved, and crew’s decisions should be 
approved by the company. There were a series of adjunctive terms imposed on the 
use of a captain’s decision-making power. (Safety and Quality Manager, C2) 
 
It was stated in section 2.4 that the development of modern communication technology, such 
as satellite communication, has significantly reduced the ‘distance’ between shore and ships. 
As a consequence, a crew’s decision making was more likely to be influenced by the shore 
management in terms of the balance of the ship’s safe transport and the company’s profit 
earning. As noted in the quotation above, it frequently happened that a crew’s decision had to 
be approved by their company before they took further action. Although it was unclear how 
and to what extent crews’ work had been affected so far, the data highlighted the 
management’s concern about their company’s core interest. For example, one marine affairs 
manager said:  
We work in the shore office. From our perspective, we cannot say, ‘Captain, you 
just do it (as you wish)’. We would also consider whether the action is line with the 
company...the boss’s intent (interest). If a captain insists on his own decision, we 
would support him. But we could not support him to act against the company. 
(Marine Affairs Manager, C2)  
 
‘The boss’s intent’ was an alternative way of interpreting the company’s core interest. In 
general, the data suggested that shore management had a strong commitment to the so-called 
company’s core interest in undertaking a supervisory role over ships. In order to satisfy the 
boss’s core intent, the high level of consistency between what was required by the 
management and what was actually done on board ships was emphasised. For example, a 
manager stated:  
The company’s order should be implemented on board ships without any 
compromise and discount. (Marine Affairs Manager, C1)  
  
From the management’s perspective, full compliance with their orders or instructions 
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implied good OHSM at sea. Some managers clearly expressed the view that if a crew acted 
according to their requirements, they would not be held responsible for any negative OHS 
consequences. In practice, the interview data also suggested that the real situation in both 
companies demonstrated a certain level of satisfaction to the management in terms of a 
crew’s response to their orders or instructions:  
According to my experience, disagreement between shore management and crew 
was rare. (Marine Affairs Superintendent, C1)  
 
There has been no case where a ship has failed to follow the company’s orders. 
(Marine Engineering Superintendent, C2)  
 
Thus, from the management perspective, they showed their respect for crew’s decisions 
regarding the operation and management of the ship. However, it might also be understood 
that the crew did not question the management decisions and simply followed what they were 
told by the management. They will be further discussed in the following sections.  
 
In order to protect the company’s core interest, any decisions relating to a ship’s operation 
had to be approved by the shore management, which meant that the ultimate decision making 
power was in the hands of the shore management of both companies. In section 2.7.2, it was 
stated that decision making in Chinese organisations tended to be centralised. This study 
revealed a similar situation in these companies. Although the shore interview data showed 
little tension and discrepancy in the communication between the shore management and a 
ship’s crew, the possible extent of the impact of the shore management on a crew’s decisions 
remained unclear. In the next section, this kind of impact, particularly the impact on senior 
crew members, such as a captain, will be discussed first.   
  
6.2.2 Pressure on a Ship’s Captain  
The discussion in the preceding sub-section was conducted from the shore management’s 
perspective. In this sub-section, the focus will be shifted to the ships, with the aim of 
examining how shore-to-ship communication for the purpose of management control 
affected crews and their work. Among several senior officers on board a ship, the captain was 
certainly the first person responsible for overall shipboard OHSM. This sub-section will 
examine how a captain’s decision making as well as shipboard working practices were 
affected by shore-to-ship communication.  
 
The Incoming Call: Captain, Keep Going – You Decide 
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Before the ISM Code was introduced to the international shipping industry, a captain’s power 
was subject to different interpretations. With the adoption of a mandated safety management 
system, a captain’s power was exclusively addressed. In the management systems of both 
companies, there was a dedicated section called captain’s power statement, issued and signed 
by the general managers of both companies. In the system of C1, it stated: 
For the protection of human life, ship and cargo safety, and pollution prevention, a 
ship master can take any measures or issue any orders whenever necessary. No 
matter whether those measures or orders are consistent with company’s 
requirements, this decision-making power should not be constrained by the ship 
owner, charterer, or any other persons. The company promises to guarantee the 
captain’s right and welfare, and should not treat him differently whenever he exerts 
his absolute power.  
 
In the system of C2, the statement was: 
A ship master can take all necessary measures to maintain a ship’s order, and to 
ensure crew and ship and cargo safety. He has the absolute power to take determined 
actions and make requests for the company’s support in order to prevent the crew 
from being hurt, the ship or cargo being damaged, and ocean environment being 
polluted. A ship master may use his professional judgement and should not be 
constrained by the ship owner, charterer and any other person. 
  
It can be seen that a captain’s decision-making power was guaranteed in the management 
systems. Some comments from shore management in the previous sub-section supported 
these statements. From the crew’s perspective, many crew members also showed a clear 
understanding of a captain’s power. For example, one captain described: 
In the management system, a captain’s power is clearly stated. It’s overriding. The 
PSC inspectors would also ask me to reiterate it. What power does a captain have? 
Nobody is allowed to interfere when a captain exerts his power, including maritime 
administrations, company’s leaders, ship owners and charterers. (Captain, S1 C1)    
 
Interviews with lower ranking crew members also showed that a captain’s independent 
decision-making power should be maintained and respected. For example, a bosun expressed 
his view as follows: 
Now it’s the captain’s responsibility scheme. The company’s management system 
endows a captain with absolute power. The captain, in view of the prevailing sea 
conditions, has the right not to listen to any person’s instructions; a captain has the 
power to decide what to do. Previously, this occurred only in foreign countries. Now 
it has been introduced into China. (Bosun, S4 C2) 
 
Given the clear written statement and the crew’s understanding of a captain’s power as 
illustrated above, the interviews with crew members offered different views on its 
operationalisation in reality, particularly in the case where a crew’s decision was inconsistent 
with the company’s wishes. A general view was that, in practice, a captain’s decision-making 
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power was limited; to a large extent, it was the company’s orders or instructions that really 
mattered.  
 
It was found that, among all the work supervised by management on shore, a ship’s sailing 
schedules were one of the major concerns in routine management. A captain (S2 C1) told me 
a recent event that had happened to him. His ship had been going to call in at a domestic port 
in QZ in China, which was his first voyage there. The company suggested the captain apply 
for a pilot for assistance safety considerations. When the ship arrived, the pilot was not 
available. The company then asked the ship to call at the port directly. Meanwhile, the 
company agreed to arrange for two tugs to assist with berthing. Eventually, only one tug 
arrived. By that time, it was night and already dark:  
I said (to the company) that there was only one tug available. Additionally, it was at 
night. I could not call at the berth. Not soon later, the company called me 
again…They ordered me to call at (the port)…From my perspective, they were my 
immediate superiors. They asked me to call. Should I call or not call??? Even though 
I followed the order, I felt very reluctant. (Captain, S2 C1)  
 
Notwithstanding his reluctance, the captain did follow the company’s order and took a risk to 
make it eventually. This led him to re-think his decision regarding his decision-making 
power as a captain: 
Regarding this issue, I had contradictory feelings. When the safety aspect conflicts 
with the business aspect, the safety should be prioritised. When the company’s 
leaders visited us, they also said so. The same was stated in the management system. 
They repeatedly emphasised this (principle). The management’s statement about a 
captain’s overwhelming power was stated and signed. But, in practice, it is different. 
It is useless! (Captain, S2 C1) 
 
In this case, the captain felt infuriated by the company’s order. He felt his power had been 
stripped away, particularly in a critical situation where the ship’s safety and the company’s 
interest were in conflict, as a result of which there was little room to accommodate his 
independent decisions. Coincidentally, a similar example was given by a rating on S1 C1. 
One evening, the wind was heavy and the sea was also rough. When the ship arrived at the 
port of CJ, the company asked the ship to call at the berth at night. Although the captain felt 
in a dilemma and thought it was too dangerous, eventually, the ship submitted to the 
company’s order. The company’s reply was that the ‘company knew the ship had difficulties, 
but the ship should manage to overcome them’ (Rating, S1 C1).  
 
Apart from the pressure borne by the crew on the occasion of calling at a port, similar 
situations were encountered when a ship was at sea. My field notes (8 April 2010) recorded 
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one event, told by a third officer, which occurred during the voyage just before my 
embankment on S4 C2:  
The previous voyage was deemed extremely dangerous. The ship encountered a low 
pressure storm. Affected by athwart waves, the ship rolled at a maximum degree of 
40-50 degrees. It was extremely dangerous. Most things on desks were gone. The 
chef could not cook, since the cooking oil would flow out as it was poured into the 
pan. Several cadets were seasick and vomited the whole day.  
 
Another similar event was told by the bosun on S3 C2. The ship confronted heavy winds after 
the ship setting sail outward bound. The captain thought the situation dangerous and reversed 
the ship’s course back to shelter. Then, the company started urging him: ‘Other ships are 
sailing as usual, so why don't you dare to sail’? Eventually, the ship was forced to resume 
sailing again. But the captain was condemned by most of the crew for his selfishness – he 
considered his own interest rather than crew’s and did not dare to offend the shore 
management.  
 
Given that in some cases there might be a foreseeable danger, the management could give 
their order in a more flexible way. A common practice was that, seemingly, the company was 
giving orders in such a way that it seemed to be asking for a consultation. In fact, the real 
situation was described by a chief officer: 
The company wanted you to sail, so the company would not give you direct order 
‘not to proceed’. ‘Captain, you see, you keep sailing if conditions allow…You 
decide’. How does a captain make a decision? Many similar issues ... putting the 
ball in his court…, (they) are not willing to take direct responsibility (CO, S3 C2).  
 
In such circumstances, the abundance of words’ (multi-) meanings in the Chinese language is 
used for a certain effect – certain words in a specific context should be understood in the 
opposite way. For example, a chief engineer illustrated the multiplicity of words’ meanings 
as follows: 
‘Captain…the ship was STILL anchored, but you must ensure safety’...this is a 
reverse of the words’ (meaning). In Chinese, the meaning of words in this context 
should be understood in reverse. (CE, S2 C1)   
 
In the Chinese culture, the communication style is more ‘implicit, subtle and indirect’ than in 
western counterparts (Shi and Westwood, 2000, p.212). The intention is mainly to avoid 
direct confrontation and to preserve harmony and face. Usually, the real meaning (intention) 
of communication is embedded in its context, such as tacit understandings and mutual 
relationships, rather than in the words themselves (Hall and Hall, 1987; Shi and Westwood, 
2002). In this quotation, literally, the management seemed to offer a kind of safety reminder 
by emphasising the word ‘still’, but the hidden meaning was that the ship should not remain 
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at anchor, and should start off on the next leg of the voyage.  
 
To sum up, the quotations above suggest that a ship’s captain could be placed under 
tremendous pressure in communication with the management in both companies. The 
analysis of the data further revealed that such a kind of communication was done mostly by 
telephone. In section 2.4, it was described how telephone communication could be achieved 
through a GMDSS system (satellite phone) or mobile phone service (when a ship was in 
domestic waters or even foreign coastal waters/ports where a ship visited regularly). 
However, it is a matter of fact that written communication would be much cheaper and 
clearer. Unfortunately, written communication was found to be infrequent on the occasions 
when the shore management were concerned about a ship’s sailing schedule. Meanwhile, it 
was found that it was rare for the management to give compulsory and pressing orders to 
crews via written communication, as witnessed during my time on board ships. A captain 
revealed why his company urged ships through telephone communication (which was more 
expensive in terms of communication costs) rather than in writing: 
After all, if any incident occurred, they (the company) could discharge their 
responsibility. ‘I (company) made a call to you (captain). When did you receive my 
call, and what was discussed over the phone? There was no record at all, was there?’ 
I asked them to send a written order. It was the procedure in the management system. 
They didn’t dare to send a written order to me. They didn't dare! ... You couldn't let 
me take the risk alone. I could take this risk, but you couldn't put all the 
responsibility for the risk on me. So the crews on ships and them (shore 
management) belong to a different social status. (Captain, S2 C1)  
 
This view was also echoed by some other senior officers, such as the CO (S1 C1), CO (S3 
C2), and the captain (S4 C2). The captain’s fiery words could explain why the shore 
management used telephone communication to urge the captain to set sail. Written 
documents are retrievable, and they could serve as evidence for an investigation of any 
unexpected occurrences. The shore management could be obliged to share certain 
responsibilities if an ‘unreasonable’ written order was given to a ship. Through telephone 
communication, the shore management would be exempt from any accountability, simply 
because there was no practice in place to record telephone communication on board ships. 
Without any evidence to prove that a ship was forced to set sail by the shore management’s 
coercive order, a captain would eventually be held responsible for potential incidents or 
accidents. The consequence was that the aftermath of any risky operations on board a ship 
would be imputed entirely to the ship’s captain.  
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In this sub-section, the company’s tight control over a ship’s sailing could be seen from the 
communication between shore and ship. The control could commonly be seen in an adverse 
natural environment where imminent dangers to ships existed. The shore management’s 
communication with crew was achieved mostly via the telephone. The crew’s interpretation 
was that this was to avoid negative consequences to the management originating from the 
issuance of improper orders or instructions. Under such circumstances, it is foreseeable that a 
captain would bear more psychological pressure and tend to take more maritime risks.  
 
Captain’s Authority Revisited  
As discussed above, although a captain’s authority was guaranteed in written form, it was 
significantly affected by the company’s management. In order to understand this discrepancy 
better, it will be revisited in this sub-section. In general, some crew members, particularly the 
senior crew, stated that it was impossible for a captain to have the power to make the final 
decision. For example, one captain commented: 
The final decision making power is in the captain’s hands – this is said from the 
theoretical perspective. In reality, it is impossible to do so. This is common in China. 
(Captain, S1 C1) 
 
Specifically, some crew members said that a captain was equal to an employee working for 
the company. The written statement of his power did not change the subordinate nature of 
role in relation to the shore management. Although a captain was considered a member of the 
company’s safety management team, the research indicated that a captain’s sense of 
belonging was weak:  
I don't have this sense. I don't feel I am a member of the management team. I 
manage this ship under their leadership. I am not equal to their rank (laughing). 
(Captain, S3 C2)  
 
Furthermore, if a captain’s decision were inconsistent with that of the company, it could 
potentially cause tension between the two. A senior officer explained why it was like this as 
an insider as well as outsider: 
For the shore management, a captain’s individual interest is closely held in their 
hands. If he refused their request, he might be punished by them implicitly or 
explicitly. Right? ‘I (shore management) want you (captain) to call at berth; while 
you made me lose face…’. For a captain, it’s a heavy psychological pressure. (CO, 
S2 C1)  
 
It was mentioned in section 2.7.2 that ‘face’ is one of the key aspects of the Chinese 
traditional culture. If a captain did not follow shore management’s intent, the management 
could be annoyed with him. The negative impact on a ship’s captain could even extend to his 
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job security if the management was seriously offended by him. For example, a captain talked 
about his dilemma:   
You could have the absolute power, but sometimes you would need to balance back 
and forth. If you make a decision today and tomorrow you might go home. As a 
captain, it doesn't work if you make decisions entirely according to objective 
conditions. (Captain, S4 C2) 
 
Furthermore, he gave an example to support his argument:  
The fire extinguishing system was broken … I could proceed. According to the 
requirements of the PSC or oil majors, the ship was not seaworthy. If I required 
repair work in this port, what would the company make of this decision? But in case 
there was a fire, then what to do? In such a circumstance, I didn't have the right to 
make decision, and I had to sail.  
 
This situation was found to be very similar to what was described in Perrow’s work (1999, 
p.188):  
That is, as long as a captain meets the production level expected, no action is taken 
even if it is known that he takes large risks to do so. If the captain falls below this 
production level, pressure is increased. If the result is an accident, the captain is 
blamed, and penalised through fines or dismissal.  
 
In this sub-section, data analysis revealed that a significant gap existed between what was 
stated in the safety management system and what happened in reality. The result showed that 
a captain was left with little authority in the presence of the management’s controlling power 
over his crew. In section 6.2.1, it was mentioned by the shore management that a crew’s 
non-compliance with the company’s orders was rare. Considering the data presented in this 
sub-section, it could be understood that it was a kind of forced compliance which tended to 
become a common practice in the name of the implementation of the management’s 
collective decisions. As a consequence, OHSM on board ships was, by and large, 
compromised, particularly in situations where a decision whether to ‘stay or go’ had to be 
made in an adverse natural environment or a ship’s seaworthiness was not guaranteed.  
 
6.2.3 Other Crew Members: We Listen, Given the Difficulties 
In the previous sub-section, the study showed that a captain’s authority was compromised by 
the involvement of the shore management. In this sub-section, I will continue to explore the 
extended impact of shore-ship communication on the rest of the crew on board.  
 
Compliance of Collective Decisions 
As a decision would be agreed as a result of communication between the shore management 
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and a ship’s captain, it would be implemented accordingly by the crew. On the whole, many 
crew members had a ‘strong sense’ of compliance with collective decisions between the 
shore management and senior officers, particularly a ship’s captain:  
In general, they should be implemented 100 per cent without any conditional terms. 
(2O, S1 C1)  
 
The work order...it doesn't matter whether it is difficult or not (to implement). They 
(shore management) give you an order, and then you just do it accordingly. (3O, S3 
C2)  
 
A junior officer considered this issue from perspective of the relationship between 
compliance and liability, which had implications for the crew’s individual interest: 
We should act as instructed by the company. Everybody is afraid of taking liability, 
right? (If) you do it alone, what happens if there is an incident/accident? Then you 
should take full liability. (2O, S4 C2) 
 
Regarding the crew members’ opinion of this view, they thought unconditional compliance 
could avoid responsibility for the negative consequences of an operation being attributed to 
them. Furthermore, some crew members interpreted the need for compliance with collective 
decisions from the perspective of the employment relationship: 
After all, we ‘eat the company’s rice’ – the company issues a salary to us. There is a 
saying, ‘If you are invited for a meal, it would be difficult to say something against 
the inviter’. We are the ‘soldiers’ of the managers. We should submit to our 
superiors. Generally, we would not intentionally delay the voyage. If the company 
could make profit, they would be happy to issue us with a salary. (Chief Motorman, 
S3 C2) 
 
In C1, it was found that the style of the shore management could have a certain impact on 
crews’ attitudes towards the implementation of collective decisions. Terms such as ‘formal 
regiment’ and ‘semi-militarised management’ were referred to by some crew members in 
order to distinguish their company from others. The terms originate from a military context, 
and were used to feature a high level of compliance with the company’s decisions. For 
example, a junior engineer described: 
Basically, we act according to the company’s instructions. It is rare to violate them. 
This company, as viewed by the managers, is the formal regiment. (3E, S1 C1)  
 
In some cases, even though a crew disagreed with the management’s decisions, they were 
still forced to comply. For example, a bosun, the crew member in charge of the cargo tank 
washing operation, told me of one of his recent experiences. The ship was scheduled to carry 
ethylene glycol in a port in South Korea, so the cleanliness requirement of cargo tanks was 
extremely demanding:  
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The coating was oxidised. The ship was not suitable to carry such highly demanding 
cargoes. We reported to them (shore management), and they didn't agree with us and 
forced us to carry (the cargo). At the loading port in South Korea, the ship could not 
pass the tank cleanliness test, and we sailed out to sea to wash the tank again. We 
could not pass the inspection until the fifth washing. Back and forth, half a month 
was gone. (Bosun, S3 C2) 
 
He concluded by complaining about the shore management: 
This was the shore management’s (problem). They didn't care about our opinion, 
(but made) arbitrary decisions. They didn't consider real conditions when giving 
orders … chaos…(Bosun, S3 C2) 
 
During that time, they felt they were being squeezed between the shore management and the 
cargo tank inspectors, as a result of which they experienced tremendous physical as well as 
psychological pressures. In brief, for many crew members, the ‘wise and safe way’ was to do 
as requested by their company even though a decision was ‘unreasonable’.  
 
Interpretation of employees’ compliance and non-compliance involved a complex number of 
factors; therefore, it was important to identify the reasons and produce some constructive 
ideas for the improvement of the levels of compliance (Hutter, 2001, p.232 and p.250). 
Makkai and Braithwaite (1994) conducted a qualitative study across different industries, and 
found that employees’ compliance was affected mainly by their moral obligation. The study 
conducted by Hutter (1997 and 2001) in Britain’s railway industry showed that employees’ 
consciousness, work morale and personal sense of social responsibility could affect their 
sense of compliance. However, my study showed some different explanations for a crew’s 
compliance with the management’s collective decisions. The presence of the organisational 
decision-making power, the crew’s fear of taking responsibility and their consideration of 
individual interests were the apparent reasons that emerged from the data. Under such 
considerations, compliance was considered important given that a decision for action was 
unjustifiable. As a result, crews’ onboard OHSM practices were significantly affected. 
Details will be discussed below.  
 
Hectic Schedules and Long Working Hours 
The study revealed that the crews’ work was significantly affected by the result of 
communication. As a consequence of fully implementing the decisions made jointly by the 
shore management and the senior crew, the data collected from onboard interviews and 
observation identified the most direct problems that seriously affected the crews’ OHSM 
practices: one was hectic sailing schedules; another was long working hours. These will be 
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discussed in detail in turn.  
 
On average, the study found that, on board the four ships, the sailing schedules were always 
hectic. For example, a senior engineer described an occasion when the ship’s normal 
schedule was turned into a rush by a sudden order received from the company:   
Last time, we were going to carry cargoes in the port of HZ. The Chief Officer on 
this ship is good at work arrangements and would not cause overtime. Suddenly, the 
company ordered the ship to call at the berth that night. Then tank washing, 
ventilating, mopping the tank floor…all had to be done. Usually, it took two days, 
but we were forced to complete the tasks in one day. (2E, S1 C1)  
 
As seen above, an order given by the shore management had to be implemented by any 
means. The temporary short notice meant an additional workload for the crew in this case. 
Although a temporary order was not often seen, the issue of tight schedules was widely 
addressed by many crew members. For example, a junior officer said:  
The company’s order was issued on board, and we had to act accordingly. The main 
difficulty was time. The voyage orders came one after another. In our minds, we felt 
that the schedule was too tight and we were too tired. You were seasick yesterday. 
They (deck crew) were on deck to wash the cargo tanks; even the ship was pitching 
and rolling heavily. They had to complete the washing as soon as possible. The 
shipping task was pressing. There was no other way around it. (2O, S1 C1)    
 
The described scene was witnessed during my sailing voyage. Influenced by a strong 
cold-front winter storm, I was terribly seasick for almost two days lying on my bed, but the 
tank-washing team continued their work as usual. As a consequence, the hectic schedules 
intensified the crew’s workload and their working environment deteriorated. Furthermore, 
the data also showed that hectic sailing schedules were linked to the booming shipping 
business. This could be seen from the following account: 
After the financial crisis, this year is better. The ship would discharge cargo without 
any delay. Like this ship, the berthing time would not exceed 16 hours. There was no 
time to rest and no time to go ashore to have your hair cut. It was normal to call at 
berth at 1 or 2 am in very early morning. (2O, S3 C2) 
 
Due to hectic sailing schedules, a ship’s normal maintenance work could be affected, 
particularly regarding work the in engine room department: 
All our work was prioritised by the ship’s sailing schedules. The company wanted 
us to keep the schedules, but there was a conflict with the equipment maintenance 
plan. The engine had to run, and we didn't even have time to do the work. The 
company asked us to ensure safe production, but what happened if a machine was 
over attrited? The ship would not stop sailing until its condition did not allow (it to 
continue). (CE, S1 C1)  
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Consequently, the shortage of time led to longer working hours, which was also commonly 
seen in the data. Given the rule in place regarding the limit to working hours, many crew 
members expressed the view that the real working hours were much longer than the 
stipulated limit. The field notes recorded a number of observed events. For example, on 
board S1 C1, a ‘high time’ for tank washing was described as follows:  
Over the last two days, I could see that everybody on board was very busy. They 
were not willing to talk much with me. Tiredness could be seen from their eyes and 
faces. I went to the bridge again after dinner. I saw the second officer was still on the 
bridge. I asked why (since it was not his duty time). He answered that the chief 
officer was sleeping and so he was taking the watch duty for him. He said the chief 
had slept only two hours yesterday. He was too tired. I read the poster on the back 
door of the bridge and in the dining room, in which it was clearly stated that 
nobody’s work hours should exceed 8 hours a day. But I noticed that, in reality, 
apart from the cook, everybody on this ship exceeded the stipulated working hours. 
Fatigue was common among crew members on this ship. (Field Notes, S1 C1, 5 
February 2010)  
 
Similarly, one rating also described to me a working day during my trip on the ship:   
I read the written rule, but (we) do not act according to that. For example, the bridge 
watch keeping duty for a rating should be four hours per shift. Last evening, I was 
on duty from 18.00 to 24.00. When I was ready to hand over my duty, the ship was 
going to call berth. I was asked to continue till 2.30am. We had work till all the work 
was done. One cadet continued till 4.00am. Today, I should get up at 5.40am to take 
over duty. We do not work according to the rule. On this ship, if the bosun requests 
me to continue, I must do so…more time and more work. There is no other way 
around it. (Rating-2, S4 C2) 
 
As part of the work records in the management system, a crew’s working hours should be 
written down on a daily basis. The records should be checked by both the shore management 
as well as external inspectors, such as those from PSC or oil majors. These records serve as 
key evidence indicating whether a crew’s health and safety are guaranteed. However, the 
company’s method of dealing with this problem was described by a junior officer: 
We fabricate the records. The real working hours are far more than those 
stipulated…more than 12 hours! (2O, S2 C1) 
 
The reason for fabricating the records was understood by all crew members, since long 
working hours would mean a major deficiency. If this were identified by an external 
inspector, the ship could be detained by PSC or would fail the oil majors’ inspection. In C1, 
the problem of long working hours was reported by crews, and the company asked crews to 
make a separate record of their real working hours and report it to the company. But it was 
said a significant amount of time had elapsed since the real working hours had been reported 
and the company had not offered a better solution to this problem yet:  
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For most of us, most of the days would have extra working hours. The rest time 
could not be guaranteed. The company currently has no solution to this problem. 
(Captain, S4 C2)  
 
For the overtime, they just asked us to make a scientific arrangement (for the work). 
(CE, S1 C1) 
 
Making a ‘scientific arrangement’ was mentioned by some crew members as the shore 
management’s response to this problem. However, it was found that the underlying problem 
was not a scientific arrangement in facing the challenge of the essential workloads that must 
be completed by crews. Some other crew members mentioned their request to the shore 
management for several more crew members. Meanwhile, they also repeated the 
management’s reply: it was difficult to add one more crew member given the manning policy 
and cost consideration.  
 
An overall impression on the four ships on which I sailed was that, more or less, crew 
members experienced the problems of hectic sailing schedules and long working hours. As a 
result, crew fatigue was commonly observed on board. For example, a second officer talked 
about his own experience:  
Sometimes, as I sat there, I could have gone asleep. When I was on watch duty, I 
stood there and I would suddenly fall asleep. Then suddenly I would wake up. I 
walked back and forth, back and forth … no other choices. (2O, S3 C2) 
 
The hectic schedule, long working hours and subsequent fatigue could pose a severe threat to 
a crew’s OHS. On S1 C1, a finger injury was witnessed and it was detailed in my field notes 
(S1 C1, 8 February 2010). The injured motorman blamed himself for his negligence, but the 
rest of the crew were compassionate towards him, saying it was caused by fatigue – he had 
participated in tank washing and had been on continuous duty for 18 hours that day. Similar 
problems of OHSM were highlighted in the literature. Woolfson and Calite (2008) analysed 
recent cross-industrial survey data in Lithuania, one of the most recent members of the EU, 
and found that a worker’s workload intensification, long working hours and poor working 
conditions are common. Cooke and Rohleder (2006, p.221) observed that short-term 
pressures to keep a production schedule could result in risky operations and unsafe 
conditions being tolerated. Oltedal and Wadsworth (2010, p.616) argued that hectic 
operations could ‘trespass safety boundaries’. They further argued that production pressure 
could lead to operation shortcuts being sought, and a high workload could limit workers’ time 
for submitting safety reports. Oltedal and McArthur (2011) identified that the demand for 
efficiency was one of the most common reasons for procedural violations. My study in the 
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Chinese chemical shipping industry showed similar results to those of previous studies in 
some other industries (further discussion will be offered in section 9.2.2).  
 
Having discussed the shore-ship communication during a ship’s sailing and its effect on a 
crew’s OHSM practice on board, I will now shift my focus to the ship visit scenario, i.e., 
communication in a face-to-face mode.   
 
6.3 COMMUNICATION DURING A SHIP VISIT  
In the previous section, the discussion centred mainly on technology-based communication. 
For the management, ship visit communication was equally important and it is this that will 
be examined in this section. In a similar way, the discussion will be made with reference to 
the perspectives of the shore management as well as the crew on board to explore how ship 
visit communication could affect safe practice on board.  
 
6.3.1 The Management 
A ship visit is an important part of the work for the shore management in order to maintain 
safe working conditions on board. The visit was usually taken by superintendents or 
managers (including senior managers such as the designated person as stated in section 4.3) 
responsible for the safe operation and management of ships. In general, the shore interview 
data showed that the management had a positive commitment to shipboard OHSM.  
 
The Need for Face-to-Face Communication 
In land-based industries, managers might be able to visit and oversee workplaces any time 
they wish. In the context of the shipping industry, the case is different. Communication, to a 
great extent, depends on technological means, such as satellite telephone and emails, due to 
the physical distance between shore and ship. From the management perspective, the 
physical distance is a significant feature that could affect mutual communication. For 
instance, a manager said:  
The (role of) technology-based communication with ships is limited. We don't work 
together with any crew members. What he says face-to-face might not be the same 
as what he does in reality. For some (crew members), he might speak perfectly, but 
in practice, his performance would be very different to what he had said. This 
phenomenon is common. (Safety and Quality Manager, C2)  
 
Another manager expressed a similar view: 
In many circumstances, we are not on the spot (on the ship). We don't fully 
understand what on earth has happened. It is likely that crews hide facts. It 
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happens on many ships. (Crewing Vice Manager, C1) 
 
On board the ships, keeping work records was an essential requirement of the company’s 
management system. Meanwhile, many of these records should be reported to the shore 
management; they serve as evidence of what has been done by the crew on board. They 
would also be checked during various internal and external inspections. For this reason, the 
importance of written records was highlighted and the authenticity of them would be 
verified by the management during a ship visit:   
Usually they (crew) did the paperwork very well. It’s not possible always to see 
the facts just from the paperwork. Therefore, the role of a ship visit is prominent. 
Superintendents are required to visit ships at regular intervals to see whether it (the 
paperwork) is true, or whether the expected outcome is achieved. (Marine 
Engineering Superintendent, C2)   
 
The interviews with the shore management suggested there was unanimous agreement 
regarding the necessity of conducting ship visits. For the management, it was not enough 
for them only to judge the reality based on ‘listening’ – there was a need to ‘see’. They 
thought that the real problems could not be identified if the management remained in the 
shore office and knew ships only by their oral or written reports. Perrow (1999) addressed a 
similar case of a captain not being kept under surveillance, and therefore, there was a 
chance of untrue records being written in the ship’s log. This raised the issue of mutual trust 
between shore and ship. An empirical study by Bhattacharya (2012) in the international 
shipping industry showed a low level of trust between managers and their seafaring 
colleagues. He found that the physical distance between shore and ship hindered the 
development of trust between them. Haney (1986) found that a trusting relationship goes 
hand-in-hand with effective communication performance. Klauss and Bass (1982, p.23) 
also argued that ‘trust influences the quality, level, content, and directionality of 
communication’. This study showed a similar situation, as identified in the literature review. 
In this study, this trust crisis existed between the shore management and the ships’ crews 
suggesting the need for face-to-face communication.  
 
In addition, Leiss (2004) pointed out that large-scale incidents over the past decade have 
clearly demonstrated the need for face-to-face communication. The study of shore 
industries showed face-to-face interaction accounts for 25 to 70 percent of working time 
depending on the job type (Whittaker et al., 1994), while in the shipping industry, 
face-to-face communication between management and crews apparently obtained a much 
lower percentage. This further suggests the need for more face-to-face interaction. Hence, it 
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was understandable why ‘seeing is believing’ was so important from the management’s 
perspective. Through a ship visit, the real working conditions could be observed, 
understood and verified, which, in theory, would overcome the distance barrier that isolated 
shore from ship.  
 
Understanding Real Situation 
A general impression that emerged from the data was that visitors would try to 
communicate more with crew members during a ship visit. On board ship, visitors would 
usually first conduct a general observation of the ship’s working conditions. An initial 
(informal) conversation would be established whenever a crew member was met. Their 
communication with senior officers was essential. Visitors might also talk to individual 
crew members, who had been randomly or purposefully selected. Sometimes, there might 
be a plenary meeting among some or all of the crew, if time allowed. The purpose was to 
perceive the crew’s work attitudes and understand the all-around situation on board. For 
instance, one manager said: 
(When) I was on board, I would talk with them (crew members). I did this by 
chatting freely so that I could understand the situation on board. The first-hand 
information could be obtained through on-the-spot communication. (Marine 
Engineering Manager, C2)  
 
The acquisition of first-hand workplace information was elaborated upon further by a 
superintendent: 
When I was on the site (ship), I could understand the situation in a way which was 
not possible in the office. (The crew’s) performance, work attitudes, work outcome 
and their (sense of) responsibility could all be understood. (Quality and Safety 
Superintendent, C1) 
   
In general, the first-hand information collected from ship visits helped facilitate 
management’s decision making on issues relating to OHSM. In the name of ‘ship safety’, 
some visitors focused on a crew’s team work. For example, a senior manager (also the 
designated person, as defined in the management system) said: 
We focus on the stability of the crew as a team on board. If a captain was 
responsible and competent, messy conditions would not happen. If the team’s 
capability and sense of responsibility were weak, the (messy) conditions would be 
unavoidable. (Vice General Manager, C2)  
 
The data suggested that the stability of team work on board was an essential condition that 
affected a ship’s safety. Teare et al. (1997) stated that a team concept is central to the 
development of system-based management. Efficient teamwork was seen as a key element 
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for improving business process performance as well as organisational performance (Telleria 
et al., 2002, p.338). The importance of aligning teamwork with a company’s management 
policy and the measurement of team performance has been stressed by many researchers, 
such as Zigon (1997) and Zobal (1998). Therefore, the company management’s concern 
regarding a crew’s teamwork was understandable. Sometimes, if there was a conflict raised 
among the crew, it would be of particular concern to the management. Alper et al. (2000) 
noted that conflict is a major disturbing factor within an organisational team. A team could 
be demoralised and unable to perform effectively if a conflict were not dealt with 
successfully (ibid). A marine engineering manager gave his view on this issue: 
If there were a conflict among crew members, we would go to solve it. We would 
try to get them to work together as a whole. Now the crew’s minds are flexible and 
some lack a sense of responsibility. If we made an effort and there was no 
improvement, we would (consider the need to) change the person (s). (Marine 
Engineering Manager, C2)  
 
Apart from the concern regarding a crew’s teamwork, in a similar sense, individual crew 
members were given equal consideration. For example, a superintendent explained: 
All the work on board is done by them. I would try to talk to them individually. If 
their thoughts and spiritual status were unstable, shipboard safety would be 
seriously affected. (Marine Engineering Superintendent C1) 
  
Another superintendent further added: 
If one (of the crew) showed prejudice against our company, his psychological 
status would be unstable. This would certainly have a negative impact on the 
safety of his work. (Quality and Safety Superintendent, C1) 
 
Although the management tended to communicate more with senior officers, some 
mentioned that they would also talk with low ranking crew members, such as junior 
officers or ratings: 
We would also ask low ranking crew members: How do senior officers treat you? 
What are your feelings? If you have had a quarrel with others, what was the 
reason…? (Marine Affairs Manager, C1) 
 
In this sub-section, the data showed that understanding the real situation on board a ship 
was highlighted by the management during a ship visit. They obtained first-hand 
information that could help the management make adequate decisions in relation to the 
arrangement of OHSM on board the ship. The study further revealed that the management 
showed equal concern about the crew’s work performance, which will be discussed below.    
 
Assessing a Crew’s Work  
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Apart from understanding what was really happening on board, another focus during a ship 
visit was to assess the crew’s work performance and outcome. The word ‘inspection’ was 
predominantly used by the shore management as part of their work during a ship visit. For 
example, a marine affairs manager talked about his work on board: 
We would see whether the crew’s operation could meet the company’s 
requirements, national and international regulations, or industrial guidelines. We 
would not know this until we had carried out an inspection. (Marine Affairs 
Manager, C1) 
 
For a marine engineering manager, his focus was the machinery in the engine room: 
If a person is tired, he needs rest. The machine is ‘tired’; it also needs maintenance. 
In the management system, it is clearly stated how regularly a machine should be 
maintained. For us, it is (to see) whether the maintenance work is done properly or 
not. (Marine Engineering Manager, C1) 
 
Apart from focusing on operation and maintenance work, during a ship visit, the written 
records would also be checked comprehensively, since they were treated as equally 
important, as explained by a marine affairs manager:   
The daily work records … like a kid doing his homework … If we didn't go to 
check and ask, we could not understand whether the recorded work had been done 
or whether the records were right. If the crew knew that we would often go to 
check, they would keep better and neater records. Furthermore, if they only had 
records and did not do the maintenance work, the equipment’s real status was there, 
which would indicate that their records were false. (Marine Affairs Manager, C2)  
 
In general, nearly ‘all the items’ that could affect a ship’s safe operation would be ‘gone 
through’ (Marine Affairs Superintendent, C1). The data suggested shipboard inspections 
were comprehensive and thorough. Certainly, crew members were heavily involved in the 
process of the safety inspection. They were usually asked to ‘show up’ for an interview. As 
a problem was identified, it would be talked about in more detail. A superintendent depicted 
the situation as viewed by the management: 
During the inspection, we would communicate more with the crew, letting them 
acknowledge that it was true they had not done the work well. This plays an active 
role in improving a crew’s work. It is the purpose of the management. (Marine 
Engineering Superintendent, C2)  
 
Some of the data showed that the management dealt with the problems in a mild way, 
which was similar to the situation stated in section 5.3.1. For example, a manager described 
one occasion of his visit to a ship, during which a safety net was found not to be wrapped 
around the gangway:  
We stayed there and asked them to make corrections. We didn't mean to blame 
them, but to tell them in a clear way. Why should a safety net be placed? Let them 
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understand this and do it accordingly, rather than them being forced to do so. 
(Marine Engineering Manager, C2)  
 
However, some other members of the shore management expressed their serious attitudes 
during their inspection. For example, a superintendent stated: 
If we found problems, we would take corresponding measures, such as giving 
critiques or instructions, or suggesting a change of personnel. (Marine Affairs 
Superintendent, C2)  
 
In extreme cases, the person involved could be sacked unconditionally due to his 
‘incompetence’ or ‘lack of responsibility’, as was specifically mentioned by 
superintendents and managers in both companies. Thus, the role of the shore management’s 
power in managing ships and crews was influential. The study further revealed that the 
shore management’s power was embedded in the reward and punishment schemes that 
were in place in both companies. It was thought an effective way of ‘improving a crew’s 
work performance and enhancing their sense of responsibility’ (Marine Affairs 
Superintendent, C1). In other words, if a crew’s performance were not assessed, they would 
be less active and responsive to shipboard work safety.  
 
In addition, the importance of the oil majors’ inspection has already been mentioned in 
sections 4.2.3 and 5.2.1. It was widely accepted that the oil majors’ inspection was highly 
demanding. To a considerable extent, an internal inspection served for the purpose of 
passing an external inspection. It was also called a mock inspection or pre-inspection 
before an external inspection. In order to ensure various external inspections would be 
passed, an internal inspection was even stricter than an external one: 
If the oil majors’ inspection requires us to pass with a score of at least 8, we will 
ask (the crew) to set a pass at a score of 10. The company’s requirement is higher 
than that of the oil majors. (Marine Affairs Superintendent, C1) 
 
Furthermore, all the oil majors had their own inspection standards rather than 
acknowledging those of other inspectors, as a result of which more internal and external 
inspections on chemical ships could be seen. On average, there would be one inspection 
from an oil major per ship on a quarterly basis in both companies. Hence, the role of the 
internal inspection in improving internal safety management was highlighted as well the 
role it played as a dry run for an external inspection.  
 
In section 2.5.2, the importance of management control, management-employee power 
relations and disciplinary measures applied for OHSM were briefly discussed. It was found 
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that, more or less, evidence of the involvement of these elements could be seen from the 
data presented in this section. However, the study revealed that these elements also 
emerged from the data collected from crew members. They will be further examined in the 
following section.  
 
6.3.2 The Crew 
The previous section showed that, from the management perspective, ship-visit 
communication was one of the indispensable ways to identify safety problems and ensure 
safe production. In this section, I will continue to explore from the crew’s perspective how 
this affects crews and their routine work.  
 
The Impact on a Crew 
It was discussed in the previous section that ship-visit communication was dominated by 
safety inspections. On board the four ships, a question was asked regarding what the shore 
management did during a ship visit. Surprisingly, an immediate response given by many 
crew was, ‘one word: inspection’. During the inspection, the management could observe a 
crew’s performance and question crew members as they wished. As far as the crews were 
concerned, the shore management had the decisive power over issues relating to shipboard 
OHSM as well as the crew’s work performance appraisal:  
Whether you do well or not, it’s up to them (shore management); they give your 
performance appraisal. (3O, S1 C1)  
 
Under such conditions, many crew members felt added pressure whenever there was a ship 
visit by the shore management: 
After all, they are the officials from the shore base. First, they will carry out an 
inspection; second, they will conduct supervision. For the crew, no matter how 
well or badly we perform, we will have pressure. (3O, S3 C2)  
 
It was found that such a kind of pressure commonly existed among crew members across 
different hierarchies. However, the crew members in senior positions seemed to bear more 
pressure than the rest of them: 
For the senior crew, they all had responsibility over a certain range of work. When 
our ship called at port and there was a ship visit, the higher the position one had on 
board, the more pressure one bore. (2O, S2 C1)  
 
The reason was that senior crew members held more responsibility for shipboard OHSM. 
Although they might not be directly involved in each operational process, they would hold 
major responsibility if there were a problem identified relating to their work.    
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Furthermore, the data suggested that the crew’s psychological pressure could originate 
from their fear of a reduction in their income. When an inspection was finished, a ship-visit 
report would be produced by the visitors. A captain described how it worked:  
The ship-visit report is clear-cut … What was the ship’s condition, crew 
performance and their compliance with the rules…? The (crew’s) bonus would be 
affected (by the report). You could not argue about why you performed badly. The 
visitors would give you a discounted mark. (Captain, S3 C2)  
 
The result of a ship-visit report served as partial evidence for deciding the distribution of 
the crew’s bonus. In C1, it was called ‘performance pay’, while in C2, it was called ‘a 
safety bonus’. Apart from the impact of the safety bonus, it was found that the inspection 
result could affect crew members’ prospects of promotion. In order to be able to be 
promoted to a higher position, a crew member’s licensing upgrading exam had to be 
arranged by their company. The arrangement would be prioritised by those whose 
performance was assessed as good by the shore management. The inspection result of a 
ship visit was a key indicator of a crew member’s performance. This was particularly true 
in C1, where a majority of crew members had a long-term contract with their company:  
If your work was not done well and it was found out, this would affect the 
company’s consideration for (the arrangement of) your license upgrading 
examination … affect your promotion. They are all relevant. (2O, S2 C1) 
 
More directly, the impact of a crew member’s job arrangement was also significant. For 
instance, a senior engineer gave the following reason:  
If a senior officer does not perform well, it is impossible for him to be promoted to 
captain or chief engineer. A superintendent can decide that a person cannot be a 
captain (on the ship supervised by him). He has this power, since it involves the 
shared responsibility. (CE, S2 C1) 
 
The implication is that a superintendent had the decisive power over the appointment of a 
crew member, particularly a senior officer. This means that even if a chief officer gained a 
captain’s qualification, he might not be able to be appointed to a ship (as a captain) 
supervised by a superintendent who disliked that person or distrusted his capability.  
 
In C1, if somebody was found to be making mistakes repeatedly, he might not be able to 
work on his company’s ships. Instead, he might be dispatched by the company as an export 
seafarer to work for another company. This would give the person ‘an opportunity’ to 
practise and improve his skills – which was presented as a way of training crew. The crew 
member could return to work for his company if there was evidence indicating that his 
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skills had improved. In C2, where crew were recruited mainly from the domestic labour 
market, the impact was mainly on the continuation of next contract term:    
If a problem was identified by the shore management, their impression of you 
would be bad. This contract term might not be affected, but (it) would affect the 
next contract. (2E, S3 C2)  
 
While moderate problems identified by the visitors of the shore management were tolerated, 
some severe cases would be dealt with seriously. It could lead to the dismissal of a crew 
member if evidence showed that he lacked a sense of responsibility:   
Last time, when a superintendent visited the ship, a third officer was found by the 
superintendent to be catnapping in the public room when he was on duty. At that 
time, the ship was loading cargo. He was deemed to be irresponsible and was 
asked to leave the ship by the superintendent. (Bosun, S2 C1)  
 
Another example was about the completion of paperwork: 
There was a case previously on this ship. The chief officer did not do much 
paperwork. When a superintendent came, he did all the paperwork for him (the 
chief officer). The superintendent did all the written records alone. Then he had 
enough evidence – the chief officer was not good and was asked to leave (the ship). 
(4E, S4 C2)  
 
For ratings, if it was found that their work was not done well, it was equally possible that 
they might be asked to leave the ship. For this reason, many crew distanced themselves 
from the shore management visitors in the hope of avoiding or reducing any potential 
negative impact on them. Some crew members expressed their preference for ‘sailing the 
outside world’. Under such a circumstance, the ship was able to avoid the shore 
management’s spot inspection and supervision, and it was seen as an admirable way of 
escaping management’s control.   
 
The Impact on Crew’s Work 
Apart from the crew’s psychological pressure and the fear of their self-interests being 
affecting, the data further suggested that ship-visit communication could also affect OHSM 
practice on board.  
  
First, it was found that a ship visit could affect the crew’s routine work. In both companies, 
‘routinisation’, or ‘normalisation’ was their slogan for guiding a crew’s daily work, which 
meant that whenever or wherever there was a ship visit, the crew should maintain normal 
working order, and should not need to have ‘extra-preparations’. The reality was found to 
be different. Many crew members stated that if they knew that a ship visit had been 
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scheduled, they would make thorough preparations before the visit. At the very least, 
shipboard hygienic work would be complete and thorough, since they thought that the 
visitors would feel unhappy if they saw dirty places on board. Some crew members thought 
the impact went far beyond cleaning work. A senior officer told of one occasion when his 
ship called at a port adjacent to his company:  
It’s near (the company). The senior management would come. We were very busy. 
The hygiene in public places or cabins also had to be completed. At least it had to 
be better than (that) in ordinary time. Most importantly, all the safety-related items 
would be checked in advance. All the records had to be updated to the latest entry. 
(CO, S2 C1)  
 
Many crew members insisted that it was essential to leave the visitors with a good 
impression of the appearance of their ship. From the crew’s point of view, the appearance 
reflected the quality of crew’s work. In this sense, the appearance could be explained as 
what Goffman (1990, p.35) identified as a ‘front’. He noted that a ‘front’ was closely 
related to the ‘manner’ of a performance. They both had strong implications for the quality 
of the performance. In a broad sense, it refers to impression management or self 
presentation behaviour that serves for the protection of self image or as an attempt to 
influence others’ perception of performers (Wayne and Liden, 1995). Therefore, it was not 
difficult to understand that a clean appearance in hygiene, equipment status and written 
records could help reinforce visitors’ positive impression of a crew’s OHSM work on board 
their ship.  
 
In addition, it was stated that it was very common for a chemical tanker to have oil majors 
inspection every year. One of the major purposes of the management’s ship visits were to 
ensure crew’s preparatory work was appropriate in order to pass the oil majors’ inspection. 
Some crew referred to the oil majors inspection as a ‘big stick’ to the company. Everybody 
from top to bottom in the company was intensively focused on it. For this reason, it could 
equally affect crew’s shipboard routine work. In addition the oil majors inspection was very 
detailed. It engaged itself with ‘every nut and bolt’. A common view held by crew was that 
their workload was significantly increased:  
In order to meet the standards of both management and the oil majors, everybody 
should check his own work to see whether the standards have been met. This 
added significant workload to us. (3O, S3 C2) 
 
The additional workload would be very likely to cause crew fatigue and had noticeable 
effects on crew’s OHS.  
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Second, during a ship visit, a few senior crew members would accompany visitors to check 
the work. This could affect some crew members’ work and rest time. Some crew 
commented that a ship visit could disturb their normal working rhythm: 
For me, I do not expect their visit. If they came for an inspection, my work plan 
would be disturbed. I would shift my focus to the inspection. If they saw a valve 
plate was missing, we would be asked to fix it. On board a ship, my opinion was 
that, first of all, I should guarantee equipment safety. For those tasks that affected 
little on safety, I would leave it aside to a later stage. But when they came, they 
would see those (superficial) as ‘real problems’. They would disturb my work 
arrangement (3E, S3 C2).  
 
One second engineer described his experience during a shore management’s ship visit: 
I did my work according to my plan. Some problems could not be solved 
immediately. At that time, a superintendent came; he saw the workplace (mess) 
and said, ‘Why didn't you do this and that?’ He thought my work was a mess. In 
fact, I was busy with maintenance work of the main engine. I could not solve all 
the problems at once. My work plan was disturbed. (2E, S1 C1) 
 
Although he tried to explain it to the visitor, it seemed of little use. His safety bonus was 
deducted for that month. Work interruption has emerged as a workplace concern today 
(Garrett and Danziger, 2008). Excessive workplace communication was identified as the 
most common source of work interruption (Mark et al., 2005). Workplace interruption 
could disrupt a worker’s thought processes, distract a worker’s focus, and hinder work flow 
and productivity (Gillie and Broadbent, 1989). In a similar sense, the ship visit was 
regarded as work interruption by a number of crew members. Most commonly, their normal 
scheduled work was interrupted by the visit.  
 
Third, as has been mentioned several times already, written records were one of the major 
areas that would be checked by the visitors of the shore management. The study showed 
that many crew members placed a particular focus on the completion of work records: 
Before their visit, all the accounts and records all have to be updated to the latest 
entry. There are too many records. Some are really not necessary, but we must 
complete them. Even though we just wrote the minimum, we would spend 
significant time on them. (CO, S4 C2)  
 
A captain talked about his work on keeping written records: 
A major part of their visit was to check the records. In my office, I had more than 
90 types of written records. If I did 2 to 3 in one day, it would be tiring for me, just 
to do this. (Captain, S3 C2)  
 
The completion of written records represented a considerable workload for the crew. The 
study showed a similar situation to one that has been frequently mentioned in the maritime 
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literature. The plethora of paperwork has been criticised as being a result of the adoption of 
management systems in shipping organisations (Anderson, 2003; Bailey, 2006; 
Bhattacharya, 2009). It also contributes to a crew’s fatigue (Smith et al., 2006). Many crew 
members stated that they could only do the paperwork during their off-duty time, since they 
were too busy during their duty time, when lots of operational tasks needed to be prioritised. 
Surprisingly, in order to meet the compulsory requirement of completing written records, 
the data suggested that fabrication of them was common among crew on board ships: 
Sometimes, even when we were on board, we found the records we had made 
ridiculous. We did fabricate records, but there was no other way (to manage). The 
visitors check all of them. (2O, S2 C1)  
 
The fabrication of written records was an issue also identified by Bhattacharya (2009) in 
his study on sailing voyages on board tankers among mixed crews. Therefore, it was 
certainly not too early to claim that the check of written records could play a significant 
role in improving OHMS practice on board ships. Actually, many crew members had rather 
different views on its usefulness in OHSM:  
It is a problem focusing only on (the check of) the written records, but the 
inspectors did not understand this. They said it was about safety consciousness. 
They insisted that if the records were not done well, they could not believe safety 
measures were in place on ships. (CO, S4 C2)  
 
As stated in section 6.3.1, the verification of written records was one of the major tasks 
during the shore management’s ship visit. For the crew, they all seemed to understand the 
management’s intention. The result was that, over time, crews became more careful with 
their fabricated records. ‘Reasonable inference’ was applied when completing the records 
in order to achieve the effect of their ‘genuine authenticity’.  
 
In general, the above discussion suggests that the impact of a ship visit on a crew’s work 
was noticeable. Unfortunately, from the crew’s perspective, it does not show that there was 
any positive impact on the promotion of OHSM on board ships. This was particularly true 
when crews described the difference before and after a ship visit: 
Before a ship visit, most (of the crew) became tense. Some tasks would be done in 
(crew members’) spare time, including written records, and provisional deck 
painting work (in order) that deck would look like new. After the visit, it would 
happen that the work became delayed, and the crew would not work as seriously as 
before. (2O, S2 C1)  
 
In a similar sense, a senior officer described the difference before and after a ship visit: 
During the two to three months when the superintendents were absent, the work 
would become disarticulated (disconnected). The extent of care, the records ... all 
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would be discounted. (CO, S1 C1)  
 
The data suggested a remarkable contrast in a crew’s work in terms of whether there was a 
ship visit. Under such circumstances, the management would not be able to perceive what 
really went on aboard ships. Thus, it could be concluded that ship visits did not play a 
significant role in improving OHSM practice on board ships.  
 
Lower Ranking Crew: No Common Ground for Talking 
In general, most crew members expressed the view that, during a ship visit, the shore 
management would communicate mainly with the ship leaders, such as the captain, chief 
engineer, chief officer or second engineer, while the lower ranking crew, i.e., junior officers 
and ratings, had fewer opportunities to communicate with the management: 
If the company’s leaders came, mostly they would communicate with the captain 
or chief engineer. It was very rare for them to communicate with ordinary crew 
members. (3E, S1 C1)  
 
They would have contact with the crew at management level (senior officers), not 
the operational (junior officers) and supportive level (ratings). The hierarchy on 
board was strict. (CE, S4 C2)  
 
Furthermore, some crew members, particularly those from the lower ranks, doubted the 
shore management’s intention of communicating with them:  
I don't know whether the company’s managers really want to communicate with 
lower ranking crew members. I guess they didn't have this intention. (2O, S1 C1)  
 
It was found that the main feature affecting communication was the ‘inequality of the 
hierarchy’:  
We have little contact with the management during the visit. When we 
communicate with each other, we hope we are at the same level. But we are not at 
the same level as them (the shore management). The hierarchical gap does exist. 
There is a sense of repulsion. We don't even eat together. The cook sends the 
separately cooked dishes to the captain’s cabin (for them). (Rating-2, S2 C1)  
 
The interview data also showed that the low ranking crew’s willingness to communicate 
with company visitors was also weak. The gap in social status seemed to be an inherent 
divide that affected their mutual communication. The following extract from an interview 
dialogue demonstrates this:   
Q: Would they (superintendents) talk to you? 
A: No.  
Q: Would you hope to talk with them? 
A: I don't want to chat with them...to be honest.  
Q: Why? 
A: Sometimes, if we speak more it is worse than if we speak less. There is a 
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Chinese saying: When drinking with a bosom friend, a thousand cups will still be 
little; when the conversation gets disagreeable, to say one word more is a waste of 
breath. We lack any common ground with them. We do more work while speak 
fewer words; I feel this would be safe. (Chief Motorman, S4 C2)  
 
On the whole, the data suggested that lower ranking crew members had little 
communication with the shore management during a ship visit. Some commented that it 
would be sufficient for them to complete their tasks as assigned by their superiors. Some 
stated that if their own self interests were not affected, they would not want to have any 
communication with the shore managers or superintendents.   
 
6.4 SUMMARY 
It was widely agreed by both the shore management and the crews that safety was the 
lifeline of their company, and both companies dealt with OHSM seriously. In this Chapter, 
the shore-to-ship communication for management control was extensively discussed. The 
discussion was based on two typical situations (scenarios): one was at a ship’s sailing, and 
the other was during a ship visit. Both the shore management’s and the crews’ perspectives 
were considered as a consequence of the communication. Specifically, its impact on 
shipboard OHSM was examined. In terms of communication at a ship’s sailing, the shore 
management agreed that the ship leader’s absolute decision making power over issues 
relating to the safety of a ship’s operation and management should be maintained, which 
was also consistent with the requirements of the management systems in both companies. 
Meanwhile, the shore management also showed they had reservations about this entitled 
power. From a crew’s perspective, it was found that in both companies, senior officers’ 
decision making was significantly affected and compromised by management’s instructions 
and orders. Particularly, the data showed that a captain was often put in a dilemma deciding 
between seeking shelter from adverse natural conditions or following management 
instructions to keep his ship sailing. The examination of a captain’s authority showed a 
very limited role in implementing shipboard health and safety management. In general, the 
study showed that a crew’s autonomy was rather limited, and could not be guaranteed 
despite what was stated in the management systems.  
 
Apart from the impact on senior officers, the impact on the rest of the crew was also 
noticeable. Within shipboard hierarchy, senior officers onboard ship actually played an 
intermediary role in conveying orders or instructions given by the shore management. The 
execution of sailing orders given by the shore management was mainly undertaken by the 
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rest of the crew. This study showed that work intensification and longer working hours 
were commonly observed on all four ships of both companies. In general, crew members 
bore considerable psychological as well as physical pressures due to centralised decision 
making.  
 
Regarding ship visits, the management in both companies expressed their eagerness for 
communicating with crew members. For one thing, the management could verify the facts 
that were reported by the crew. For another, it was the only opportunity for the 
management to communicate with the crew face-to-face, enabling the management to have 
an in-depth understanding of what really went on and what safety-related problems there 
were on board. Thus, regular ship visits were highly expected by the shore management. 
However, from the crew’s perspective, the ship visit communication did not help improve 
shipboard OHSM. Significantly, the visit was characterised as a safety inspection and 
resulted in considerable psychological pressure on crews; the impact on their routine work 
and personal interests was equally significant. The study showed that ship visits did not 
help promote the communication about shipboard safety problems between the 
management and crew. In particular, the data revealed that there was poor communication 
between the lower ranking crew members and the shore management.  
 
In conclusion to Chapter 5, the study raised the issue of whether the management’s 
commitment to safety is more formal than real. In this Chapter, the study showed a 
dichotomy of purposes of communication between management and crew, especially when 
interference with rapid sailing times is involved. As a consequence, the examination of the 
communication for management control showed that many safety-related problems were 
not communicated and remained unsolved, and the identified psychological and physical 
pressures had a considerable negative impact on shipboard OHSM practice. On the whole, 
evidence from this Chapter suggests that the asserted management commitment to safety 
was questionable. Further discussion is offered in Chapter 9.  
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CHAPTER 7 (SHIP-TO-SHORE) COMMUNICATION FOR SAFETY 
REPORTING  
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous two chapters addressed mainly shore-to-ship communication and its 
implications for shipboard OHSM. This chapter will shift the focus to ship-to-shore 
communication. According to the ISM Code and the safety management systems of 
shipping companies, ship-to-shore communication (reporting) should be clearly defined. In 
the companies studied, all ships were required to report all safety related issues to the shore 
management on a regular basis. The communication helps the management understand a 
ship’s working conditions. In the management system in C1, there were four reports: Ship 
Equipment Deficiency Report, Nonconformity Report, Accident Report, and Near-miss 
Report. In C2, there were six reports: Nonconformity Report, Report of Ship Inspection 
Deficiencies, Monthly Report for Rectifying Ship’s Deficiencies Found on Previous 
Month’s Inspection, Initial Report on Shipboard Emergencies, Accident/Incident Follow-up 
Report, and Near-miss Report. In principle, three general categories were covered, as 
specified in the ISM Code: ‘non-conformities’, ‘accidents’ and ‘hazardous situations’, as 
mentioned in section 2.5.1. Normally, they should be reported in writing. In some urgent 
cases, an initial report should be made by telephone followed by a written one. The purpose 
of this chapter is to examine the attitudes of the shore management and crews towards 
reporting those critical safety events. Furthermore, the immediate factors affecting a crew’s 
reporting will be explored.  
 
7.2 THE MANAGEMENT 
In terms of ship-to-shore reporting, the shore management in both companies showed a 
strong interest in encouraging crews to report; paradoxically however, it was also found 
that the shore management teams were not willing to see many reports from ships. This will 
be explained below.  
 
7.2.1 ‘We Encourage Reporting’ 
Usually, a shipboard self-inspection had to be conducted before a report was made. Its 
positive role was highlighted by the management in both companies. The report was seen 
as a ‘window’ for viewing shipboard working conditions and a ‘channel’ for improving the 
management of the company’s fleet. In other words, it could have considerable implications 
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for promoting OHSM on board ships. The study showed that the management in both 
companies held a similar policy and attitude of encouragement toward a crew’s reporting of 
safety issues. Some managers clearly expressed the view that safety problems were not 
caused by ‘the lack of sense of responsibility’ or ‘personal negligence’. Therefore, there 
was no reason to hesitate. For example, a marine affairs manager explained:  
If you (crew) can identify potential problems, and report them to the company, that 
is very good. The company will reward you for reporting. There is no any negative 
effect on individuals. (Marine Affairs Manager, C1)  
 
Predominantly, the value of such reports was confirmed by the shore management. It was 
regarded as a good practice that could make significant contributions to OHSM in both 
companies. For example, a marine engineering superintendent said: 
For a major case, there is a need for the company to take countermeasures. For a 
minor one, it could remind others to be more careful. It’s a good practice. It’s for 
the good of safety management. Everybody hopes that a ship is in a safe condition. 
(Marine Engineering Superintendent, C1)  
 
Some shore interviewees even commented that timely reporting of safety issues could 
‘avoid unnecessary economic losses’. As for the consequences of reporting, the 
management frequently referred to the phrase ‘non-blame attitude’ or ‘non-blame culture’ 
to indicate their standpoint on safety reporting. For instance, a marine affairs superintendent 
said: 
Encourage. The company always advocates a non-blame policy. You (crew) may 
report whatever you want. We hope you could report ten near-misses, but we don't 
want to see one accident. (Marine Affairs Superintendent, C2) 
 
In C1, there was a special reward policy for reporting near misses. Some 200 Yuan RMB 
would be rewarded to the person reporting one near miss. If a captain could report several 
near misses successively, 500 Yuan RMB would be rewarded.  
 
In general, it could be seen that safety reporting was encouraged by the shore management 
in both companies, irrespective of what the issue was, as long as it had safety implications 
for OHSM on board ships. ‘Fair treatment’ was also announced by the management in 
dealing with a report received from a ship. For example, the following paragraph was 
extracted from the management system of C1: 
The company guarantees that the person who makes the report will not be treated 
unfairly; instead, the company will give awards to those who are helpful in 
improving the company’s safety management and environmental protection. 
 
A few managers emphasised ‘the need for reporting’ by interpreting the relationship 
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between reporting and the allocation of accountability. For example, a marine engineering 
manager explained: 
(If) you (crew) hide problems; you do not fully understand the essence of the ISM 
Code and the management system. If you found a problem and made a report, it 
would be the company who would be held responsible. If you hid the problem but 
it was identified by the company, you would take full responsibility. (Marine 
Engineering Manager, C1)  
 
Therefore, the data suggested that the management’s stance in both companies was clear: if 
a safety problem was not reported, and it represented a hidden threat to the crew’s as well 
as to the ship’s safety, that is, if it was likely to ‘develop into an accident sooner or later’ 
which could lead to ‘damaging consequences’ (Marine Affairs Superintendent, C2) – and 
both the management and the crew were unwilling to see accidents occur. It seems that it 
was commonly believed that safety reporting could help promote OHSM on board ships. 
 
The role of safety reporting in OHSM was discussed in section 2.5.3 in the literature 
chapter. First, the reported problems could help management to understand the condition of 
OHSM on board ships. The management could therefore support crew members to solve 
the reported problems. Different kinds of shore support were widely discussed in Chapter 5. 
Second, based on the procedure of a management system, the reported items could trigger 
further investigation to identify the underlying reasons causing those problems. The 
identified reasons could help in the establishment of proper preventative measures and 
prevent the reoccurrence of some problems. Third, the reporting was based on the 
procedure of an OHSMS. The proper functioning of a safety-reporting subsystem within an 
OHSMS is essential for the successful OHSM in any organisation (Havold, 2000). 
Therefore, it could be seen that, from the management’s perspective, safety reporting in the 
shipping industry played an important role in promoting OHSM on board ships. 
Nevertheless, although the reporting was encouraged and a non-blame policy was 
emphasised by the management in both companies, my data further indicated that the 
management had a special concern for crews’ what it regarded as over-reporting on safety, 
which will be discussed next.  
 
7.2.2 ‘The Less (Reporting), the Better’ 
Despite the management’s encouragement of safety reporting, the analysis of data indicated 
another view: the less reporting, the better. It was found that the management in both 
companies were unwilling to countenance more safety-related problems reported from 
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ships, since they thought less reporting meant better shipboard management:  
Generally if they (crews) don't report any problems, it’s good news. It signifies that 
ship’s management is good. Every aspect on board is good. (Marine Affairs 
Manager, C2) 
 
If a captain doesn't report any problems, and nor does the chief engineer, this ship 
is perfect. It shows that everything is very good. (Marine Engineering 
Superintendent, C1)  
 
The two quotations show that there was a common understanding among the company’s 
management that the ‘number of reported events’ was an important indicator of the quality 
of shipboard OHSM. In other words, a lower number of reports implied a higher level 
quality of OHSM. 
 
Ships sail one voyage after another. One of the main duties for the shore management was 
to monitor and assess whether a voyage plan had been successfully and properly 
implemented. From their perspective, the successful completion of a voyage meant less 
reporting of any safety-related problems. For example, a senior manager commented:  
If you (a crew) completed a voyage, and hadn't reported any incidents/accidents, 
this would mean that the ship hadn't caused any major economic loss to the 
company. It represents the successful completion of the voyage. (Marine Affairs 
Manager, C2)  
 
Thus, it became clear that, in contrast to the attitude of encouragement illustrated in the 
previous sub-section, the ‘sub-agenda’ that emerged was that the reporting of safety 
problems was considered undesirable by the shore management. The review of the 
literature shows there is debate about whether low reporting rates indicate a better quality 
of OHSM at workplaces (Cox and Lippel, 2008; Balka and Freilich, 2008). Reason’s 
research (1997) at an organisational level found that a low reporting frequency may suggest 
an ‘image of safety’. However, he warned that it might not reflect the reality, and as a 
consequence, the improvement of workplace safety would be considerably compromised. 
So far, the discussion has been from the management’s perspective. From the crew’s 
perspective, the data showed a rather different picture in terms of their understanding of the 
reporting of various safety related issues. These will be detailed next.  
 
7.3 THE CREW 
In general, crews in both companies demonstrated a clear understanding of the company’s 
‘reporting encouragement’ policy. Also, they were aware of the general principle of 
‘seeking truth from the fact’. However, it was found that crews behaved differently in 
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practice. In this section, the immediate factors affecting a crew’s safety reporting will be 
explored from the crew’s perspective. The conclusion is drawn on the basis of the data 
analysis.  
 
7.3.1 The Need for Reporting 
According to the requirements of the management systems of both companies, safety 
reporting covered a wide range of OHSM activities on board a ship. Each of the crew 
members on board a ship had the responsibility to report safety-related events to the shore 
management no matter how minor they were – even if they were a ‘pin’ or ‘wire’ for fixing 
or lashing a lifeboat, as long as they had implications for improving shipboard work safety:  
According to the requirement (of the management system), even a tiny problem 
should be reported. Even if it had occurred today, and would be repaired tomorrow, 
it should also be written and reported. (3E, S4 C2)  
 
This requirement was commonly seen in other OHSMSs, such as that in Esso’s safety 
management manual (Hopkins, 2000). In general, the importance of making such reports 
was acknowledged by many crew members during the interviews:   
The report must be made. Self-inspection reports must be made regularly. If you 
don't have any deficiencies (to report), is it realistic? (3E, S2 C1)  
 
Self inspection was one of the major OHSM activities on board a ship. The inspection 
result should be reported to the shore management at regular intervals. In general, the crew 
had the common sense to know that, more or less, there were certain safety-related 
problems on board a ship. In a few cases, it might be that, indeed, there were no 
deficiencies to be identified on a ship, but that did not mean that the ship was perfect: 
If you cannot find out the problems yourselves, it doesn't mean you are 100 
percent perfect. If you dared to claim so, the shore management would come to 
assess and inspect ... to see whether you actually were 100 percent safe. (Bosun, 
S1 C1)  
 
The alternative conclusion to be drawn from the lack of any reports of safety issues could 
be a crew’s failure to identify safety-related problems, which further pointed to their 
incompetence regarding onboard safety management. Therefore, safety reporting was an 
indispensable feature of a crew’s routine work and was one of the main channels for 
improving shipboard OHSM.  
 
In addition, safety reports would also be checked by inspectors from external bodies, such 
as oil majors or CDI (see section 4.2.3). They served as key evidence of communication for 
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problem reporting and solving. During my fieldwork on S1 C1, a chief officer told the 
following story. Several years ago, the company had asked this ship to hide all the 
deficiency reports (treated as internal confidential documents) prior to an external 
inspection. But the absence of any deficiency reports was judged by the external inspectors 
to be a deficiency. In recent years, safety reporting has been emphasised by both 
companies: 
This area (reporting) involves an oil majors’ inspection. If we have deficiencies, 
they must be reported. Then where are the written records? (CO, S4 C2)   
 
Therefore, the data suggested the importance of reporting safety-related problems to the 
shore management at regular intervals to comply with not only the requirement of the 
management system but also that of external inspections, such as those from oil majors.  
 
Although the need for safety reporting was well recognised by many crew members, the 
study identified some immediate factors that affected a crew’s decision regarding reporting. 
The examination of those factors will be conducted along the three formal reporting 
systems, as stated in the ISM Code, as well as in the management systems of both 
companies, namely, ‘nonconformity reporting’, ‘accident reporting’, and ‘hazardous 
situations reporting’.  
 
7.3.2 Nonconformity Reporting 
In both companies, the definition of nonconformity in section 1.1.9 in the ISM Code was 
adopted equally in their management systems, which has been given in section 2.5.3 (safety 
reporting). Often, nonconformity was applied interchangeably with the term ‘deficiency’. 
In the management system in C1, the detailed nonconformity events included deficiencies 
identified in a PSC/FSC inspection, deficiencies identified during an oil majors’ inspection 
and dock inspection, the required shore support not being provided, deficiencies identified 
by the captain’s daily supervision, deficiencies identified by a company’s inspection, and 
deficiencies identified during self-inspection. In the management system in C2, the 
following events were principally specified: nonconformity in a system document, violation 
of operational procedures, failure to provide satisfactory service to customers, and failure 
of a ship’s equipment that affected the safe operation of the ship and jeopardised the 
environment. According to the procedures of the management systems in both companies, 
the nonconformity cases, as a major part of the ‘monthly self-inspection reports’, had to be 
reported to the shore management at monthly intervals. The data analysis showed that 
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crews had various considerations before a deficiency report was made. They will be 
detailed as follows.   
 
Incompetence of Safety Management 
From the crew’s perspective, reporting nonconformity cases could imply that the crew’s 
safety management on board was poor:  
If you (crew) report them, it is certainly not good for you. It has the implication 
that your job has not been done well. (4E, S4 C2)  
 
Thus, crews were sensitive about the number of reported cases. In other words, if a lot of 
cases were reported, this would affect the management’s impressions of the crew on that 
ship. The shore management might think that the ship’s leaders were not competent in their 
work:  
If you (crew) reported more, the shore management would have second thoughts: 
this ship often makes such reports, while other ships don’t do so. The shore 
management would think your ship had safety problems and that the ship’s leaders 
were no good. (2E, S2 C1)  
 
Furthermore, the company’s criteria for judging a ship leader’s competence also included 
his ability at problem solving. For example, a third officer said: 
If you solve (problems) perfectly, it shows that your individual competence is good. 
If you cannot, and you need support from the shore management, it might mean 
that your individual competence is poor. Others would have second thoughts about 
you (3O, S2 C1).  
 
There was discussion in section 5.2.2 about the company’s commitment to problem solving. 
However, the above comment suggests that if a deficiency were not solved by the crew and 
reported to the company, it could mean that the crew’s competency at problem solving was 
poor. In this context, the shore management’s ‘second thought’ would mean ‘doubting the 
crew’s competence’. In order to make a good impression on the shore management, some 
safety related problems were not reported even if they had not been solved by the crew.  
 
In addition, as mentioned in different sections in the data chapters, one of the major 
concerns for the shore management was the need to pass external inspections, particularly 
those by the oil majors. The self-reported deficiencies would be easily observed by an 
external inspector, which could lead to further enquiry into the deficiencies. In other words, 
an inspector could not easily identify whether a deficiency had not been written. Under 
such a circumstance, there was a chance of a ‘near miss’ unless it was incidentally targeted 
by an inspector. For example, a second engineer explained: 
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It (reporting deficiencies) is not good for external inspections. If an inspector 
found that you had many deficiency reports, he would doubt your ship’s 
management and check in more detail. (2E, S2 C1)  
 
Thus, it could be seen that the recorded deficiencies could affect an inspector’s judgement 
of a ship’s OHSM status. Furthermore, if a deficiency report was made in a written mode, it 
would have to be dealt with according to the relevant procedure in the management system. 
Follow-up measures would have to be taken, and written records would also have to be 
maintained accordingly. Thus, it could make things worse if a deficiency could not be 
rectified entirely. It would be same as the self-exposure of safety problems to an inspector. 
As a result, some cases were intentionally excluded from the reports.  
 
The Impact on Shore Management 
Apart from a company’s doubts about a crew’s competence regarding onboard safety 
management, the potential negative impact on the shore management was considered by 
crew members when making reports. In section 5.3, the impact of the support to crew by 
the shore management was discussed. Given the positive sides of such support, some new 
deficiencies might subsequently emerge. Thus, there was a need to report those deficiencies. 
Under such a circumstance, a crew’s reports could potentially affect the company’s 
performance evaluation of the managers or superintendents in charge of a particular ship. 
The following interview extract was selected to show this: 
A: There is much internal knowledge about what to report. Although some 
problems are severe, we should not report them. Some problems are minor, but we 
must report them. You might not understand… 
Q: What does that mean? 
A: Take, for instance, some equipment problems such as a pump or valves … If a 
superintendent in charge could not supply them on board duly, or the supplied 
spare parts had quality problems, we (crew) could not directly report the problems 
to the company.  
Q: Why? 
A: Each time a problem is reported, a senior manager or designated person might 
hold a meeting to review the problem and find a solution. If we made a report, the 
superintendent in charge would be questioned. He would have to explain the 
reason and might be reprimanded (by the manager). (CO, S1 C1)  
 
Some crew members clearly expressed the view that they did not want their immediate 
superior to be blamed because of their reports, particularly in consideration of managers’ or 
superintendents’ decisive power over crew arrangements, as discussed in section 6.3.2. 
Furthermore, given that the reported items would be investigated thoroughly by senior 
managers or designated persons of the company, crew members were worried that the 
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reported problems would lead senior managers to think that the department in charge of the 
ship had failed in its managerial and supervisory duty. For example, a senior officer said: 
For the Marine Affairs Department, they wanted ships to report fewer (problems), 
right? If you (ship) reported more (deficiencies), it would not be good for the 
company senior managers to see them. It also involves the shore management 
departments in the problem. (CO, S3 C2)   
 
In order to avoid the shore managers or superintendents being blamed by senior managers, 
a crew’s pre-communication with them was usually seen to be an initial step before a 
formal written deficiency report was sent. The reporting would be ‘guided’ by the manager 
or superintendent responsible for that ship regarding what and how to report. For example, 
a senior officer described the issues as follows: 
Sometimes, the superintendent hopes you (crew) report by telephone; sometimes, 
they hope you report by written (report). If you (communicate) through a written 
report directly, it’s very formal. His (superintendent’s) leader would also be able to 
see it, and it would affect the superintendent himself. This might not help us. So 
we would make a telephone call to him to make the report in advance in order to 
avoid annoying him. (CO, S2 C1) 
 
For some other crew members, the ‘importance’ of pre-communication was not entirely 
understood. As a result, they might be blamed by the shore management for their reports. 
The following is an example of this: 
One of the lifeboat’s engines could not be started by mechanical operation. The 
deficiency was reported to the company. Later, a superintendent contacted the ship, 
asking the captain to have a careful look at the problem before reporting it. It was a 
hint that the ship should not have reported this item. (2E, S3 C2) 
 
Furthermore, it was found that some deficiency reports could annoy the shore management. 
The shore management did not want some inherent deficiencies, particularly inherent 
equipment problems, to be reported. Some examples of this were observed during my trips 
on the four ships, which included the cargo pump problem on S1 C1, the tank heating 
system on S2 C1, and the anchoring system on S4 C2. They all had functional deficiencies 
although they appeared to work as usual. All those problems caused a significant 
inconvenience for the crew’s work. However, the management did not want the problems to 
be reported in written form:  
If you submitted a report about an inherent deficiency, they might ask you, ‘Should 
the ship be scrapped to eliminate the problem?’ (2E, S2 C1) 
 
A significant cost would be involved in order to solve those problems if they were dealt 
with according to the formal procedure set out in the safety management system. Thus, it 
was not difficult to understand why the shore management were unhappy to see such 
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reports. In some cases, the crew were even thought to have troubled their company 
intentionally. For example, a captain expressed his view: 
If I reported a deficiency that could not be solved easily by the company, the 
company might think that I was intentionally making things difficult. (Captain, S4 
C2)  
 
From the data, it could be seen that hesitation about reporting did exist among crews. In all, 
it was not beneficial to crews if the shore management were offended by the reports. 
Although pre-communication was observed before any deficiency reports were made to the 
company, these fundamental deficiencies were by no means solved, which remained a 
potential threat to shipboard OHSM.   
 
Deduction of Safety Bonus 
The research further found that deficiency reporting could affect the crew’s safety bonus. 
On board the ships, all the work was well structured across different hierarchical levels, and 
each position was assigned a specific duty in terms of the division of labour. Therefore, it 
was quite easy to identify to whom a deficiency related. The reported items would be 
assessed by the shore management as evidence when issuing or deducting a crew’s safety 
bonus in accordance with the company’s reward and punishment scheme. In C1, the safety 
bonus comprised several separate items, such as a one-hundred days safety contest bonus 
and a fuel oil consumption-saving reward. In C2, it amounted to 10 percent of a crew 
member’s total salary. During my field work, many crew members expressed concern for 
their safety bonus: 
We came for the purpose of making money, so we worry they might deduct our 
bonus. For some deficiencies, they would say it’s our responsibility. But, we would 
not think so. (Pumpman, S3 C2)  
 
The issue of the safety bonus was basically decided by the shore management. The reports 
were one of the major grounds for deciding how much to award to a crew. Although some 
crew members felt this was ‘unfair’, as illustrated in the data, they could take only 
whatever was given to them. In C1, the salary reform had been launched just two years 
previously. It was linked more closely with the result of the company’s assessment of the 
crew’s performance. The deficiency reports were part of the evidence used to assess their 
performance. One captain mentioned that there were often deductions from his salary by 
his company: 
Now it is tricky. If a problem was reported, my money would be deducted. 
Personally, my salary was often docked by the company. Usually they deducted me 
1,000 Yuan RMB a month. (Captain, S1 C1)  
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In C1, the liability for each deficiency particularly indicated the ship leaders’ failure to play 
a proper supervisory role on board ship. Thus, it was used to promote ship leaders’ sense of 
responsibility in shipboard OHSM. Understandably, the impact of deficiency reports on a 
crew member’s income could discourage them from voluntary reporting. If a deficiency 
was a major one, there would be more negative impacts on the crew member involved. 
Then, some situations described in section 6.3.2 would also apply. 
 
7.3.3 Accident Reporting 
If a nonconformity case developed into an accident, it would be dealt with more seriously. 
Both companies’ management systems showed that they adopted a similar definition of the 
term ‘accident’, as was given in section 2.5.3 (safety reporting). Should an accident happen 
on board, the crew should first respond according to the emergency action procedures, 
which included immediate telephone contact with the shore management. In C1, the form 
‘Accident Report’ should be filled out and sent to the company. The report should include 
an initial cause analysis of the accident and any relevant written and photographic evidence. 
In C2, the report was made at two sequential stages, the first ‘Initial Report on Shipboard 
Emergencies’ and the second ‘Accident/Incident Follow-up Report’.  
 
In both companies, the scales of accidents were well structured and defined. In C1, all the 
accidents were divided into four scales: catastrophe, major accident, average accident and 
minor accident. In C2, they were divided into five scales: from A to E, A standing for the 
most severe while E was the least severe. To illustrate this, the different scales of an 
accident in C2 are given (Table 6). If the consequence of an accident met any one of the 
three index standards, i.e., casualties, property loss and environmental impact, the 
corresponding scale was applied.  
 
Table 6: Categories of Accidents 
 
Consequences of Accidents 
Scale Casualties Property Loss Environmental Impact 
A Fatalities Explosion/Collision/Ground
ing etc. Total Loss ≥ 
200,000 Yuan
xiii
 
Major oil spill≥ 100BBLS
xiv
 or uncontrolled 
gas release＞ 10 tons or equivalent 
                                                        
xiii
 Yuan: a base unit of Chinese currency. 1 Yuan = 0.095 British Pounds (6 Feb 2011) 
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B DAFWC
xv
 Ship Not under Control etc. 
Total Loss ≥ 100, 000 but 
<200,000 Yuan 
Regional environment impact, caused 
subpoena/punishment that could harm 
company’s credibility 
C RWI
xvi
 Total Loss < 100,000 Yuan 
but ≥ 50,000 Yuan 
Regional environment impact and violation of 
environmental law at moderate level, having 
potential impact on company’s credibility 
D Medical 
Treatment 
Injury 
Total Loss < 50,000 Yuan 
but ≥ 5,000 Yuan 
No environmental impact, minor violation of 
environmental law and minor impact on 
company’s credibility 
E First Aid 
Case 
< 5,000 Yuan LoC
xvii
 < 1 BBL, no spill on deck or to 
environment  
 
In general, most crew members agreed that an accident had to be reported to the shore 
management according to the reporting procedures. In the previous sub-section, various 
factors affecting a crew’s nonconformity reporting were discussed. However, the impact of 
an accident on a crew became significant provided that one could not escape the charge of 
work negligence. Apart from the deduction of safety bonus, rank promotion, job 
appointment and security would all be affected (see section 6.3.2 for the impact on a crew). 
A common view was that if an accident occurred, for whatever reason, it meant someone 
‘had not done his work well’. In C1, one of the special disciplines applied to the crew 
member who caused an accident was rank degradation. A junior officer gave an example: 
One of our company’s ships collided with a small ship, and the latter was sunk. 
Investigation showed that it was the chief officer’s problem. That chief officer was 
degraded to second officer. (2O, S2 C1)  
 
In C2, the common practice was to terminate an employment contract immediately after an 
accident. During my field work on both ships in C2, a few similar cases were heard, for 
example, the ‘collision with wharf’ (S3 C2) and the ‘loss of anchor’ accidents (S4 C2). The 
crew member who caused the accident would never be employed by the company again. 
Despite the fact that an accident could not be covered up and it had to be reported, the data 
showed that some of the accident reports could still be biased, particularly for minor 
accidents.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                        
xiv
 Barrel 
xv
 DAFWC: Days Away from Work Cases 
xvi
 Restricted Work Injury 
xvii
 Loss of Cargo 
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Concern of Liability 
According to the management systems of both companies, all the accidents had to be 
immediately reported to the shore management. Simply, the consequences could not be 
handled properly without the intervention of the management. An accident report would be 
drafted by the head of the department on board and verified by the captain. Principally, the 
report was meant to be based on the facts. However, this was not always the case in practice. 
On some occasions, a report could be purposefully biased. For example, I met the chief 
engineer on S3 C2. Before he had come to C2, he had worked for C1 for almost thirty years. 
He talked about his observations and experiences in dealing with an accident report: 
In the past, when I was in C1, the way of dealing with this was: first, it (report) 
should not link to your responsibility; second, (it) should not be attributed to your 
colleagues (responsibility); and third, (it) should not be linked to your company 
leaders (responsibility). If you throw (discharge) all the responsibilities to your 
company, do you mean that the shore management is not effective? Definitely, this 
is not good. Then what to do? Try to find some causes from yourself, and some 
from the external natural environment. The rationale is not to affect anyone, or to 
affect everybody as little as possible. (CE, S3 C2)  
 
A similar view was held by some other senior officers who had experienced one or more 
accidents. In general, the common feeling for drafting an accident report was that there was 
a tendency to attribute the accident to more objective causes rather than human-error 
related factors. Once an accident had been reported, it would be investigated by the 
company. The initial report would be seriously considered given the unavailability of a 
real-time monitoring process on board. It would serve as important evidence for the 
‘distribution of responsibility’ for the persons involved in the accident. Therefore, it was 
understandable that the wording of the report was of particular concern for the crew.   
 
‘Violation of Procedures’  
After an accident had been reported to the shore management, an investigation team might 
be formed for further investigation depending on the nature of the accident. In the 
management systems, provisions were made to guide the investigation. In C1, it was stated 
specifically that the focus of any accident investigation should be on the crew’s compliance 
with procedure and their competence. The research showed that the ‘perceived 
investigation result’ would not encourage a crew’s reporting: 
Basically, as for the investigation results, more than 90 percent (of accidents) were 
caused by the violation of operational procedures. They (shore management) 
thought if an accident was not caused by the crew’s violation of procedures, it 
would not happen. If you read many circulars, they are all about a crew’s violation 
of operational procedures ... He he! (Scornful laughter) (3E, S1 C1)  
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Apparently, this situation discouraged crews from making honest accident reports. 
Although it was clearly stated that an accident must be reported to the company, it was 
found that the minor accidents (C1) and accidents located in Category E (Table 6) in C2 – 
the personal injury accidents – were most likely to be underreported. My field notes 
recorded a few personal injuries on the four ships, and none of them were reported. Among 
those, one bloody injury case was described: 
The motorman showed his finger covered in blood. The finger had been hit by a 
roller in the engine room, and his thumbnail had come off. He pressed the root of 
the finger that had been hurt, gnashing his teeth and showing pain on his face. 
(Field Notes, S1 C1, 8 February 2010)  
 
The cut was treated and shore medical assistance was called for on arrival at a foreign port. 
On the returning voyage, I asked the second engineer how the shore management had 
responded. He said the accident had not been reported. Then I raised further questions: 
Q: How do you deal with the shore commission fees? 
A: (In the name of) seeing a doctor.  
Q: If it was reported, how would it be dealt with? 
A: If it was reported, the company would think it was mainly because of the 
violation of procedures. The safety bonus would be deducted from top to bottom 
(all crew). But the real cause was fatigue. (2E, S1 C1) 
 
On board S1 C1, almost all the crew members I met thought the injury was caused by 
fatigue (also see section 6.2.3 on hectic schedules and long working hours). The crew’s past 
experience told them that if the accident were reported, the result would be, as a Chinese 
proverb says, ‘to lift a stone to drop it onto one’s own feet’. Therefore, the crew would 
prefer not to report an accident. The literature review showed that the ‘human error’ 
investigation approach (Psarros et al., 2010; Oltedal and McArthur, 2011) or the 
‘person-oriented’ focus (Oltedal and Wadsworth, 2010) might lead to negligence in the 
identification of ‘real causal factors’, which achieved only ‘limited success’ in reducing 
unsafe practices. The example described above showed a similar situation to those 
described in the literature. The study showed that the ‘perceived’ investigation result 
significantly affected the crew’s willingness to report. Typically, the consequence was that a 
significant number of minor personal injury accidents were not reported, and the shore 
management would not be ‘informed’ unless an accident caused a loss of property or 
environmental pollution. 
 
7.3.4 Hazardous Situation Reporting 
In parallel with reporting nonconformities and accidents, reporting hazardous situations 
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received equal emphasis. Following the implementation of the ISM Code, IMO has made 
dedicated efforts regarding this. In practice, the term ‘near miss’ was widely used to 
represent hazardous situations that occur on board ship. In the MSC
xviii
/Circ.1015 (2001), 
shipping companies were urged to promote ‘reporting near misses’. This requirement was 
made even clearer in the MSC-MEPC
xix/Circ.7 (2008) ‘Guidance on Near-miss Reporting’, 
in which the investigation of near misses was regarded as ‘an integral component of 
continuous improvement in the management systems’. The purpose of any investigation 
was to learn lessons from the reported cases, since a near miss could have the same 
underlying causes as an accident. In addition, the two circulars highlighted the importance 
of ‘anonymisation’, the ‘avoidance of punitive action’ and ‘confidentiality’ in dealing with 
near miss reports.  
 
Both companies adopted the definition of a near miss from the IMO recommendations (see 
section 2.5.3 safety reporting). However, reporting near misses was a recent development 
of the management systems in both companies in response to the requirement of the IMO 
recommendations as well as the oil majors’ inspections. In line with the requirement, both 
companies adopted an anonymised approach in order to encourage more near-miss 
reporting. Not only could this help protect individual privacy, but also it could be in line 
with the spirit of the company’s non-blame policy (see section 7.2.1). In C1, a list of 
hazardous situations was given in the management system, which included, but was not 
limited to, the following events: 
 Unsafe practices in daily safety management; 
 Unsafe practices or procedural violations in safety-related operation; 
 Incompletion of operational measures in safety operations; 
 Violation of procedures in shipboard maintenance; 
 Bad operational habits in personal OHS; 
 Incompletion of the corrective measures to non-conformities, incidents or near 
misses.  
 
On each of the two ships in C1, there was one box labelled ‘NEAR MISS’ in a public place. 
One was put in the meeting room and the other was in the crew canteen, meaning both were 
easily visible. It was used for the collection of voluntary reports by whoever on board 
witnessed an unsafe act or behaviour; the report should be made anonymously. The purpose 
                                                        
xviii
 MSC: Maritime Safety Committee 
xix
 MEPC: Marine Environment Protection Committee 
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was to ‘protect’ those persons who made the report and those who were involved. In C1, the 
report was requested as soon as a near miss was identified on board, while in C2, there was 
a compulsory requirement that at least two near misses be reported every month, the logic 
behind this being that the shore management did not believe that in a month there would be 
no near miss occurrences on board. The data suggested that there were some misgivings in 
crew members’ minds about making near miss reports. These will be discussed below.  
 
Potential Affect on Individuals 
It was just mentioned, a near miss report was made anonymously to both companies. 
However, some crew members were still worried by such an ‘anonymised’ approach in 
terms of its effectiveness. For example, a second officer said: 
It was said to be anonymous … but which ship sent this report ... about which 
case ... they (shore management) could still know who you were. It’s useless for 
anonymity. Even if you didn't write your name, the management could still know 
it’s you. (2O, S1 C1)  
 
The easy identification of ‘who caused the case’ was commonly recognised by crew. The 
reason was that the work on board was ‘one radish; one whole’, a saying often mentioned 
by them, meaning that there were very few overlaps in their respective duty tasks. Under 
such a situation, the anonymisation seemed to be essentially ineffective.  
  
It was agreed by both management and crews that reporting would not affect a crew 
member’s safety bonus, and it was even rewarded by C1 (see section 7.2.1). However, the 
data showed that it could have an indirect effect on a crew member’s job arrangements and 
promotion. This view existed among crews in both companies. It was particularly true in 
C1 with which most crew members had long-term contracts. For example, a junior engineer 
said: 
It would affect my future work. For example, the loss of electricity on board, we 
might not report, since it didn't cause any losses. If it was reported, it would have a 
negative impact on me. My future work and promotion would definitely be 
affected. So the impact would be severe. (3E, S2 C1) 
 
It has been mentioned that a near miss would also be assessed and investigated by the shore 
management in both companies. If the result of the investigation was judged as valuable for 
improving a ship’s safety, it would be circulated among the company’s fleet. Therefore, 
many ships’ crews in the company would know about the case. It was mentioned that it 
would be easy for the shore management to identify who was the cause of the near miss; 
similarly, the person who caused it could be easily identified by his fellow colleagues. For 
 158 
example, a second engineer expressed his worry about the potential impact on his personal 
reputation:  
Even though the person’s name is not mentioned, other colleagues could know by 
guessing, since they would know who the second engineer is on that ship. It has a 
bad affect on the person. (2E, S2 C1) 
 
The importance of ‘face’ at work for Chinese people has been discussed in the literature 
(see section 2.7.2). It could mean that the loss of face would be known to his colleagues. 
Therefore, it becomes clear that reporting near misses could have a potential unfavourable 
impact on individual crew members.  
 
Detrimental to Crew Solidarity 
Moreover, the research found that the potential impact could go beyond individual crew 
members; it could affect solidarity among the crew. A senior officer explained: 
When reporting near misses, the captain would consider our interests. The captain 
is the same as us. We are arranged to work together. We are colleagues, brothers. 
When on shore, the hierarchical position gap doesn’t exist anymore. (CO, S1 C1) 
 
It could be seen that the negative impact on a crew’s relationships was considered before a 
report was made. There is an ancient Chinese saying which says that ‘harmony matters’. 
Harmonious relationships are valued by the Chinese, and this applies equally in the 
organisational context. The ‘avoidance of conflict and need for harmony’, as part of the 
core values of Confucianism, are upheld by the Chinese people (Fang, 1999) (also see 
section 2.7.2). However, a harmonious relationship could be disrupted if such a report were 
submitted to the shore management. An example was given below: 
If you made such a report, you would have offended that person. We all know each 
other and are not willing to offend others. (Rating -1, S4 C2)  
 
The data analysis also showed that some major near misses were not reported: 
Once, the ship was sailing seaward, and the third officer was on duty. The captain 
went to the bridge ... (he) could not see the sky (ahead). There was a very big ship 
ahead, and the view was blocked by that ship – You could imagine how big it was! 
The foreign ship was a stand-on vessel (according to the collision regulation). It 
would not give way to us. The captain immediately took control … Luckily, an 
accident was avoided. You guess, would the captain report it to the company? 
Certainly, he would not. If he reported it, he would harm the third officer. The third 
officer would definitely finish (his career). (CO, S2 C1)  
 
This account shows that a considerable sense of solidarity existed among Chinese crews. In 
a similar way, one chief engineer expressed his concern regarding young crew members: 
The young crew members ... they are very kind usually. One might show 
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dangerous behaviour due to carelessness. I met this situation on this ship. Should I 
kick him out? Then how should I deal with it? Try my best to remedy the situation, 
rather than something else (reporting). (CE, S3 C2)  
 
In general, the importance of maintaining solidarity on board ship was strongly desired by 
most Chinese crew members. The study showed a strong presence of ‘in-group 
collectivism’ on board ships, which could affect a ship leader’s decision to report near 
misses to the shore management.  
 
Rule Restriction  
In addition, the study found that another factor that limited the crews’ near miss reporting 
was the rules of the management systems. It has been argued that both companies 
encouraged near miss reporting. Meanwhile, the management systems of the two 
companies specified that the reported cases should not be repetitions of those that had been 
reported previously from any of the ships. The reason was that all ships had been informed 
of those cases, and the repeated reporting meant a lack of care regarding the company’s 
notifications, which equally meant the lack of sense of responsibility. For instance, a senior 
officer said: 
All the near misses that have been reported previously should not be repeated. If it 
has occurred once and it occurs a second time, then it proves that your (ship’s) 
management was not good. (CO, S1 C1)  
 
The restraint of this rule led to a gradual reduction in reportable cases: 
Generally, the number of reportable near misses was reduced. We have almost 
completed reporting whatever we are able to think of. We have almost finished 
reporting, because we should not repeat the mistakes we have made previously. 
(Captain, S1 C1) 
 
The reoccurrence of a particular case could signify where there was a vulnerability that was 
more likely to cause an incident or accident. This constraint of this rule could lead to the 
company missing out on valuable statistical data. At the beginning of this sub-section, it 
was stated that, in C2, two near misses should be reported on a monthly basis. The 
assumption was that it was impossible for there to be no such case on a big ship. However, 
from the crew’s perspective, they showed a different understanding of this rule. In order to 
meet the requirement, some crew members described how they responded to this 
requirement: 
We have to submit a report even if there are no such cases. What should we report 
if there are no (such cases)? (As a result), the only way is to think and fabricate… . 
(CO, S4 C2) 
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For (the purpose of) collecting cases, the captain asked the crew whenever he met 
us. (The captain said), ‘Report a case to me today’… (with a facial expression of 
joking). (2O, S3 C2)  
 
In general, the response of the crews on the two ships in C2 showed that they did not take 
this requirement seriously in their work practice. The data presented above suggest the 
failure of the requirements of non-repetition reporting and compulsory near-miss reporting. 
As a consequence, the shore management’s evaluation of the paper logs reported by crews 
was of very limited value for OHSM on board ships.  
 
During my field trips on board the four ships, some near misses were observed and noted 
down in the field notes, which included the leak of Phenol gas on S1 C1, Pxylene 
sample-taking on S2 C1, the mooring operation on S3 C2, and cargo tank washing on S4 
C2. The last one, the cargo tank washing operation, is given below to illustrate:  
It was a fine day sailing at sea. The tank washing work was arranged among the 
crew on the deck department. I decided to participate in their work … I saw deck 
ratings wearing only common yarn gloves. The washing required crew members to 
go down to the bottom of the tanks, which were more than 10 meters high, but 
nobody wore any protective apparatus on their heads (faces). I could feel the 
pesticide-like smell from time to time. During the break, I kept asking whether this 
cargo was toxic. They said, yes. One of the ratings showed me his thumb. His skin 
had become white and chapped … When I climbed out of the cargo tank, I felt 
faint. The skin on my fingers felt hot. I remembered that I had touched the mop 
when sweeping the floor… . (Field Notes, S4 C2, 9 April 2010) 
 
Although many of the cases observed on board the ships had the features of a near miss as 
defined previously, the data suggested that they were mostly neglected by the crews and by 
no means were they reported to the shore management. They occurred in a crew’s 
day-to-day operations and the crew gave them no further thought. Working at risk became 
part of their lives on board.  
 
7.3.5 Under-reporting and Biased Reporting 
In section 7.3.1, it was shown that the need for safety reporting was understood by many 
crew members. However, in practice, it was carried out in a different way. In sections 7.3.2, 
7.3.3, and 7.3.4, the immediate factors that affected the reporting of nonconformities, 
accidents and hazardous situation were widely identified. They all suggest that 
OHSM-related problems were not factually and fully reported. Instead, a significant 
number of them were underreported or biased-reported, which will be further discussed 
below.  
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The interview data with the crew members showed that a significant number of them 
showed reservations regarding the question ‘whether all the safety-related problems were 
fully reported according to the facts’. Surprisingly, I was given a negative answer. In reality, 
the data suggested that very few of them were willing to participate in voluntary reporting. 
The low ranking crew showed a significant disinterest in reporting. They thought it was 
unnecessary to make such reports: 
The reporting is done by the captain. Whether he reports to the shore management, 
it’s up to him. The lower ranking crew would not make a report. It’s unnecessary 
to talk about this. It is nothing to do with my job. (Motorman, S4 C2) 
 
This motorman thought the reporting was done mainly by senior officers and so it was 
irrelevant to his work. A rating also showed an indifferent attitude towards reporting near 
misses: 
The near miss ... It didn't have any real consequences. We feel it has passed and 
there is no need to report it. What is it for? (Rating, S3 C2) 
 
The research by Bailey et al. (2007) identified different levels of risk perception in the 
maritime industry, and lower ranking crew members also showed a lower level of risk 
perception, which was similar to the findings of this study. Regarding the officers, they 
were supposed to be more active and were obliged to submit reports. In a similar way, the 
data suggested that voluntary reporting was rare in both companies. A captain described the 
gap between what the shore management expected and what the crew actually thought: 
It is very likely they will not submit a report. They (shore management) are leaders 
and they want to know everything about us: Don't hide anything. But it is difficult 
to do as they wish. (Captain, S3 C2)  
 
A senior engineer felt he was placed in a dilemma about whether a problem should be 
reported, since making a report meant the problem could be solved soon. Otherwise, there 
would be trouble:  
If a problem was reported, it would have to be solved: You (crew) completed a 
report ... you knew it was wrong and you didn't solve it … not only would the crew 
be in trouble, but also the company would be in trouble. It was very easy to be 
identified by inspectors. Since some problems could not be solved by the crew 
alone, a flexible way for the Chinese was not to write (down the problems). (CE, 
S1 C1)  
 
In general, it could be seen that a balance would be considered in terms of deciding whether 
a problem should be reported. These issues were widely discussed in sections 7.3.2 to 7.3.4.  
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In addition, it was found that crew fluidity could also weaken a crew’s willingness to make 
reports. This appeared to be more evident on two ships in C2 where many crew members 
were employed on short-term contracts. For example, one senior bosun talked about his 
thirty years of experience as a seafarer: 
In general, I would not submit a report. We are freelance seafarers. We work here 
and there. It (problem) would not be reported until there was an accident. In that 
situation, you could not avoid (reporting). (Bosun, S4 C2)  
 
The data showed that the employment of short-term contract seafarers could contribute to 
the under-reporting of safety problems and thereafter weaken the outcome of OHSM in the 
shipping industry. The reason is given in section 8.3.5 (The fluidity of seafaring 
occupations).  
 
As a result, ‘self-digestion’ was referred to by some crew members in dealing with 
safety-related problems on board ships. They might not report a problem until a significant 
consequence occurred. For example, a chief officer said: 
It was rare (to report). If you reported (it) to the shore management, it would cause 
trouble. Usually, it would be digested on board unless it caused serious 
consequences. (CO, S3 C2)  
 
Although it was not stated what kind of troubles these were, the data analysis between 
sections 7.3.2 and 7.3.4 was able to shed some light on this. In brief, the discussion in this 
sub-section showed the under-reporting of safety related problems was very common in 
crews’ reporting practice.  
 
As well as under-reporting, it was found that biased reporting existed on ships in both 
companies. The data showed that crew members, particularly senior officers, would take 
‘deliberate considerations’ prior to sending any reports to the shore management. For 
example, a captain talked about the so-called ‘principle’ that guided his reporting: 
Basically for us, the principle of reporting is to report only the good and not the 
bad, to avoid critical points and to dwell on the trivial. (Captain, S1 C1)  
 
As mentioned above, it was accepted that it was impossible to have no safety problems on 
board at all. However, some crew members commented that the reporting could be done in 
an alternative way. For example, a chief officer said:  
We had certain considerations. The ship could not report all the issues (to the shore 
management). Also, (the ship) could not report nothing. We could report some 
innocuous cases. (CO, S4 C2)  
 
 163 
Among those ships that did submit reports, the data showed that crews tended to report 
‘innocuous’ cases which were of less significance to the OHSM. This view was commonly 
held among many crew members:  
Sometimes, if it is hard to find anything, I just randomly write something 
unimportant, for example, I find something that is going to expire. (2O, S2 C1) 
 
In the kitchen, the flour was put on the fire prevention station, where it was not 
allowed. Let’s make a report. (Bosun, S2 C1) 
 
Some other similar examples given by crew members included the belated correction of 
nautical charts (2O, S4 C2), incorrect recording in the logbook (2E, S3 C2) etc. The study 
showed that many reported items were deliberately ‘designed’ by the crew. For one thing, 
the reporting was submitting with the aim of meeting the shore management’s requirement; 
for another, the reported items were, in nature, of little significance to the OHSM on board 
ships. The data suggested that the real situation about a crew’s day-to-day work practice 
was not truly reflected in the reports.  
 
7.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter dealt with ship-to-shore safety reporting (communication). The study was 
made by examining the perspectives of both the shore managements and the crew. From the 
management’s perspective, they showed an open and encouraging attitude toward crews’ 
safety reporting. Equally, the encouragement of reporting was also written in the 
management systems of both companies. However, from the crews’ perspective, although 
they recognised that there was a need for reporting, they did not act in accordance with this. 
The data analysis was based on the examination of three major reporting requirements: 
nonconformity reporting, accident reporting and hazardous situations reporting. The 
reasons that affected those reporting requirements were explored.  
 
Regarding the nonconformity reporting, the study showed that crews worried that the 
reporting could lead management to blame them for their bad safety arrangements on board. 
Crews also worried that the reporting could offend some of the shore management. 
Furthermore, crews were worried that the reporting could lead to a reduction in their safety 
bonus. As for the accident reporting, the data showed that this depended on the nature of 
the accident. For those accidents that resulted in considerable consequences, although they 
had to be reported, there was still the possibility of biased reporting in an attempt to reduce 
the negative impact on the crew members involved. Minor accidents, particularly personal 
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injuries, were least likely to be reported. Crews’ past experiences of the result of shore 
management’s investigation did not encourage them to make any reports. With regard to 
hazardous situations reporting, given the company’s anonymous approach and non-blame 
policy, the study showed that the reporting could potentially affect a crew’s self-interests 
and their solidarity on board. The rule’s restriction could also affect a crew’s reporting.  
 
The findings after examining the three kinds of reporting showed that a significant gap 
existed between the management’s expectations and a crew’s work practices. To a great 
extent, management’s expectations for safety reporting were unmet. The study revealed that 
a significant number of unsafe events remained unreported, under-reported and reported 
with bias. The study also explained why crews tended to report insignificant safety-related 
events rather than those that actually occurred in their daily work. Although less reporting 
and the reporting of insignificant events could create an ‘image of safety’, it was superficial 
to a large extent and did not help proper OHSM. Apparently, the under-reporting and biased 
reporting led to the accumulation of more safety-related problems that were not then solved, 
and so could contribute to a higher possibility of the occurrence of a major accident. 
Further discussion in relation to its negative consequences in relation to OHSM is given in 
Chapter 9. 
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CHAPTER 8 (SHIP-TO-SHORE) COMMUNICATION FOR SAFETY 
SUGGESTIONS  
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Following the discussion in the previous chapter on safety issue reporting, this chapter will 
examine ship-to-shore communication for safety suggestions, as stated in section 2.5.5. 
Reporting safety suggestions were both required and encouraged by the shore management 
in both companies. They included, but were not limited to, regular review reports of the 
management systems and safety practices that could help improve OHSM on board ships. 
This chapter will explore the immediate factors affecting crews’ reporting of safety 
suggestions. In addition, the impact on OHSM practice will be discussed. First, the shore 
management’s attitude is examined; this is followed by a general discussion of the crews’ 
response. The findings will then be summarised.   
 
8.2 THE MANAGEMENT 
From the discussion in the previous chapters, it is not difficult to see that the shore 
management in both companies had a strong desire to improve OHSM on board their ships. 
There was much evidence that the shore management valued crews’ suggestions that might 
improve OHSM.  
 
8.2.1 Improvement of the Management System 
In order to encourage crews’ participation in the improvement of OHSM on board ships, 
certain measures were in place in both companies. A captain’s review report was a formal 
report that achieved this objective. In both companies, this review report needed to be made 
at regular intervals. In C1, a ship’s captain was required to make such a report every six 
months. However, if he worked for less than the specified period, a review would have to 
be completed before he left a ship. The captain was required to organise review meetings 
among crew members to assess the real effect of the management system on board. They 
included, but were not limited to, the operationalisation of the management system, the 
crew’s level of satisfaction with the shore-based support and the deficiencies of the 
management system. Particularly, the crew’s comments and suggestions for the 
improvement of the management system were requested. The following reason was given 
by a manager: 
After all, who are the persons who implement (the system)? – The crew 
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themselves. If the crew thought some rules were impracticable, it would be 
difficult for them to follow them. If we (shore management) did not follow the 
crew’s suggestions, the result would be bad. So we must change. There is a need to 
collect the crew’s comments and suggestions. (Safety and Quality Manager, C2)  
 
In a similar way, a marine engineering manager highlighted the role of the management 
system in maintaining a ship’s safety as well as the role of the crew in improving the 
system:  
In a shipping company, a management system is essential. If the system is 
incomplete, a crew’s onboard work would be compromised. Very likely, a ship’s 
safety would be seriously affected. As soon as a review report was sent to shore 
office, the senior management would organise with us to discuss the reported items. 
If the crew’s suggestions and opinions were reasonable, the management system 
would be modified. It is to control safety fundamentally. (Marine Engineering 
Manager, C1)  
 
It could easily be seen that the shore management in both companies showed their open 
attitudes toward the improvement of their management systems. They all agreed that crews 
should be fully consulted before any revision was made. Meanwhile, some other shore 
interviewees expressed the view that the revision of the management systems was led 
mainly by the shore management. In particular, the shore management’s access to various 
resources was highlighted:  
We provided channels (of communication) for crews, but the revision of the 
system was mainly done by the shore management. The management is in charge 
of tracing changes in international regulations, the latest safety requirements and 
standards. (Marine Affairs Superintendent, C2)  
 
The data showed that some shore interviewees acknowledged that their work was done 
‘appropriately’. Some others commented that it could be ‘troublesome’ if a management 
system was frequently revised, since it involved ‘many ships’ and the ‘replacement of many 
materials’. In general, many of them agreed that the revision of the management system 
should be given with the highest priority, given that a revision involved a significant 
workload.  
 
8.2.2 Reasonable Suggestions 
Apart from the crew’s participation in the revision of the management systems, an 
anonymised questionnaire survey was another approach which was identified as aiding the 
improvement of OHSM on board ships. The interview data showed that such a kind of 
survey was conducted regularly by both companies for the purpose of gathering ‘reasonable 
suggestions’ from crews. Typically, when a ship called at a domestic port, the shore 
 167 
management would have an opportunity to visit the ship and distribute questionnaires 
among the crew. In C1, a quarterly- or six-monthly based questionnaire survey would be 
carried out while in C2, irregular surveys would be done whenever it was considered 
necessary. Essentially, there would be one arranged by the end of each year. As a result of 
the survey, the commonly addressed areas would be reviewed and discussed by the shore 
management. For example, in C1, a superintendent described his company’s practice as 
follows: 
When a ship called at a domestic port, we might go to the ship for a survey. We 
would issue a questionnaire to the crew, and they would be requested to complete 
it anonymously. The company values crews’ opinions in improving work safety. 
The company would pay more attention to the areas frequently mentioned by 
crews. (Quality and Safety Superintendent, C1)   
 
In addition, in C1, there was a dedicated column on the company’s webpage asking crews 
to contribute whatever was potentially valuable for the improvement of shipboard OHSM. 
This was open to all crews to access whenever they wanted. In order to encourage crews’ 
active participation, C1 would give some material awards, while C2 would give a bonus 
reward provided that a suggestion was assessed as being of real value. A marine affairs 
manager gave one example of a crew reporting their good practice to their company: 
Crews report their safety comments or suggestions to the captain. The captain 
reports all of them to the shore office. Once a ship called at a port and the ship 
reported a suggestion for the ship’s operation in that port. The shore management 
found it was very good and it was distributed to all ships. It was to share others’ 
experience to improve ship’s safety management. (Marine Affairs Manager, C2)  
 
In general, it was found from the interviews with the shore management in both companies 
that their attitude of encouraging crews to make more safety suggestions was perceived in a 
similar way to that of the safety reporting discussed in section 7.2.1. Given the examples 
provided by the management, the data clearly suggested that there existed a significant gap 
between the management’s expectations and crews’ thoughts. The underlying factors will 
be further explored below.  
 
8.3 THE CREW 
The above discussion was from the shore management’s perspective. However, the data 
collected from ships showed that the situation was different from the crews’ perspective. 
The research found that crews’ willingness to report suggestions was affected by various 
factors. These will all be discussed in this section.  
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8.3.1 The Managerial Influence 
Provided that a crew was willing to make suggestions, the data showed that the 
communication (reporting) could be influenced by the responses of the shore management.  
 
Response to the Revision of the System  
The previous section argued from the management’s perspective that the ongoing revision 
of the management system played an important role in improving onboard OHSM practice. 
The study on board ships in both companies showed that their management systems had not 
improved. Many crew members complained that too many written reports needed to be 
made to the shore management:  
Today, this ship has a problem relating to tank washing, and the relevant inspection 
forms are sent onboard. Tomorrow, that ship has a collision accident at sea, and the 
correspondent inspection forms are also sent on board. Consequently, there is a 
huge stack ... too many (reports) need to be submitted. (Captain, S2 C1)  
 
This was particularly true in C1. Apart from the reports specified in the management 
system, ships also participated in additional safety-related activities, such as the ‘Great 
Safety Inspection Activity’ organised by its parent company. In response to its requirement, 
a significant number of extra written reports needed to be produced and sent to the shore 
management.  
 
Apart from ‘redundant’ reporting items, the problem of ‘repetition’ in the reports was also 
identified. For example, a chief engineer said: 
There is much repetitive content. For example, for the deficiency report and the 
self-inspection report, the contents are similar. They are complicated and 
troublesome. We suggest revising it. (CE, S2 C1)  
 
In general, there were strong appeals from crews to reduce redundant reports – they should 
be submitted in ‘a simplified mode’. But the shore management’s response to their 
suggestions was discouraging:    
The suggestions were given to the management … generally there would be no 
response to us. Till now, a long (period of) time has passed, and nothing has 
changed. There is no other way. (Captain, S2 C1)  
 
We raised the point to the shore management, but there was no response. Our 
suggestions have been of little use. (3E, S4 C2) 
 
As a result, some crew members evaluated the reporting system as a ‘mixed and messy 
dish’. In the shipboard interviews, the question was also asked why company management 
showed so little concern for crews’ suggestions about simplifying the reporting procedures. 
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Some interesting points were raised by crew members. One was that the shore management 
treated the management system as a ‘showcase’ of its company, equal to one’s appearance. 
The management wanted to show its customers as well as external inspectors their 
excellence in OHSM. The management wanted to show them that its management system 
had achieved a certain degree of ‘theoretical depth’. Given this consideration, the 
management system should indicate a certain level of complexity and breadth of coverage. 
Therefore, the shore management did not want to simplify the management system of the 
company. As a result, many crew members referred to their management systems as a 
‘theory’, rather than a practical guide for their daily work. The data analysis aided 
understanding of the ‘difficulties’ inherent in any simplification of the management system. 
The final decision was made mainly by the shore management rather than by the crew. The 
situation was similar to that expressed by a senior officer: ‘We made suggestions, rather 
than participating’ (CO, S3 C2). The study showed that crews’ participation in the revision 
of the management systems in both companies was limited. 
 
Response to Reporting Good Practice 
The discussion above showed there was a perception that the crews’ suggestions on 
improving the management systems were not considered seriously by the shore 
management. Similarly, the data also showed that nor was crews’ reporting good safe 
practice well received by the shore management in both companies. For example, a captain 
described in detail why it would be reasonable to adopt his suggestion and how it would 
help to improve shipboard OHSM: 
When I was on another ship as a chief officer, (I found that) the tank washing pipes 
were separated from each tank by one valve. It had been found that if the pressure 
in a tank was high, the lubricant in the hydraulic system connected by the pipes 
would be easily leaked out onto the deck. I noticed that this problem could cause 
more severe problems if the pressure in two tanks was different and when the 
valve coincidentally had problems. We reported this to the shore management and 
suggested that one more valve should be added. But so far, there has been no 
response at all. Perhaps they have their own ideas. Up to now, the ship still keeps 
the original arrangement. (Captain, S2 C1) 
 
The company’s no-response attitude disappointed this captain, and he did not make any 
further suggestions to the shore management. Similar cases were also seen in C2. For 
example, a second officer said: 
You would make suggestions to the shore management; they would not answer 
you. Even if you made a good point, it might not be considered by them. Even if 
you thought it was right, it was not right in their eyes. So eventually, many of us 
were not willing to make any suggestions. (2O, S3 C2)  
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In the literature, the importance of giving feedback to the person who made the report was 
highlighted. The investigation of the Esso accident showed that the failure of management 
to give feedback to workers contributed to their unwillingness to report (Hopkins, 2000). In 
contrast, the feedback given by the management could indicate a management commitment 
to safety improvement and could encourage more reports made by workers (ibid). However, 
my study showed that the management’s failure to give feedback to a ship’s crew affected 
the crew’s motivation to make any further suggestions which were of potential value to the 
improvement of OHSM practice.  
 
‘Formalistic’ Encouragement  
The data also showed that, even though the shore management claimed to encourage crews’ 
suggestions, it was regarded as ‘formalistic’, rather than being in earnest. A bosun had one 
experience: 
Once, I raised a point (to the shore management), and they asked me to draft a 
feasible plan. Why was it up to me to produce such a plan? How much would I be 
paid? (If I could earn that), I would not work as a seafarer … I make reasonable 
suggestions, and they should consider how to adopt and apply them to improve 
management. They should not ask me to produce such a plan. (Bosun, S3 C2) 
 
The comment showed that the shore management lacked a sense of sincerity in their 
consideration of crews’ suggestions. Even the management’s ‘encouragement’ policy was 
doubted by some crew members in both companies; it was regarded only as a temporary 
formalistic task in order to ‘demonstrate’ that the shore management valued crews’ 
suggestions. It was just like ‘a gust of wind’ that disappeared, and would not have any real 
effect. For example, a second engineer said:  
Every year there are such kinds of activities. We make suggestions to the shore 
management. But it’s hard to say how they value and adopt these suggestions. If 
their real starting points had been to gather good suggestions from crews for 
promoting ship management, it would be fairly ok. Actually, they just wanted an 
activity as a formality, and it would disappear after a short while. It doesn’t make 
sense. The key is to be authentic. (2E, S2 C1)  
 
In C1, the use of the company’s website for collecting comments or suggestions was 
mentioned in section 8.2.2. However, it seemed that it had little effect. Some crew members 
viewed it as no more than a ‘formalistic display’: 
I’d read it (website) before. I didn't find anything fresh. It seemed that nobody 
used it. You made suggestions (to them), and they might give you an explanation 
by referring to relevant provisions. The rules are clearly stipulated. They do not 
listen to you. It’s impossible for you to change something. It has been (this 
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situation) for many years. (2O, S1 C1) 
 
Gradually, the idea of making reports faded from crews’ minds. Some crew members 
thought it was nothing to do with them, and some even saw it as causing trouble. For 
example, a junior officer said: 
I thought a few people would be willing to make suggestions. It is common sense. 
It’s better to have one issue less than one more. It would be all right if I knew this 
if it didn’t affect my own work safety. (3O, S4 C2)  
 
In sections 6.3.2 and 7.3.2, it was clearly stated that shore-ship communication could affect 
a crew’s income. Crews’ grievance against the reward and punishment policy could be 
perceived. The study revealed that it could equally affect a crew’s motivation to make 
constructive suggestions to the shore management: 
Generally, nobody raises such points. The shore management do not care about 
you much. We do not really like this company. They often deduct our money. They 
are not beloved by us. They cannot win our hearts and minds. We would not give 
them good suggestions. (4E, S3 C2)  
 
This sub-section showed that although the shore management appeared to encourage 
suggestions from crews for the improvement of OHSM, crews were disappointed by the 
management’s no-reply attitude. Many crew members felt that the encouragement was 
formalistic, as a result of which crews’ willingness to make suggestions remained low. This 
suggests a very limited crew participation in OHSM in both companies.  
 
8.3.2 Shipboard Hierarchy 
The study showed that a hierarchical gap existed between senior officers and junior officers 
or ratings on board. Oltedal and McArthur (2011) argued that the shipboard hierarchy could 
significantly affect all aspects of the crew’s work and social life. In a similar sense, it could 
affect the crew’s willingness to make safety suggestions. The data showed that many crew 
members worried about offending senior officers even if they had an idea and wanted it to 
be reported to the shore management: 
If I suggest that the chief officer report it to the shore management, it would be 
good if he could listen to me. If he doesn't agree with me, he might give me a grey 
eye all day … be angry with me. On this ship, we don't want to raise any points. 
(3O, S4 C2)  
 
Even when some crew members dared to make suggestions to the ship’s leaders, those 
suggestions were not given serious consideration by the ship’s leaders. As a result, the 
suggestions were not passed to the shore management. For instance, one junior officer 
expressed his concern to the captain about the potential risk that might arise from the cargo 
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pump system: 
The other day, I made suggestions to the captain regarding the arrangements of a 
thorough inspection of the cargo pump systems, since I could smell (cargo smell) 
when I was on deck duty (during cargo operation). This is a chemical tanker. It is 
an obvious threat to our health. I said, ‘You (captain) should make a report to the 
shore management’. He argued that how did I know he hadn’t made such a report. 
But it has been three voyages so far, and it has not been touched. We do not know 
whether he has made the report or not, or how the company replied. But the key 
was that it was urgent and the ship should not sail before it has been solved. (2O, 
S4 C2)    
 
It seemed clear that this junior officer was unhappy with the captain’s reply. He expressed 
his intention to leave this ship soon, since he felt that the ship leader’s safety attitudes did 
not encourage him to work there any longer. He could not take the chance to risk his future 
on a ship which he thought was unsafe.  
  
As for the ratings, many commented that their work was basically arranged by the heads of 
departments on board, and they did not make any suggestions to the shore management 
given their limited knowledge and experience. Sometimes, even though they had a 
suggestion, it would eventually vanish along the long upward communication chain:  
I gave a suggestion to the bosun. He had no obligation to tell me whether he 
reported the point to the chief officer, right? Even if the bosun reported it to the 
chief officer, (it is doubtful) whether the chief reported it to the captain … whether 
the captain reported it to the shore management … They do not have an obligation 
to tell me everything. (Rating-2, S4 C2)  
 
Level-by-level reporting was a prescribed communication process, which was commonly 
accepted by the majority of crews. In other words, skip-level reporting (communication) 
was an unusual practice in accordance with formal reporting procedures. Therefore, the 
long communication chain seemed to obstruct ratings’ willingness to make any meaningful 
suggestions to their immediate leaders and eventually the shore management. During my 
field work on four ships, only one rating (Rating-2, S2 C1) mentioned that his suggestion 
about duly recycling waste articles on board was adopted by the shore management and he 
was awarded with a stainless steel kettle. By and large, it could be seen that the ratings’ 
voice seemed to be weak and their views were apparently neglected.  
 
In general, the data indicate that crew members in higher positions could have a noticeable 
impact on their subordinates’ upward communication. This suggests the influence of 
positional power on communication across the different hierarchical positions of an 
organisation. Positional power results from a superior’s position in the organisational 
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hierarchy, and it can be normative or coercive (Rajan and Zingales, 2000). It gives higher 
levels of management the ability to control their subordinates’ behaviours (Peiro and Melia, 
2003, p.17). Braham and Steffen (2008, p.57) argue that positional power is the result of 
interplay between the arrangement of positions in an organisation and the decision-making 
mechanisms in use. In this study, it is clear that the lower ranking crew members’ upward 
communication was hindered by their shipboard immediate superior’s positional power. As 
a consequence, lower ranking crew members’ views could not be communicated to the 
shore management.  
 
8.3.3 The Cultural Elements 
In the literature, it was stated that a national culture can have significant influence on 
people in an organisation and on their management practices (see section 2.7.2). In terms of 
upward reporting, the study among mixed crew on a Danish fleet showed that crew showed 
an inactive attitude toward reporting practices and that major differences were identified 
between different ethnic groups (Hansen et al., 2008). It was echoed by a secondary data 
analysis among crew from different administrations (Ellis et al., 2010). However, a Chinese 
crew has its own particular considerations which can be explained by Chinese cultural 
elements. They will be discussed below. 
 
Offending Seniority  
This study showed that in two Chinese chemical shipping companies, making suggestions 
to seniority was regarded as an ‘impolite behaviour’ to the shore management. As discussed 
in section 2.7.2, ‘respect for hierarchy’ is identified as one of the core values of Chinese 
Confucian culture (Fang, 1999). The importance of maintaining a superior’s status is still 
ingrained in Chinese society (Farh and Cheng, 2000). In this context, the need to avoid 
offending seniority was considered by many Chinese subordinates (Yang and Zheng, 1989) 
to be a virtue by which respect for senior colleagues or superiors is particularly important. 
During the interviews on board ships, some senior officers thought that it was an impolite 
behaviour if an inferior made a suggestion to his superior: 
The shore management encourages us to give suggestions and advice regarding 
(the implementation of) safety policy and regulation etc. Actually, it is rare. I 
haven’t done this before. Also very few others (have done). I feel that they (shore 
management) are professionals. No matter how much I know, I am not an expert. 
They have many years of experience. If I give them advice … (it might) not be 
respectful to them. (CE, S2 C1) 
 
Some crew members used the term ‘high-end persons’ to refer to those ‘elites’ working in 
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the shore office in order to distinguish them from those who held higher hierarchical 
positions in their companies. They did not consider them to be ordinary crew members who 
could work on and make contributions to the improvement of OHSM. Some other crew 
members said that they hesitated to make any suggestions to the shore management, since 
the management might alter their impressions of them and they thought it might even bring 
them more trouble. Therefore, it could be seen that crew members’ fear of offending 
seniority affected their willingness to make any substantial suggestions to the shore 
management.  
 
Relationship  
The study further showed that the onboard superior-subordinate relationship could also 
affect crew members’ willingness to make suggestions. The relationship, or Guanxi, was 
briefly mentioned in section 2.7.2. It refers to a special type of relationship built on 
particular ties and is one of the important social relations in the Chinese context (Yang, 
1994). Tsui et al. (2000, pp.226 & 228) noted that its cultural roots reside in the Confucian 
legacy, and it is a dyadic relationship that is based implicitly on ‘mutual interest and 
benefit’. In a situation where the relationship between a superior and a subordinate is not 
well established, a subordinate is not motivated to report upward. The following comment 
was selected to illustrate this: 
Many of us didn't want to report...he (one crew member) knew this very well. His 
practice was even better than that stated in the management system - more 
reasonable. If his relationship with his superior was not good, he was not willing to 
report. His superior might not believe him. He did not want to create trouble. The 
result was that some good practices on board disappeared after years, and we 
returned to bad practices again. (2E, S3 C2)  
 
As a consequence, some crew members felt that it was a pity that some good practices on 
board a ship failed to be incorporated into the management system and that they eventually 
disappeared after turns of a crew’s shift. 
 
‘Being Conservative’ 
The research further showed that making suggestions to the shore management was 
regarded as ‘show-off’ behaviour by some Chinese crews. Commonly, Chinese crews deal 
with issues with prudence and do not like to show off as individuals. This view was given 
by crew members across different hierarchies on board. For example, a captain said:  
Now, the idea of making suggestions to the shore management faded, since it was 
of no significance. If you talked much to them (shore management), contrarily, it 
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gave them the wrong impression that, as captain, you were a bully: ‘Don't you 
think even that I know less than you as a Guide captain/chief engineer’? They 
would feel that we wanted to show off. They might not consider (our views). So, 
we are not willing to make such suggestions. I only guarantee this ship is normal 
and safe. Then it’s OK. (Captain, S4 C2)  
 
Some officers also mentioned that they did not want to make any suggestions to the shore 
management since they did not want to ‘create’ something new. For example, a senior 
engineer commented:  
In general, we are reluctant to do so. If we were to write more (to the shore 
management), it would be good. But it would give others an impression of creating 
something singular and exceptional, showing off. We don't want to write. (CE, S1 
C1)  
 
Similarly, some ratings also stated that they did not like to make suggestions; they also saw 
it as a way of showing off:  
No. We don't have this kind of idea (giving suggestions). I am not a person who 
likes to show off. (Rating-1, S4 C2)  
 
In general, many crew members saw making suggestions to the shore management of their 
companies as show-off behaviour. They did not want to distinguish themselves from other 
fellow colleagues. This characteristic could be understood to be due to the influence of 
traditional Chinese culture. Walker et al.’s study (1996, p.23) showed that the Chinese are 
rather conservative and not very outspoken. Zhao (1997) identified that Confucianism itself 
contained conservative elements of social values. Huat (1989) viewed Confucianism as a 
conservative doctrine that stressed the maintenance of traditions rather than creation. Being 
conservative is seen as one of the characteristics of respectable people (Zapalska and 
Edwards, 2001, p.289). Therefore, it could be seen that the traditional Chinese culture had 
considerable influence on crews’ willingness to make any creative and valuable suggestions 
to the shore management for the improvement of OHSM practice on board ships.  
 
Flattery  
Furthermore, in some cases, it was found that making suggestions was viewed as flattering 
the shore management. Regier (2007, p.3) interpreted flattery as ‘praise, either spontaneous 
or prepared, given whether earned or not, in order to get something in return’. It could also 
be explained as being ‘for a man to sacrifice to a spirit which does not belong to him’ 
(Zhang, 2000, p.12). In English dictionaries, the word ‘flattery’ is commonly interpreted as 
‘excessive compliment’. Lafaytte De Mente (1995) found that in all cultures, flattery was 
usually accompanied by a hidden agenda, such as wanting minor favours. Flattery has a 
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long tradition in China and it is an integral part of the Chinese culture (Regier, 2007). 
Lafaytte De Mente (1995) found that, in the Chinese context, the aim might be to gain a 
‘special’ advantage in relationships. However, it was argued that not all flattery is scheming. 
Sometimes flattery seeks nothing more than to be liked and noticed (Regier, 2007, p.3). In 
general, moderate flattery could mean ‘courtesy’ or ‘expressions of goodwill’, while 
genuine flattery would be despised by many Chinese. In this study, the data revealed that 
some crew members thought there was a strong sense of flattering when ‘making 
reasonable suggestions’ to the shore management of their companies. For example, the 
following dialogue demonstrates this: 
Q: Would any good practices or your personal experience be reported?   
A: No. Here is an example. We dismantled a high pressure oil pump in the main 
engine. Every time we dismantled it, the oil reservoir and the spacers would 
always be deformed. Later, we found that the connection fitting was too sharp. 
Then we made it blunt. It’s a good experience.  
Q: Did you report it to the shore management? 
A: No. We would not voluntarily report it. Others would see it as us kissing the 
leader’s ass (flattering), right? Generally, we would not report. (Rating, S2 C1)  
 
The term ‘kiss-ass’, referring to flattery, is used by the Chinese in daily life to describe a 
person deliberately wanting to flatter or please somebody for a ‘special’ purpose. In the 
literature, ‘kiss-ass’ was the label given to the worst sorts of flatterer (Regier, 2007, p.8). 
For this reason, some crew members were reluctant to make suggestions to the shore 
management. This was disappointing for some crew members who wanted to report their 
good practices to the shore management.  
 
8.3.4 Trade Unions on board  
It was stated in section 2.5.4 in the literature chapter that trade unions could play a 
significant role in promoting OHSM. This research into the Chinese shipping industry 
showed a rather different picture.  
 
Trade unions in the Chinese shipping industry are organised in a similar way to those in 
land-based industries. The situation in C1 will be discussed first, since in that company 
there was a formal trade union unit organisation on each of its ships. One of the crew was 
appointed as the head of the unit. Usually, crew members that had a long-term contract with 
their company automatically became members of the trade unions. A small percentage of a 
crew member’s monthly salary would be deducted as trade union member fees. The 
interview data suggested that the major role of a trade union unit on board was the 
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organisation of various activities. The activities could be purely for entertainment, such as 
playing cards, chess or table tennis, particularly during important holidays in China, such as 
the Spring Festival. Or, they could be work-related contests, such as a heaving-line 
throwing contest among the deck crew or a machinery or pipeline dismantling contest 
among the engine room crew. Some crew members commented that it was good for 
improving their life on board and helpful for shipboard work safety. In order to support the 
activities on board, 1,000 – 2,000 Yuan RMB of the trade union allowance would be given 
by the company to each ship each year. The money could be used to buy books, magazines, 
or videos/DVDs to improve the crew’s leisure activities, or to buy the crew’s daily 
consumables, such as toothbrushes, shampoo, soap and towels, which would be distributed 
free of charge to the crew. In a sense, the union played the role of an onboard welfare 
agency. The allowance could also be used to buy some gifts or awards for those who won at 
onboard collective activities as described above.  
 
However, this brief description of the role of the trade union unit on board does not suggest 
any positive role in communication with the shore management for the improvement of 
OHSM. For instance, it was found that the shipboard work rhythm could significantly 
affect the functioning of the trade union unit on board a ship. The impact of hectic 
schedules and long working hours on crew members and their work was discussed in 
section 6.2.3. The fast turnaround and heavy workload did not allow crew members to think 
about the role of the trade union in improving their health and safety conditions at work:  
The trade union unit didn't organise any activities this year. It’s difficult to organise. 
The sailing schedule was too tight... calling at one berth after another. You could 
see the crew were belaboured. There was no energy and no time for entertainment. 
We work, eat and sleep. (Bosun, S2 C1)  
 
The trade union played an insignificant role. The whole day, we were busy with 
our work and nobody cared. (Motorman, S1 C1)  
 
It was discussed above that the major role of the trade unions was the organisation of 
onboard entertainment activities or work-related contests; many crew members commented 
that there was nothing beyond that. Some said that a trade union was only a formalistic 
organisation, and the power of trade union unit was weak: 
In China, a trade union only has its name and has no substance. The case is similar 
on board. There is no resource for us to manipulate. It would be different if we had 
the power over human or financial resources. Thus the problem is obvious: what 
else can you do? (Captain, S2 C1) 
 
The head of the trade union unit on board ships was appointed by the ship’s captain rather 
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than elected by the crew. Usually, the post was taken by a lower ranking crew member such 
as a bosun (S1 C1) or chief motorman (S2 C1). Part of the reason for this was that senior 
officers had too much work and could not spare much time for this task. A person who was 
active and enthusiastic in public activities would be considered to take this position. The 
role of a trade union unit on board was rather limited. In such a context, its role in 
communication with the shore management for the improvement of the crew’s health and 
safety conditions was equally limited: 
Regarding the trade union, it’s less effective on board. It doesn't play the role that a 
trade union should play. The trade unions should be concerned about the crew, 
report the crew’s collective opinions/suggestions to the shore management, 
negotiate with them for the crew’s rights including OHS issues etc, and expect 
them to give solutions. But this part of the function has been lost. Unlike foreign 
trade unions, they stood on the opposite of the management. They had strikes. I 
came across similar cases in SK (a country name) quite a few times. (CO, S1 C1)   
 
During the interviews, many crew members made attempts to compare trade unions in 
China with those in foreign countries, and they agreed that the trade unions in China were 
powerless. The role of the trade union unit in communication with the shore management 
was for reporting activities organised on board, as stated by the head of the trade union unit 
on board S2 C1: 
We have no special work to do with the shore management. It is only to submit an 
annual activity report. Usually, it is submitted before the end of a year. That’s all. 
(Chief Motorman, S2 C1)  
 
As stated in section 4.3.2, C2 was set up by a few shareholders. Although the company 
received some investment from a state-owned group, the operation of the company was 
independent. No formal trade union organisation existed on board ships in the company. 
However, the question was still asked about how the absence of any trade union on board 
could affect communication between the management on shore and the crew on board. 
Many crew members stated that it did not make any difference. One of the key 
pre-conditions underpinning the trade union activities was the allowance given by the 
company. In C2, the financial support was given from a captain’s fund as set by the 
company: 
We don't have a trade union unit on this ship; therefore, we don't have any trade 
union allowance to buy things. But the captain’s fund could be used to buy all that 
stuff. We could achieve the same purpose. (CE, S4 C2)  
 
It was mentioned that trade unions mainly exist in state-owned companies in China. In C2, 
many crew members, particularly officers, had had experience of working in state-owned 
companies before. They were well aware of the trade union’s role and explicitly stated that 
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it had little effect on the crew’s health and safety at work: 
In China, a trade union is only an empty title. I worked in CSA (a state-owned 
company) before. If I were not happy with my work conditions, would the trade 
unions represent me to negotiate (with the shore management)? If they were to 
represent me, what could they do if the boss didn't agree? Could they announce a 
strike like foreigners do? Definitely, the answer is no. (Captain, S3 C2)  
 
The data suggested the trade union’s negotiating power with the management was weak, 
since it was affiliated to its organisation and could not work independently in the Chinese 
context. An experienced bosun who had worked in a state-owned company for decades 
described the similarity:  
The trade unions in China are under the control of an organisation’s management. 
They are not independent and there is no way of functioning. Therefore, they play 
a minimal role. (Bosun, S3 C2)  
 
In this sub-section, the role of shipboard trade union unit in negotiation with the shore 
management was examined. In C1, a trade union unit existed on board each of its ships 
while in C2, there was no trade union organisation at all. The study showed that the 
existence of a shipboard trade union unit did not help strengthen their negotiating power 
with the shore management for the purpose of improving OHSM practice. In this sense, it 
seemed to be of little significance whether there was a trade union unit on board a ship, for 
example, in the case of C2. It became clear that the real role of the trade union unit on 
board ships, the collective bargaining power with the shore management, as stated in 
section 2.5.4 in the literature chapter, did not appear in the context of these two companies 
in the Chinese shipping industry. 
 
8.3.5 The Fluidity of Seafaring Occupations 
It was discussed in section 7.3.5 that the fluidity of seafaring occupations could affect 
crews’ willingness regarding safety reporting – it became one of the noticeable factors 
contributing to the under-reporting of safety-related problems. In a similar sense, it could 
further diminish a crew member’s willingness to propose any constructive suggestions to 
the shore management. As was shown in C2, many crew members, who had short term 
contracts, showed a disinterest in making any suggestions:  
I worked in this company today. It’s uncertain whether I will leave some day. Why 
should I care about it? If I had a long-term contract with this company, I would 
raise the point. I would arrange to improve this ship’s safety, since I might return 
to this ship again next year. That would also be convenient for me. But for us 
freelance seafarers, why should we raise (suggestions)? (Bosun, S3 C2)  
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The impact of short-term contract employees on OHSM can be found in the studies in 
land-based industries in some countries. In a study of temporary employees in Norway and 
Australia, the lack of involvement, interest and knowledge in OHS work is identified 
(Saksvik and Quinlan, 2003). Some studies conducted in Australia (Quinlan and Mayhew, 
2000) have suggested that precarious employment is not only associated with a low level of 
understanding of OHS knowledge and practice, but also a high level of resistance to 
compliance. In this study, although the short-term contact crew did not show obvious 
incompetence, the lack of motivation to participate in OHSM activities, such as making 
suggestions, was perceived.  
 
In C1, although most crew members worked with longer term contracts, it did not appear to 
help: 
If you were on board this ship only for a few months, and you changed everything 
and you were going to leave ... many people would not want to do like that. Next 
time, I might change to another ship. I might not go to this ship again. So this 
affects the crew’s motivation to make suggestions. (3O, S1 C1)  
 
The data suggests that different terms in contracts played an insignificant role in 
influencing upward safety-related suggestions in this case. In general, the study shows that 
the fluidity of seafaring occupations affected crews’ motivation to propose any 
safety-related suggestions.  
 
From section 8.3.1 onwards in this chapter, various features affecting crew members’ 
willingness to make safety related suggestions have been identified. The data suggested that 
upward communication (reporting) for crew members’ safety suggestions was rather 
limited, and crew members’ participation in the improvement of OHSM practice remained 
low. In parallel with this finding, it was also found that peer communication, as an 
alternative method of upward communication, was common. This will be examined next.   
 
8.3.6 Peer Communication 
Peer communication for crews could refer to communication among those on board a ship, 
or between the ships of a company. On board a ship, peer communication regarding good 
practice was observed during my field work. Some good practices were introduced by crew 
members who had previously worked for foreign ships. In general, many crew members 
expressed their willingness to share their good experiences with their peer colleagues rather 
than reporting them to their company: 
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Some crew members had had the opportunity of working with foreign crews. They 
had learnt some good practices from those foreigners, and we could learn from 
them. Generally, we would not report (them) to the company. (3O, S4 C2)  
 
It was found that, in many situations, the communication of good practices happened 
between superior and subordinate crew members in the same department on board a ship. 
For example, a description of how a good practice was imparted was noted down during 
my field work: 
The bosun was teaching a cadet the deck fittings there. He pointed to a short rope 
tied to the wheel of a valve and explained that if the rope was attached to the wheel, 
it indicated that the valve was closed. Otherwise, it was open. Since there are many 
valves on deck, this was convenient for a duty person to check their status. I asked 
whether it was mentioned in the written operational procedures. The bosun said, 
‘No’. (Field Notes, S3 C2, 22 March 2010)  
 
On S2 C1, a chief officer narrated a case of when a lower ranking crew member had once 
played an important role in a ship’s mooring operation. It was his unique experience which 
helped the ship overcome an immediate difficulty:  
Like how to tie a ship to a floating buoy … How to work on that and which tools 
were needed ... we (senior crew) did not have such an experience. It was a senior 
bosun who reported it to me. He knew how to do it more safely. It was very special 
and we hadn't seen or experienced it before. (CO, S2 C1) 
 
As stated in section 4.2.1, a chemical tanker usually carries different types of toxic cargoes. 
The different features of cargoes and notices regarding cargo operation were of particular 
concern to the crew. When a new type of cargo was to be carried by a ship, some of the 
crew members who had had experience of it would be consulted by the others. A third 
officer told of a common practice on board: 
If a chemical cargo had not been carried by this ship before, the crew members 
who had had experience would be asked to give a speech to us. What features … 
how to operate safely … they would remind all of us. (3O, S4 C2) 
 
The data suggested the existence of a ‘learning community’ among the crew on board a 
ship. Within such a shipboard community, learning from peers or mutual knowledge 
sharing were observed to be common, which became one of the important channels for 
crew members to complete their work tasks, prevent work hazards, and develop their 
knowledge and skills. Bhattacharya (2009) conducted an empirical study among a mixed 
crew on four tankers; his finding showed a strong presence of communities of practice in 
the onboard ship environment. The role of communities of practice in workplace OHSM in 
an organisation has been widely discussed in the literature. They were where practical 
knowledge existed and they acted as both the agent and the object of initiatives to promote 
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safety (Gherardi and Nicolini, 2000, pp.10 &16). Likewise, shipboard communities of 
practice could contribute to safeguarding seafarers’ OHS (Bhattacharya, 2009, p.111). This 
study among Chinese crews in two Chinese chemical shipping companies showed a similar 
result. Communication of good practices among crew members could play an active role in 
improving OHSM on board ships.  
 
Moreover, peer communication could be seen to take place beyond the ships. It could 
happen among crews of different ships of a company. This was particularly true in C1, 
where the majority of crew members were on long-term contracts and some crew members 
had had the opportunity to work together and to get to know each other. Thus, a crew’s past 
experience on a ship could be shared with their predecessors of that ship. Some safety 
reminders would be communicated among them:  
If I had worked on that ship before, and I was familiar with that ship’s captain or 
chief officer, I would give him a reminder when we had a conversation - ‘You 
should be careful of this and that’ - and try to prevent the occurrence of an accident. 
(Captain, S2 C1) 
 
This was echoed by some other senior crew members, who said that although their 
experiences were their ‘own asset’, they were willing to impart them to their colleagues or 
friends on sister ships (ships sharing a similar structure) or other ships.  
 
In general, it was found that peer communication among crews achieved a positive 
outcome for OHSM on board ships. Such a kind of communication helps promote a 
supportive organisational communication climate (Klauss and Bass, 1982; Pace and Faules, 
1994; Byers, 1997). 
 
8.4 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, a crew’s upward communication (reporting) for safety suggestions was 
examined from the perspectives of both the management and the crew. From the 
management’s perspective, they encouraged the crew to make safety suggestions. The data 
suggested that the management valued the crew’s contributions since the crew worked on 
the front line and the operationalisation of the management system relied mainly on them. 
In order to ensure a crew’s effective work participation, various communication channels, 
including the captain’s review report and a questionnaire-based survey or online inquiry (in 
C1), were in place in both companies. As a result, positive outcomes derived from those 
communication channels were perceived by the management. They helped to improve the 
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management systems as well as shipboard working practices.  
 
However, from the crew’s perspective, a number of immediate factors influencing the 
upward reporting of the crew’s suggestions were identified. First, the data showed that it 
was common that the shore management did not duly respond to crew members’ 
suggestions. Some crew members were dissatisfied with the management’s non-reply 
attitude, and this further discouraged the crew’s willingness to report. Crews saw that the 
management’s efforts to gather their views were formalistic and they were not treated 
seriously. Hopkins (2000) highlighted the importance of a timely response to a reporter in a 
reporting system. In the case of any failure to respond, the system should have an 
alternative means to send the message further up the corporate hierarchy. However, there 
was no indication of such a practice in the two OHSMSs in this study. To some extent, this 
suggested the failure of the reporting system. Second, the shipboard hierarchy was another 
feature that affected lower ranking crew members’ upward reporting. Senior officers’ 
positional power could pose a significant barrier that affected lower ranking crew members’ 
reporting.  
 
Third, it was found that upward reporting may be affected by traditional Chinese culture. In 
this study, the cultural elements identified that could affect upward reporting were 
avoidance of offending seniority, relationships, conservative character, and flattery. The 
study suggests that the Chinese cultural elements did not encourage a crew’s active 
participation in OHSM activities. As this study was only of Chinese seafarers, it is difficult 
to separate the peculiarities of the seafaring industry and general issues of power imbalance 
from cultural factors. Thus, the extent to which how the cultural elements could affect 
communication as well as OHSM practice remains uncertain. The lack of comparable 
studies also suggests the need for further research in order to validate this finding. Fourth, 
the existence of a trade union unit on board ships did not add weight to a crew’s negotiating 
power with the shore management. It equally suggests a crew’s limited participation in the 
improvement of OHSM in the Chinese shipping industry. Fifth, the research further 
revealed that the fluidity of seafaring professions could affect a crew’s willingness to 
participate in the upward reporting of safety suggestions. Crews’ frequent change of ships 
limited their ‘good will’ in improving OHSM on board a ship. As a result, there was less 
upward communication for reporting OHSM-related suggestions. In parallel, the research 
found that, as an alternative way of upward communication, crews tended to have more 
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communication about their good safe practices among their fellow colleagues. The 
communication among crews themselves suggests the existence of a ‘learning community’ 
among crews. Crews’ peer communication, identified from the data, could help the 
improvement of shipboard OHSM. Given the positive role of peer communication, it was 
subject to certain conditions among which the crew’s relationship was highlighted. 
Together with limited upward reporting, the experience of good practice on one ship was 
difficult to share with crew on other ships of the company. 
 
In general, it was found that a significant gap existed between the management’s 
expectations and crews’ practice in terms of reporting safety suggestions for the 
improvement of OHSM on board ships. Similar to the situation of safety reporting 
discussed in Chapter 7, the upward communication for reporting safety suggestions 
remained weak. The research showed that such communication (reporting safety 
suggestions) helped little in improving OHSM on board ships. The identified reasons in this 
chapter are a contributory factor to the limited upward communication and suggest weak 
crew participation in OHSM, which will be further discussed in Chapter 9.  
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CHAPTER 9 COMMUNICATION: ITS CONTEXTS AND 
INFLUENCES ON CREW’S OHSM PRACTICE 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
Using evidence reported in the previous four chapters, this chapter explores the 
organisational and social relations’ contexts in which communication between shore based 
management and the crews of ships takes place. It is concerned with the influence of such 
contexts on the role of communication in determining the nature of health and OHSM 
procedures, practices and outcomes. It identifies a number of features of the social and 
organisational contexts of life and work on board ships and examines how they mediate 
communication processes in relation to occupational health, safety and well-being. In this 
way it discusses the research questions the research has set out to address – what are the 
factors that underlie the nature of workplace and organisational communication, how 
crew’s work practice in relation to OHSM can be influenced by them, and to what extent 
crew’s health, safety and well-being can be affected as a consequence of the shore-ship 
communication.   
 
In this thesis, I set out to investigate the role of communication on influencing shipboard 
OHSM. Clearly to an extent, the nature and types of communication I have investigated do 
influence shipboard OHSM practice. However, I have discovered that the significant 
influence on the role of communication in determining health and safety is not found in 
different types of communication themselves, but rather in the socio-economic and cultural 
factors that mediate such communication. My fieldwork evidence suggests that among 
these, the greatest influential factor is the underlying profit motives that drive companies. 
This affects not only the content and priorities of communication from shore management 
to ship’s crew but also the security of their employment. It is these effects that 
combinations determine the OHSM practice observed on board. In this chapter, I will begin 
with the discussion of my evidence for reaching this conclusion, before moving on to 
consider other subsidiary influences including national cultural context of Chinese vessels 
and the role of external monitoring of compliance. Following this analysis I discuss my 
evidence concerning specific cases of these influences in relation to shipboard practices and 
contrast the shore support for safe work practices on the one hand with that for achieving 
management control on the other. And also in this respect I offer some reflections on the 
way that the constraints inherent in the nature of social relations between the management 
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and crews of the ships I studied, as well as in the insecurity of the latter’s employment 
situation, undermined the quality of feedback necessary for the continuous improvement 
that advocates of OHSMSs argue to be a function of feedback. Finally I discuss the 
suggestion evident in my data that in fact communication overall may actually serve to 
worsen crew’s health and safety situation, rather than improve it, as in the stated intent of 
its role in OHSMSs.  
 
9.2 CONTEXTS OF COMMUNICATION – FACTORS UNDERLYING THE 
NATURE OF WORKPLACE AND ORGANISATIONAL COMMUNICATION 
The findings in chapters 5-8 reflect how communication between shore and ship (and also 
on board ship) was affected by a number of organisational features of work at sea. They 
included the experiences hierarchy, power and discipline within the shipping companies 
studied; as well as the ways in which the management of shipping companies pursued 
efficiency and profit in their operations and how they positioned concerns about safety in 
this respect. I further noticed how the participation of crew in the management of health 
and safety was circumscribed by these organisational contexts and how this specific 
Chinese cultural context also affected the operation of approaches to these matters. In this 
section I explore these features of life and work on board ships, situating my analysis 
within the wider literature on the role of these issues in workplaces and within 
organisations more generally. I thereby demonstrate how each of these features operated to 
affect ways in which communication was used in relation to the OHSM and its outcomes 
on board ships. 
 
9.2.1 Hierarchy, Power and Discipline in Management 
The field data showed that organisational hierarchy, power and discipline could affect 
communication between shore management and ship’s crew. In this section I explore the 
influences of each of these in further detail, situating the discussion with reference to the 
wider literature. 
 
a) Hierarchy — In general, the contrasting views between crew and shore based managers 
presented in the previous four data chapters reflected the significant influence of 
hierarchical factors on their communication.  
 
In section 2.5.2, it was mentioned that management control was achieved by 
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communication across the hierarchy in an organisation (Walton, 2003). Hierarchical 
structures are central to many contemporary organisations (Harley, 1999; Magee and 
Galinsky, 2008). Within such a hierarchical system, people are expected to accept their 
positions and fulfil their roles within it rather than challenge the order (Shi and Westwood, 
2000, p.197). The essence of a hierarchical system is to establish order, exercise control and 
achieve efficiency in the application of the work force (Walton, 2003, p.116). The influence 
of hierarchy in organisational communication can also be seen from the literature. For 
example a study in aviation industry also showed that hierarchy was a serious problem that 
affected communication between flight pilot and attendants (Eisenberg et al., 2005). Byers 
(1997) found the situation did exist that managers at higher positions complained their little 
knowledge about the situations several levels below them. Similarly, the study showed that 
the gap of understanding existed between those at different hierarchical levels. A similar 
situation prevailed on board ship with the consequence that the management-crew 
communication did not meaningfully facilitate management’s understanding of shipboard 
OHSM conditions. For example, although the management showed their eagerness to know 
crew’s thoughts and working conditions, particularly during a ship visit (as seen in section 
6.3.1), the findings presented in Chapter 7 indicated that management’s knowledge about 
shipboard OHSM was very limited.  
 
Most significantly, as stated in Chapter 7 and 8, the hierarchical structure could affect 
crew’s upward communication especially in relation to safety reporting and suggestions for 
improvements. This is also a finding that is aired in previous literature. For example, 
Leonard et al. (2004, p.186) noted that hierarchy, or power distance, could inhibit 
employees from speaking up. In my study, during interviews with crew, some terms such as 
‘hierarchical difference’, ‘the gap of social statuses’ and ‘lack of common background’ 
were referred to by them (see section 6.3.2). Rogers and Agarwala-Rogers (1976, p.85) 
pointed out the problems of organisational communication alike were caused by 
‘bureaucratic hierarchy’. It suggests the hindrance of hierarchical gap in upward ship to 
shore communication.  
 
In a similar sense, I reported how shipboard hierarchy could affect ship to shore 
communication, as illustrated in section 8.3.2. Typically, some of the important events 
occurred or views shaped at the lower levels of shipboard hierarchy could not pass through 
the hierarchical structure to reach shore management.  
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A further point of relevance here is that several observers such as Chapman (1992) and 
Kitada (2010) have likened the nature of shipboard working environment to that of a ‘total 
institution’, as that defined by Goffman (1961). Goffman (ibid) argued that an individual 
could be subordinated to the authority of the institution within which he/she resides. To 
some extent, a ship is a kind of institution. The interviews with crew showed that many of 
them cared much about their immediate leaders – crew’s at senior positions rather than 
shore management. Thus, they would not attempt to do things that they believed to be 
against the wishes or interests of these superiors. In this way shipboard hierarchical 
structure could also influence ship to shore communication such as by preventing the 
reporting of certain incidents or activities, for example the non-conformity reporting 
illustrated in section 7.3.2.  
 
In brief, this study showed strong presence of hierarchical factor in shore-ship vertical 
communication process (many further examples can be seen in Chapter 6, 7 and 8).  
 
b) Power — Within an organisational structure, different levels of formal authority are 
distributed to various positions in the hierarchy. In practice, the influence of hierarchy is 
externalised by the organisational power attached to each of the positions within it (Harley, 
1999). In a similar sense, the study showed that the communications between management 
and crew are considerably influenced by the power relations between them.  
 
Magee and Galinsky (2008) and Antonsen (2009, p.49) interpreted power as control of 
activities, resources and employee performance. In section 2.5.2, it was pointed out that the 
division of labour in an organisation leads to power differences between management and 
employees (Pfeffer, 1992). In a shipping company, the shore management, situated at a 
higher hierarchical level, was therefore entitled to exert controlling power over the supply 
of material, shipboard OHSM practice and crew’s employment. In Chapter 5, the 
examination of shore-ship communication showed that the supply of material resources as 
an essential precondition for OHSM was eventually decided by shore management. In 
Chapter 6, I reported how the communication for management control was achieved by 
instructions or orders given via technology-based communication as well as through ship 
visits. Typically, the former was characterised by the control of ship’s sailing schedules, 
while the latter was dominated by shipboard safety inspection. They all suggested the 
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prominence of managerial power in play during such communication activities.  
 
Moreover, the study showed that shore to ship communication could be affected by the 
managerial power over crew’s work arrangements. It was stated in section 4.3 that, in both 
companies, the managers from crewing, marine affairs and marine engineering departments 
had equal decisive power on appraisal of crew’s performance as well as appointment of 
individual crew, particularly those of senior crew. In this context, being evaluated by them 
as a good performer was very important for individual crew, since it closely linked to 
crew’s job security. Thus, for the crew, maintaining a high level of consistency in their 
declared willingness to follow managerial dictates in communication with shore 
management was important. Otherwise, they believed the impact on their appraisal would 
be negative. A typical example was that delays of sailing schedules were usually seen as a 
violation of shore management’s order. The case was similar to the situation described in 
Perrow’s work (1999) that management could shape a wrong impression that a captain 
wanted to maximise crew’s comfort at the expense of company’s interest. As a consequence, 
the captain’s performance appraisal would be affected negatively. In my study, although the 
shore interview data showed the management to believe it exerted a ‘moderate and 
reasonable’ controlling power over crew and ship’s OHSM activities, the interviews with 
crew on four ships indicated they shared a very different perception, in which they feared 
greater control (see Chapter 6 and section 9.3.2 for details). In general, this perception of 
the presence of management’s controlling power over ships and crew did not help to 
facilitate an open and negotiable communication atmosphere that was conducive to the 
improvement of workplace OHSM.   
 
c) Discipline — The research further revealed that the management’s controlling power was 
underpinned by disciplinary actions.  
 
The role of disciplinary actions has been discussed in section 2.5.2, and the result was 
generally positive in OHSM (Eakin et al., 2000; Wokutch and VanSandt, 2000; and Robson 
et al., 2007). As showed in section 6.3.1, 7.3.2 and 7.3.4, the reward and punishment 
scheme, applied for the appraisal of crew’s performance, was often mentioned by the shore 
management as well as crew in both companies. Hutter (2001, p.296) points out that some 
form of discipline is necessary when dealing with employee’s non-compliance actions and 
it is commonly found in modern organisations (Goulielmos and Goulielmos, 2005). An 
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effect of the potential threat of such disciplinary action and the application of the reward 
and punishment scheme was to undermine the crew’s willingness to reveal OHS problems 
during ship visits by shore side management. For fear of the blame and punishment 
(typically during a ship visit by the shore management), some of the problems that had 
significant safety implications were hidden from shore management. Similar examples can 
be found in the literature. In the DuPont and Toyota model of OHSMSs, for instance, 
various economic incentives and violation consequences were built in with the aim to 
induce workers to compliance with rules and procedures, with the effect of ‘pitting worker 
against worker, undermining union solidarity, blaming the victim for problems that do 
occur, and inducing workers to hide injuries and illnesses when they take place’(Wokutch 
and VanSandt, 2000, p.376). Lindberg et al. (2010, p.717) found that incidents/accidents 
were much less likely to be reported if reporting led to disciplinary action. This empirical 
study on board the vessels showed a similar situation. The reward and punishment scheme 
as a major management tool tended to be more likely used for punishing crew rather than 
rewarding them. As seen in section 6.3.2 and Chapter 7, the crew’s concerns in 
communication such as the fears for causing negative impact on themselves, offending 
shore management and harming crew’s solidarity suggested that such a scheme made a very 
limited contribution to better shipboard OHSM.  
 
The consequences of this concern with their vulnerability on the part of the crew are worth 
some elaboration. For while it was clear that it was a requirement that they report shipboard 
safety related problems to their company, the study showed that under-reporting was 
prevalent in practice. These specific underlying factors of hierarchy, control and unequal 
power distribution all affected the crew’s upward safety communication (reporting) and 
were therefore important limiting factors on the operation of OHSMSs that rely on 
feedback and review for their effectiveness. There are similar findings reported in the wider 
literature (Bellaby, 1999; Dorman, 2000). But they also did so through perceptions held by 
the crew concerning conflicts of interest over specific issues such as pay and promotion.  
 
For example, a reward and punishment scheme was applied in both companies and safety 
bonuses were used to reward crew when a safety objective was met. Although in practice 
these bonuses contributed little to crew’s overall income, the crew nevertheless worried that 
their salary would be deducted by the shore management if a safety related problem was 
reported to the company. Evidence of this is found in section 6.3.2, 7.3.2 and 7.3.3 
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respectively. As a result, they refrained from reporting some of the problems on board.   
 
Furthermore, the study revealed that crew worried that safety reporting could affect their 
job promotion. In general, if it was proved that a problem was caused by someone, the 
affect on his promotion was inevitable. It could be seen from the data presented in section 
6.3.2. Equally, the data suggested that reporting near misses could have potential affect on 
one’s promotion. The detail was given in section 7.3.4. It was particularly the case in C1 
where most of the crew had long-term contracts with their company, and crew’s job 
promotion was mainly arranged by shore management. Thus, crew’s concern of their job 
promotion therefore could discourage their reporting.   
 
The data presented in section 6.3.2 and section 7.3.4 also showed that crew feared they 
would be assigned worse jobs (in the case of C1) and experience job insecurity (in the case 
of C2) if a reported problem was identified to associate with their responsibilities. For the 
former, a ‘bad’ performer could be moved to a ship with poorer ship conditions or 
dispatched (exiled) to a ship of another company, which was seen as a kind of 
discrimination by many crew. For the latter, crew could be at risk that their contract be 
terminated unconditionally by the shore management. Thus, it could be seen that crew’s 
concern for their job security could also affect crew’s safety reporting.  
 
Last but not least, the perception that safety reporting could affect one’s reputation was also 
prevalent. In the OHSM systems of the two companies, guarantees were given that any 
reporting, particularly near miss reporting, should not affect the person(s) involved. A 
reporter should even be rewarded. However, the crew did not trust the effectiveness of 
anonymity in reporting systems. A common view was that shore management as well as 
their fellow colleagues would know person(s) involved by ‘accurate guess’. In section 2.7.2, 
the importance of face work for Chinese people was explained. The result of ‘accurate 
guess’ could mean shame for the person(s) involved. Thus, crew’s concern for their 
personal reputation affected their willingness to reporting.  
 
These findings resonate with others described in the literature. For example, Hopkins (2000) 
noted that if reporting an incident could have negative impact on a reporter, the reporting 
would be muted. In a similar sense, this study showed that crew’s safety reporting (ship to 
shore communication) was significantly affected by the concerns of their salary, personal 
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reputation, job promotion and security. They all pointed to crew’s self-interests, one of the 
major factors affecting ship to shore safety communication (reporting). Moreover, the study 
showed that crew’s economic interest lay in the centre of their self-interests, since it was 
essential to support and survive their family. During the interviews with crew, some frankly 
pointed out the core issue that needed to be cared by the shore management: 
What might work for the crew are: one is salary; second is promotion; then (crew’s) 
family concern – since there is a family behind each of the crew. Crew’s salary is 
the core supporting their family (CO, S3 C2).  
  
Leung (2003) argued that one’s income was more crucial in developing countries with 
unsound welfare systems such as in China. It was the same for crew working in the Chinese 
shipping industry given the fact that their average income was comparatively higher than 
those working in some other industries. Therefore, crew’s concern for their income was 
understandable.  
 
As a breadwinner of a family, an employee’s economic condition may override their 
concern for OHS in the view that maintaining family income is crucial for survival 
(Levenstein and Tuminaro, 1997). Under such circumstances, an employee’s expectation 
about his/her own OHS could be low, and workplace hazards may be accepted 
‘fatalistically’ (ibid, p.6). For some crew the relatively higher salaries received by those 
working in chemical shipping sector, were believed to be associated with the relatively 
higher risk of their work. Some addressed themselves as ‘drug takers’ – drug means 
chemicals in this context. Therefore, it could be seen that the crew were themselves 
concerned more with their income than their OHS. In this situation an employee might 
intentionally ‘neglect’ workplace hazards in a scenario in which there was no reasonable 
likelihood of change of work environment or employment alternatives (ibid). Eventually, 
workplace risks were ‘naturally’ accepted by an employee as part of his/her job (Dwyer, 
1991). Here, there are echoes of Nichols and Armstrong’s analysis (1973) and the study 
among Chinese crew working in the Chinese chemical shipping industry showed a similar 
situation. In consideration of relatively higher salary, they were willing to work on 
chemical ships facing potentially higher risks than others. For ensuring that their salary was 
not deducted, many crew would rather remain some safety related problems unreported, 
particularly those likely to be deemed by shore management as human errors (crew’s 
mistakes or faults).  
 
To sum up, the study showed that shore-ship communication (particularly the downward 
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communication) was significantly affected by organisational hierarchy, positional power at 
different levels and systems of discipline (in this study the reward and punishment scheme). 
These also affected the attitude of the crew towards concerns about job security, pay and 
promotion prospects, all of which militated against open and co-operative engagement with 
health and safety management systems. The investigation further showed they all had a 
potential link to shore management’s economic concern, which will be explored next.  
 
9.2.2 Efficiency, Profit and Safety 
The examination of shore-ship communication also revealed that it was interwoven with 
the concerns of profit making as well as safety. The relationship between efficiency, profit 
and safety has been mentioned before in the literature. It is widely argued that good safety 
practice goes hand in hand with better productivity and profitability (Nichols and Tucker, 
2000). Indeed the UK health and safety regulator has made a considerable effort to 
emphasise that an organisation which successfully managed OHS will recognise the 
relationship between risk control, occupational health and the core of its business (HSE, 
1997, p.7). Most of the literature on the concept of ‘safety pays’ asserted that accidents and 
ill health are costly for individual employees, employers, insurers or the general public at 
large (Panopoulos and Booth, 2007). As I have already discussed in section 2.5.2, there is 
however another school of thought evident in the sociological literature in which the 
relationship between safety and profit is regarded as somewhat more problematic. 
Classically expressed by Nichols and Armstrong (1973) in their study on chemical workers, 
they argued that workplace safety should be addressed in their total situation and in the 
context of the social relations of production. They identified that most safety problems 
occurred due to the pressure workers were under to keep production going, and the conflict 
between safety and profit is fundamental. I will argue in this and next chapter that the 
divergent opinions held by shore management and ship’s crew that have been presented in 
the data chapters are better understood in the light of Nichols and Armstrong’s reasoning, 
than they are in terms of understandings in which safety and profits are regarded as 
complementary components of the same overall organisational goals.   
 
In Chapter 5, it was demonstrated that communication for the purpose of shore support 
showed that although there were some positive achievements for OHSM practice in terms 
of technical and informational support, the lack of material resource support limited the 
operation of various arrangements and activities of OHSM. Typically, the insufficient 
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supply of working tools and consumable materials brought about potential threats to crew’s 
OHS. 
 
In essence, the control of the supply of material resources was the control of cost. During 
my field work onboard ships, the term cost control was mentioned many times by the crew 
(see section 5.3.3). Some shore management interviewees also expressed a similar concern: 
If some items do not affect much on safety, cost issue would be considered. After 
all, we work for the boss, and we should try to earn money for the boss (Marine 
Engineering Manager, C2).  
 
These sentiments echo those presented by Nichols and Armstrong (1973) in their account of 
the ways in which workers in a chemicals factory in the UK ‘normalised’ their approach to 
breaking safety rules in order to maintain the factory activities in ways profitable to their 
employer. According to them, safety at work often ‘boils down to a question of economics’ 
(ibid, p.29). As they quote from a worker in their study: 
Managers might be interested in safety. Nobody likes to see a bloke get into an 
accident. But I think if they get their production going and things like that and the 
job going all right, that’s their interest (ibid, p.28).  
 
In a similar vein, my study showed that the company’s asserted priority of ‘safety first’ was 
actually compromised by the shore management’s prioritisations of concern over profit. 
 
Therefore, it is not difficult to understand that managers may find the requirement of 
OHSM so costly that it led to a low level of compliance (Frick and Zwetsloot, 2007). 
Similar cases have been seen in previous studies in the shipping industry. Such reasoning 
was something that was an everyday occurrence on board the ships on which I sailed. For 
example, a captain could save cost for his ship owner if he did not use pilotage (or tug 
assistance) in cases when they were optional. And such experiences are also reported in 
previous studies of safety at sea:  
Sometimes a shore person will suggest we sail with no tugs or sail in limited 
visibility. This reduces his port operating expenses…If we come into an anchorage 
in fog, his budget gets an expense of a launch and reliefs (Perrow, 1999, p.183). 
 
It could be seen that the ‘perceived cost’ of safety management activities emerged in the 
decisions making at all levels in an organisation (Cox and Cox, 1996, p.209). While the 
concern of cost saving was observed in my study, the concern of profit earning was equally 
observed. As illustrated in section 6.2.3, the hectic sailing schedules, seen on the four 
tankers on which I sailed, were resonant with early research findings in this industry that 
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more profit came from the ‘speed and efficiency’ of work and ‘the money is to be made by 
keeping it working’ (Perrow, 1999, p.181).  
 
As is known to all, weather conditions could have significant impact on ship’s sailing 
schedules. Principally, the intensity of (bad) weather conditions should be observed and 
judged by a ship’s captain in making decisions about whether to sail from ports or in 
planning the route of the voyage to be taken. In this study, the communication between 
shore and ship showed that in the two companies, the shore side seriously intervened in the 
captain’s supposed independent decision-making power over ship’s sailing. The 
consequence was that, for fear of causing voyage delay, the potential threat from external 
adverse environments was intentionally neglected by the ship’s crew. Thus, it could be seen 
that the management’s consideration for profit seeking contributed to crew’s risk taking 
behaviour. In addition, as illustrated in section 6.2.2, 6.2.3 and 9.3.2, the shore to ship 
communication for management control showed that ship’s schedules (both sailing at sea 
and calling in a port) were closely monitored by the shore management in both companies, 
which became a heavy psychological as well as physical burden on the crew, particularly 
the senior officers such as a ship’s captain. I will have cause to return to the consequences 
of this later in this chapter. As a result, shipboard OHSM was compromised by strong 
commercial pressures (also see Perrow, 1999).  
 
In general, the management’s concern for cost control and profit seeking, to a considerable 
extent, showed that short-term financial consideration dominated their ideology in their 
routine OHSM. During the interviews with some managers, they frankly said that their 
companies could not survive without these considerations. For example, a manager, one of 
those who could go in-depth regarding this topic, spoke ‘the unspoken words in the play’:  
For ship owners, mostly, the first thing they think is the economic concern. As a 
result, the (prevention) of the threat to crew lives could be tampered. I think it 
exists in their sub-consciousness, even for a responsible ship owner. But no one 
would say so on the table (Safety and Quality Manager, C2).  
 
The quote reinforced the existence of the hidden agenda, the economic concern, behind the 
way in which a ship was managed by the shore management. It has also been recognised 
previously, for example in Perrow’s work (1999). This contradiction between safety and 
production was commonly seen from the data, and which was a concern for some crew:  
In our company, the relationship between safety and efficiency is not properly 
dealt with. They are always contradictory. If you cannot guarantee safety, how can 
you ensure efficiency (2E, S1 C1)?   
 196 
 
These contradictions, between safety and efficiency, classically demonstrated by Nichols 
and Armstrong in their seminal sociological work (1973), can also be seen in many other 
sociological treatments in the literature. Authors such as Levenstein and Tuminaro (1997), 
Gunningham and Johnstone (1999), and Dywer (2000) argued that employees’ working 
conditions became worse when an employer bore the pressure of strong market competition 
and sought for short-term profitability. The study made by Levenstein and Tuminaro (1997) 
showed that when an organisation faced strong market competition, the competitive 
pressure was frequently passed along to employees and workplace OHSM practice was 
considerably undermined. Because of pressures of production, there are many cases where 
injuries go unreported, supervisors ‘turn a blind eye’ and unsafe practices continue owing to 
the drive for making profits at the expense of safety (Quinlan, 1999). The findings in my 
study showed a similar situation in the Chinese chemical shipping industry. As a 
consequence, the outcome of OHSM can be significantly undermined, which I will argue 
later in this chapter.  
 
The management’s strong economic concern further affects a company’s ongoing 
investment in OHSM. Gunningham (2007) distinguished four different types of 
organisations, i.e., the OHS Leaders, Reluctant Compliers, the Recalcitrants and the 
Incompetent one, among which the type of OHS Leaders was highly commended by him. 
Previous research in the shipping industry has showed that the above mentioned scenarios 
all applied (Anderson, 2003; Bhattacharya, 2009). It was further strengthened by this study 
in the Chinese chemical shipping industry. My examination of shore-ship communication 
revealed that the shore management tended to prioritise efficient production (in the 
shipping context it means fast sailing) rather than safe production and demonstrated that 
management in both companies had stronger ‘economic’ commitment than that held for 
better shipboard OHSM.  
 
9.2.3 Crew’s Participation in OHSM 
In section 6.2, the examination of shore to ship communication showed that crew’s 
autonomy and decision making power were assured from the shore management’s 
perspective in both companies. Also, they were clearly stated in their OHSMSs. However, 
the crew’s responses showed that crew’s autonomy and independent decision making were 
apparently compromised during shore-ship communication (interaction). Influential factors 
included those such as hierarchical differentiation, the management’s controlling power, the 
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discipline and rule restriction played a role in this. In ship interview and observational data, 
most of the crew, particularly the senior officers, indicated that they felt highly controlled 
by shore management and they had little autonomy in terms of the ship’s routine 
operations.  
 
Dywer (1991) described two types of situations in which workers autonomy was 
significantly hindered. One was the ‘authoritarianism’ under the impact of which worker’s 
autonomy was limited and they could be threatened or punished by the management. 
Another was the ‘voluntary servitude’, in which workers were obedient to management’s 
command even if there were apparent difficulties in completing work tasks. Under such 
circumstances, a seemingly harmonious relationship was created between the two, as a 
result of which adverse working environments were considered as ‘normal’. In this sense, 
the ‘normal safety rules’ become redefined as ‘abnormal controls’ (ibid, p.116). My study 
showed similar situation. Many crew complained that shore management were not 
concerned with ship’s real conditions when health and safety related decisions were made. 
They used phrases such as ‘no other way around’ or ‘no other choices’ to conclude their 
talk, which suggested very limited autonomy at their hands in terms of shipboard OHSM.   
 
In Chapter 7, it was made clear that although the shore management expected as well as 
encouraged crew to report safety related problems occurred onboard ships as often as 
possible, the examination of ship to shore upward communication showed that safety 
related events (including nonconformity reporting, accident reporting and hazardous 
situation reporting) were significantly under-reported as well as reported in a biased way. 
As I have already discussed, the possibility of disciplinary action hampered, rather than 
facilitated, crew’s participation in OHSM. Although Cooke and Rohleder (2006, p.218) 
pointed out that one important way of showing management’s commitment was to reward, 
rather than punish, incident reporting, this study did not show any significance of such a 
practice. Simply, it seemed illogical to reward a ‘mistake’, as stated by many crew.  
 
In a similar sense, the shore management in both companies equally expected crew to make 
constructive safety-related suggestions that could help the improvement of their OHSM. As 
illustrated in section 8.2, open-door policy, attitudes surveys and similar devices were used 
by both companies in order to learn about crew’s OHS concerns. The results showed that 
those efforts for strengthening shore-ship communication achieved very limited outcome. 
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In general, it was found that the bureaucratic management practice, the hierarchical 
differences and the traditional Chinese cultural elements significantly affected the 
willingness of crew to give their suggestions to the management for shaping good OHSM 
practice in the companies. For example, a chief officer stated that it was not respectful to 
the shore management if crew give them safety-related advice, since they are supposed to 
know better than crew (see section 8.3.3).  
 
In section 2.7.3, the development of Chinese seafaring labour market was described. 
Because of the frequent change of ships in a company or between companies, crew tended 
to be reluctant to give any constructive ideas for the improvement of shipboard OHSM 
practice. Many of them thought that it did not make significant sense to them since they 
work from ship to ship and the condition of each ship is different (see section 8.3.5). In 
general, the study showed that the fluidity of the seafaring occupation did not promote 
crew’s participation in OHSM.  
 
The crew’s collective participation through for example, the involvement of shipboard trade 
unions’ units did not lead to improvement in ship to shore communication. In section 2.5.4, 
the positive role of trade unions in improving workplace OHSM has been examined. 
Mostly, the evidence for this comes from developed western societies. The discussion in 
section 8.3.4 suggested that the role of trade unions in the Chinese shipping industry was 
limited. It failed to contribute to the improvement of communication between shore 
management and ship’s crew, largely because the crew’s collective bargaining power 
remained weak.  
 
In general, the crew on the four ships showed very limited upward communication no 
matter whether it was conducted in individual or collective form which further indicated 
their limited participation in organisational OHSM. This finding is similar to that of 
Bhattacharya’s research (2009 and 2012) in the international shipping industry, which also 
showed low crew’s participation in OHSM. Yet it is widely discussed and agreed that (see 
section 2.6.2) that worker participation is an essential pre-condition for improving 
workplace OHSM. The limited autonomy and participation of the crew revealed in this 
study suggests this is a challenge that remains to be addressed.  
 
9.2.4 Other Influences  
Apart from the above-mentioned dominant factors that influenced shore-ship 
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communication, the data chapters reveal two other noticeable factors that mediate 
shore-ship communication. One was the influence of the Chinese culture; the other was the 
influence of industrial bodies in the chemical shipping industry. They are discussed in the 
following. 
 
The Chinese Cultural Context 
The research literature shows that Chinese traditional culture persisted in modern 
organisations (see section 2.7.2). In this culture communication was highly contextual (Hall 
and Hall, 1987; Shi and Westwood, 2000, p.212). The present study showed that 
communication between management and crew is likely to have been influenced by 
traditional Chinese culture.  
 
From management’s perspective, the traditional Chinese culture helped enhance their 
decision making power in the process of shore to ship communication in a well-established 
hierarchical structure in an organisation. As stated in section 2.7.2, there is a large power 
distance across different hierarchical positions, and the power is unevenly distributed but 
socially legitimised in the Chinese society (Hofstede, 1991). Chinese people are expected 
to accept their positions, dutifully fulfil their roles and not challenge the order (Shi and 
Westwood, 2000). This paradigm extends into all hierarchical systems including 
organisational superior-subordinate ones and the present study showed that managerial 
power, was reinforced in the process of downward communication for the execution of 
various working instructions or orders by the Chinese cultural context in which it occurred.  
 
Nor did traditional culture help facilitate upward (ship to shore) communication on OHSM 
related issues. More specifically, the communication was affected by some traditional 
cultural elements such as ‘respect for seniority’, ‘respect for hierarchy’, ‘avoidance of 
offending management’, ‘affecting crew solidarity’, ‘conservative character’ and ‘dislike of 
showing-off’. They were identified and discussed in section 2.7.2, 6.2.2, 6.2.3, 6.3.2, 7.3.2 
and 8.3.3 respectively. These cultural elements considerably affected crew’s upward 
communication (reporting), and as a result some of the good practices were under-reported 
or not reported at all. For example, if the lower ranked crew did not establish a good 
relationship with senior crew, it was very likely that a good idea would not be reported 
upward. It is unlikely for ratings to report to the shore management without mediation from 
the senior crew. Hence, the shore management’s understanding of shipboard OHSM 
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practice was limited.  
 
As is clear from the literature the cultural differences affect the way in which worker’s 
communication and participation in OHSM related issues are conducted (Needleman, 2000). 
Chinese traditional culture helps to promote downward communication while hinders 
upward communication within a hierarchical structure of an organisation. It is an implicit 
moral order rather than codified in law or institutionalised in structures of civil society (Shi 
and Westwood, 2000, p.197).  
 
The Role of Monitoring Compliance 
The research made by Walters (2005) showed that the supply chain, the intermediary 
processes and actors in wider economic and social environment were identified to be able 
to play a significant role in influencing OHSM of an organisation. As explained in section 
4.2.3, it is common that the OHS conditions of a chemical tanker shall be inspected by 
external monitoring bodies such as FSC, PSC, CDI and oil majors. In this study, it was 
found that they could also influence communication between management and crew.  
 
Of all the external monitoring bodies that could significantly affect shipboard OHSM, the 
role of oil majors such as BP, Shell or ExxonMobil, was especially powerful. Both shore 
and ship interviewees agreed that if a ship could pass oil majors’ inspection, it would be 
easy to pass other inspections. Most significantly, passing oil majors’ inspection could have 
special implications for a company’s commercial interest. If a ship failed to pass oil majors’ 
inspection, the ship was not allowed to carry cargoes from them. In addition, the inspection 
result could seriously affect a company’s ‘international reputation’, since it would be 
uploaded to the internet that was open for access by various charterers or cargo owners 
from home and abroad. In this context, a good inspection result was an important factor 
attracting ‘high-end customers’ that could be potentially helpful for a shipping company to 
gain higher ‘economic return’, as repeatedly mentioned by many interviewees. This further 
stimulated shipping companies to apply for oil majors’ inspection in spite of their strict 
inspection standards.  
 
The implication of external inspection for the business of a chemical shipping company has 
been made clear. In common, a company’s internal inspection served for passing external 
inspection. In order to ensure passing the external inspection, an internal inspection may be 
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even stricter than an external one (see the last quote in section 6.3.1).  
 
The influence of external inspection on shore-ship communication could easily been seen 
from the data. The study showed that both shore management and ship’s crew showed 
particular concern for passing various external inspections. During the short period before 
an external inspection, the communication between the management and crew was more 
frequent and burdensome. This added significant workload and work pressure on crew, as 
seen in section 6.3.2. In particular, the research found that an external inspection could 
significantly affect ship-shore written communication. Since various written records related 
to shipboard OHSM were one of the major areas of an external inspection, crew therefore 
worried about reporting safety problems (to their company) in written forms: 
Some are about company’s internal information. They cannot be spoken out. For 
example, some equipment’s working conditions are not stable. We hesitate whether 
they would be written down on paper and get them reported (to the company). If 
we do so, the records would be easily identified by an external inspector (Captain, 
S4 C2).  
 
A second engineer further explained:  
The written reports…it is no good for external inspection. If an inspector found 
that you had more problems reported, they would doubt your ship’s management 
and check in more detail (2E, S2 C1). 
  
Thus, the data shows that shore-ship communication (more exactly, upward written 
communication) was affected by external inspection bodies, particularly the oil majors.  
 
A further indirect effect also noted was that these efforts noticeably added to crew’s 
administrative paperwork burdens. This situation was seen in studies in the international 
shipping industry (Anderson et al., 2003; Bailey 2006; Bhattacharya, 2009). The paperwork 
based audit practice was criticised by them in it is so focused on ‘correctness’ that it misses 
the point about the improvement of workplace safety. As a consequence, it indirectly 
brought about negative effects on crew by increasing their workload without giving any 
benefits.  
 
In brief, the study suggests that shore-ship communication can be noticeably influenced by 
the practice of monitoring compliance. On the one hand, it showed that the communication 
was increased before the arrangement of an external inspection; on the other the 
consequence of this is that it served to increase the administrative burdens for the crew, 
their workload and their stress, which will be particularly addressed in section 9.4 in this 
 202 
chapter.  
 
9.3 COMMUNICATION AND ITS INFLUENCE ON OHSM PRACTICE 
In section 9.2, a range of factors underlying the nature of workplace and organisational 
communication in the shipping context that could solely or jointly affect communication 
between management and crew were discussed. This section continues the exploration of 
how communication influences shipboard OHSM practice in the two selected companies.  
 
 9.3.1 The Effectiveness of Shore Support 
Chapter 5 discussed communication for the purpose of shore support. The data suggested 
that communication played a very limited role in improving shipboard OHSM. Three major 
types of support were identified from the data, i.e., technical support, information support 
and material resource support.  
 
The study of communication for technical support, particularly during ship visits, shows 
that it can play a positive role in improving crew’s safety knowledge and skills conducive 
to improving shipboard OHSM. It could be used to convey safety education from both 
management and crew’s perspectives. Given the fact that some senior or experienced crew 
did not fully agree with such a conclusion in view of their competence, its positive role 
should not be neglected. As for safety information communication, the study showed that it 
played a fairly positive role in improving shipboard OHSM. It helped crew learn lessons 
from the past, reinforced safe-working practices, and refreshed their safety knowledge. 
Similarly, its positive role in influencing OHSM was generally confirmed by both shore 
management and ship’s crew. However, the study showed that the crew regarded the 
provision of material resources for shipboard OHSM as insufficient. Examples such as the 
short supply of UTI used for the measurement of cargo and paint can be seen in section 
5.3.3 and therefore, although communication for technical and informational support 
showed certain positive outcomes, its effectiveness was bottlenecked by a failure to provide 
essential material resources as a pre-condition for OHSM, with the result that in general, 
shipboard OHSM was not fundamentally improved through such communication.  
  
9.3.2 The Effectiveness of Management Control 
In Chapter 6, communication for management control was examined. This communication 
is essential for ensuring OHSM onboard ships. This study shows that communication 
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between management and crew has made a very limited contribution to the improvement of 
Chinese OHSM practice.  
  
In section 2.5.2, the role of management control for ensuring workplace OHSM is 
discussed by authors such as Quinlan and Mayhew (2000), Dorman (2000) and Skoog 
(2007). In the shipping industry management control is achieved by technology-based 
communication and ship visit communication (see Chapter 6). The examination of 
technology-based communication shows that the use of telephones is more frequent than 
other means of communication. However, it only serves for the purpose of reinforcing 
shore management’s close supervision of ship’s sailing given the fact that its 
communication cost is comparatively higher than the written ones such as email. Telephone 
communication leaves no evidence that might accuse any shore management’s 
shortcomings or blameworthiness during shore-ship communication. One consequence of 
this is that crew bear the psychological and physical pressures, as shown in section 9.4. 
This is unfavourable for improving shipboard OHSM.  
  
Furthermore, it was seen in section 6.3 that the ship visit communication was characterised 
by spot inspection (a common way of safety control). Its role in OHSM could be seen in the 
literature. Although it might help improve tangible OHS arrangements, it could not address 
‘the root causes’ of invisible problems such as work pressure (Probst and Brubaker, 2001). 
Bruhn (2006) held a critical view that inspection is much more difficult to observe work 
organisation and psychosocial risks unless they were told by workers. The research findings 
in Canada (Bornstein and Hart, 2010) doubted the effectiveness of the conventional ‘tick 
the boxes’ auditing approach commonly applied in practice. This method is unable to 
‘assess how these actually operate in practice or ask whether the OHSMS itself is adequate 
in its design and assumptions’ (ibid, p.61). In this study, ship visit communications 
dominated by safety inspections, show that the situation was similar to that stated in the 
literature. It did not meaningfully help crew solve critical safety problems on board. Hence, 
there was a lack of evidence to show that it could improve OHSM on board.  
  
Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 discuss crew’s safety reporting and suggestions which were 
regularly reported to shore management. They dominated ship to shore communication in 
this study. Regardless of the significant problems of under-reporting and biased reporting, 
the reported events would be audited by the shore management. This communication 
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served as key evidence showing shore management the status of shipboard OHSM. It (the 
audit of ship’s reports) was a routine practice for controlling shipboard OHSM activities 
when a ship visit was not available. However, this paper trail based audit approach has been 
argued to be over-bureaucratic (Bhattacharya, 2009). The emphasis on paper logs is 
reminiscent of ‘managerialist audit culture’ that was similar to a case study conducted by 
Sum and Ngai (2005) in China. In general, Kipnis (2008, p.281) noted that paper, logs 
based audits all attempted to adopt statistical performance measures, but it can potentially 
distort the phenomena that were measured. In my study, it showed that the shore 
management’s audits of crew’s safety reports were mainly used to make deductions from 
crew’s safety bonuses. Also, the shore management’s response to crew’s safety suggestions 
was basically bureaucratic, for example, the non-reply practice shown in section 8.3.1. 
Therefore, the shore to ship communication as well as follow-up communication made very 
limited contribution to the improvement of OHSM on board.    
  
In section 2.5.2, the role of the management control in influencing OHSM was highlighted, 
and its focus on worker behaviour was criticised by many authors such as Frick and Wren 
(2000), Nichols and Tucker (2000) and Shaw and Blewett (2000), who advocated the use of 
a situational approach to safety, i.e., safety place or environment. The findings of my study 
reflected the adoption of former approach to workplace safety by the management – the 
management tended to stress crew’s safe behaviour rather than safe shipboard working 
environment. It was particularly evident during the management communication with crew 
at ship visits (see section 6.3) when shipboard communication was dominated by spot 
inspections of crew’s behavioural compliance. As a consequence, it brought about 
considerable negative impacts on crew such as increased psychological pressure and a 
greater workload.  
 
Although it was argued that the management control over workplace OHSM practice was 
important for organisational OHSM in order to cope with non-compliances (Levenstein and 
Tuminaro, 1997; Hutter, 2001), the study of shore-ship communication, together with the 
discussions in this section, showed that the shore management control played a very limited 
positive role in improving shipboard OHSM. The situation emerged in this study was 
similar to early empirical research findings:  
The surveillance of captains, and rewards and punishments for captains, and the 
financial incentives to owners, charterers, and insurers, along with other 
factors…do not encourage safety and indeed encourage risk. The encouragement 
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of risk induces the owners and operators of the system to discard the elements of 
linearity and loose coupling that do exist, and to increase complexity and tight 
coupling (Perrow, 1999, p.188).  
 
 Larsson (2000, p.199) observed that it is common that management appear as ‘absolute 
actors exerting control and enjoying the economic results of the activities of numerous 
operating units’ with less attention paid to workers' life and health. In his study, he doubted 
the notion of ‘responsible employers’, which has lost its real sense. The finding from this 
study showed that when employers compromised their safety standards under the strong 
pressure of market competition. This point was interpreted in section 9.2.2 in terms of the 
conflict between efficiency, profit and safety. Also, it is widely addressed in the literature 
that an OHSMS was basically embedded in authoritarian ideology, and as such does not 
encourage management-employee communication (Hale et al., 1998; Nichols and Tucker, 
2000; Nielsen, 2000; Frick et al., 2000, p.5). Such a management system left power and 
control in the hands of management rather than employees (Wokutch and VanSandt, 2000). 
Under such a circumstance, employees’ involvement does not necessarily provide them a 
means to question corporate objectives or allow them to participate in organisational 
decision-making processes (Webb, 1995). This situation is in line with the result of my 
study, which showed that shore-ship communication contributed little to the improvement 
of shipboard OHSM, and the quality of workplace OHSM can be fundamentally 
compromised. 
  
In brief, the communication for the management control showed that shore management 
did not help improve shipboard OHSM with their dominant management power. The field 
work observation as well as interview data presented in the data chapters showed that 
shipboard OHSM was generally degraded, rather than improved. 
 
9.3.3 The Quality of Feedback in Safety Reporting and the Limitations of Its Role in 
Organisational Learning 
OHS indicators have been widely used by shipping companies for the measurement of the 
quality and outcomes of their OHSMSs, as described in section 4.3. However, my research 
revealed that influences on ship to shore communication may significantly influence the 
‘quality’ of OHS indicators as one of the major elements of an OHSMS.  
  
Principally, such indicators are statistical data reported from ship’s crew, particularly 
concerning nonconformity reporting, accident reporting and hazardous situation reporting, 
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as discussed in Chapter 7. However, bad news does not travel easily up the corporate 
hierarchy (quoted by Hopkins, 2000) and a common problem demonstrated in mine and 
other studies was that safety-related events or information were not communicated 
(reported) to relevant decision makers, and under-reporting was omnipresent (see also for 
example Ellis et al., 2010; Bhattacharya, 2011; Oltedal and McArthur, 2011). My study 
showed that although the required reporting was well defined in the OHSMSs of both 
companies, some of the OHS related problems were not truly reported to the shore 
management and under-reporting and biased reporting were also commonly seen among 
crew. The reasons for this failure of communication were the various immediate and 
underlying factors identified in this study that were mostly concerned with the crew’s job 
insecurity. As a consequence, some of the safety-critical problems were not entered into the 
reporting system and could not be seen by shore management.  
  
In terms of the continuous improvement that OHSM theory suggests should follow from 
good feedback, my study revealed that ship-shore communication played a very limited 
role in facilitating such organisational learning and, as a result, contributed little to the 
continuous improvement of shipboard OHSM. 
  
Cooke and Rohleder (2006) identified the main components of safety-related 
communication that underpinned the operation of an OHSMS. They are: identification and 
response, reporting, investigation, identification of causal structure, making 
recommendations, communication and recalling incident/accident learning, and finally 
implementing corrective actions (ibid, p.217). They argued that communicating knowledge 
originating from incidents both internal and external can validate and strengthen the 
management system itself. They are ‘especially important for signifying improvement 
opportunities’ (Tucker, et al., 2002, p.123). Therefore, they could have a great potential to 
contribute to ongoing organisational learning that is essential for continuous improvement 
of OHSM (Sitkin, 1992; Tucker et al., 2002). However, the problem of under-reporting and 
biased reporting, as identified in my study, suggested that it significantly reduced the 
potential value of such reported information for organisational learning and improvement 
of workplace OHSM. For example, avoiding critical cases and dwelling on trifles reduced 
the value of the role of reporting in promoting organisational learning (see section 7.3.5). 
Also, in response to management’s requirement to report near miss cases, crew tended to 
report innocuous cases such as misplacing flour in the galley and mis-entry of log records 
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and these reports made little positive sense for shore management or crew on other ships. 
Under such a circumstance, safety-related communication does not meaningfully help with 
continuous improvement of OHSM in this study.  
 
It has also been argued in the literature that incident investigation is an important 
component of incident learning systems (Cooke and Rohleder, 2006). They claimed that a 
reporter should be included in an incident investigation process. But here again, my study 
showed that crew were generally excluded from an investigation team and there was no 
chance for them to participate in this process. Therefore, it was not difficult to understand 
crew’s complaints that investigation reports are always a violation of procedures, as 
indicated in section 7.3.3. Although the role of safety information communication was 
assessed as generally positive in promoting OHSM, as seen in section 5.3.2, the value of 
safety information communicated to crew was discounted in terms of its role in promoting 
organisational learning and continuous improvement of OHSM.  
  
In Chapter 8, it was stated that crew were encouraged to make suggestions that could 
contribute to the improvement of OHSM. The reality was that crew did have some valuable 
ideas, but were affected by factors such as the bureaucratic practice of the management, the 
shipboard hierarchy and Chinese cultural elements to the extent that some such good 
practices and suggestions were not communicated to the shore management and did not 
contribute to the improvement of OHSM. Zwetsloot (1995) found that if a management 
system did not support creativity and experiment – a crucial prerequisite for learning, any 
efforts for continuous improvement of OHSM would be fruitless. My interview data and 
field observations indicated that there was no evidence indicating the occurrence of creative 
and constructive communication with an attempt to improve OHSM. It therefore again 
suggested limited chances for organisational learning and continuous improvement of 
shipboard OHSM. 
  
9.4 INDIRECT EFFECTS ON CREW’S HEALTH, SAFETY AND WELL-BEING 
The study found that in some respects, rather than improving the health and safety 
experience of crew, communication from the company management may have actually 
served to undermine it in practice, no matter whether it was communication at ship’s sailing 
(technology-based communication) or during ship visits (face-to-face communication). In 
this respect many of the crew on the four ships experienced psychological as well as 
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physical pressures in the process of interaction between shore management and ship’s crew 
that may have effects on their health, safety and well-being. These are discussed in the 
following section.  
 
9.4.1 Psychological Pressure 
In section 6.2.2 and 6.2.3, the data strongly suggested that shore to ship communication 
leads to certain levels of psychological pressure on crew. In sub-sections of section 7.3, 
although such pressures were not explicitly stated, they can be inferred from the data.  
  
Crew holding senior management positions bore higher psychological pressures than the 
rest of crew. This was particularly true for ship captains when making decisions balancing 
relationships between safety and efficiency. The consequence was that his decision making 
was strongly influenced by communication with the shore management. Perrow (1999) 
observed the great pressure borne by a captain on tight schedules given the fact that 
captains are usually judged by their ability to stick to sailing schedules. Many respondents 
in that study acknowledged strong pressure and even censure if a ship failed to meet 
established schedules or refuse to sail in bad weather conditions (ibid). The examination of 
shore to ship communication in my study shows similar situations. It was featured in 
examples such as the communication between the shore management and a captain for a 
ship’s berthing operations in an adverse natural environment and without sufficient tug 
services, as illustrated in section 6.2.2. The consequences of similar communications may 
contribute to an accumulation of psychological pressure within the crew. In the literature, 
the importance of control over work was addressed by Karasek (1979) in his famous 
demand and control model. He noted that workplace stress is a function of how a worker is 
commanded and to what extent the worker has the controlling power over his own 
responsibilities. Based on the empirical research by scholars such as Johnson and Hall 
(1988), Johnson et al. (1989) and Johnson and Hall (1994), this model was extended with 
another dimension, i.e., worksite social support, addressed as ‘Job 
Demand-Control-Support Model’. One of the categories in the model is labelled as ‘high 
strain’, which means that there are high demands from an organisation, low control over 
responsibility and a low level of social support. The study of shore to ship communication 
revealed the high demand from shore management and the low level of autonomy for the 
crew. In addition, the distance between shore and ship as well as the lack of communication 
during management’s ship visits (section 6.3) suggested a low level of social support from 
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shore management. In this sense shore to ship communication for management control can 
be seen as one of the major sources leading to crew’s high strain in their work.  
 
The major factor affecting crew’s safety reporting (upward communication) identified in 
section 9.2.1, i.e., was the crew’s concern over self interests including their salary, 
reputation, promotion and job security. Bohle and Quinlan (2000) noted that the affect of 
employees’ self-interests can induce psychological pressure and lower morale. Apart from 
psychological pressure, crew also bore physical stress, which will be discussed next.  
  
9.4.2 Physical Stressors  
During my voyages on the four ships, I observed that shore to ship communication (for 
management control) was associated with hectic schedules and long working hours. These 
are identified in section 6.2.3. They contributed noticeably to the crew’s physical stress in 
addition to psychological ones.  
  
For the crew in lower ranks, they were likely to bear more physical stress due to the nature 
of their work (involving much manual labour work and high workloads), which further 
intensified their routine workload. I recorded many examples in my field notes.  
 
For officers, many of them complained that there was too much paperwork that needed to 
be completed and reported to the shore management. In section 6.3.2 data showed that the 
paperwork occupied a significant amount of crew’s duty time, as well as their off-duty time. 
Such work was considerably intensified before a ship visit or external inspection. 
Apparently, such additional bureaucratic demands for audit trails, as noted in section 9.2.4, 
increased crew’s workload and produced physical stress to crew.   
 
One of the typical ‘symptoms’ from enduring physical stress was fatigue. Seafarer fatigue 
has been widely addressed in the literature in the shipping industry. It can cause both short 
term and long term OHSM consequences (Smith et al., 2006; Smith, 2011). The 
consequences of fatigue are felt not only in terms of impaired performance and reduced 
safety, but also by decreased well-being and an increased risk of mental health problems. 
Both are also known to be risk factors for future chronic disease (Smith et al., 2006, p.9).  
  
In Chapter 7, several personal injury incidents were mentioned and recorded in my field 
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notes. According to the ship’s crew, they were mainly caused by fatigue. The 
under-reporting of those injuries suggested poorer effect on some of the crew’s health and 
safety. In addition, as just mentioned, fatigue can lead to reduced safety. In severe cases 
fatigue may lead to loss of life, property as well as damage to the environment (Houtman et 
al., 2005). From a holistic perspective, Smith et al. (2006, p.8) identified three major 
factors that caused seafarer fatigue: operational (e.g. port frequency), organisational (e.g. 
job support) and environmental (e.g. physical hazards). In this study the examination of 
communication between management and crew highlighted the organisational factor which 
contributed to crew’s fatigue, or in a general sense, their physical stress.  
  
9.4.3 The Combined Effect 
The above two sub-sections discussed shore-ship communication and its potential influence 
on crew’s psychological pressure and physical stress. In reality these stressors usually occur 
concurrently. For example, the examination of shore to ship communication showed that it 
was closely associated with a ship’s hectic sailing schedule as well as long working hours. 
They contributed to both psychological pressure and physical stress on crew. Similar joint 
effects is commonly seen onboard the four ships I observed. It implies that these stressors 
can have indirect effects on crew’s health, safety and well-being.  
 
It is widely recognised that psychological pressure can affect anyone's health condition. 
Under the prolonged influence of psychological pressure, employees can acquire ‘lowered 
immune function, ulcers, cardiovascular problems, anxiety, and depression’ (Levenstein 
and Tuminaro, 1997, p.43). Although it was not the intention of this study to investigate the 
extent to which both psychological pressure and physical stress affect crew health and 
safety, some crew members did express their deteriorated health and serious physical 
disorders during the interviews. It shows that crew's health, safety and well-being could be 
affected as a consequence of communication.  
  
Physical stress can also affect a crew’s psychological status. Smith et al. (2006) argued that 
physical stress affects worker’s social interactions beyond their work time. In the shipping 
industry, its influence should not be neglected onboard ships where crew worked and lived 
together in a confined environment. A lack of social interaction can have certain effects 
concerning work cooperation and OHSM practices onboard ships. Negative influences 
from physical stresses should not be ignored.  
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In section 9.2.3 I discussed the extent to which shore-ship communication led to limits to a 
crew’s autonomy. The ability of an employee to control his work pace and methods is 
closely related to their ‘health, satisfaction and well-being’ (Levenstein and Tuminaro, 1997, 
p.44). An employee benefits from strong control over his work and this helps reduce the 
impact of additional workload. On the contrary, a lack of work autonomy would have a 
negative influence on an employee’s OHS. This study of communication between 
management and crew in the Chinese chemical shipping companies shows that the crew on 
four ships experienced such problems of reduced autonomy as described. In this sense, they 
may have added to negative influences for crew’s OHS.  
  
During interviews on board, many crew also expressed the view that their squeezed time 
and limited energy (as a result of hectic schedules and long working hours as described in 
section 6.2.3) affected their safety reporting to shore management. This was one of the 
practical reasons affecting upward communication. A similar situation is described in the 
study in the Norwegian shipping industry made by Oltedal and Wadsworth (2010). 
Shore-ship communication in safeguarding crew’s OHS was thus weakened by both fatigue 
and stress.  
  
9.5 SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION 
This chapter started with the exploration of the contexts of communication between shore 
management and ship’s crew. The exploration identified some of the key factors underlying 
the nature of workplace and organisational communication. They include hierarchy, power 
and discipline in management and crew’s concerns for their personal income, reputation, 
job promotion and security. The result was that on the one hand these factors enhanced 
downward communication and on the other hand limited upward communication. The 
discussion also extended to an assessment on the relationship between efficiency, profit and 
safety that were treated in both companies and found that workplace safety was overridden 
by the commercial interest of the business. As a consequence, crew’s upward 
communication (safety-related problem reporting and safety suggestions) was very limited, 
which suggests that crew’s participation in OHSM both in individual and collective forms 
was very limited. In brief, the overriding conclusion that emerges from my data chapters is 
that it is not the nature and types of communication that matter. What really influences 
OHSM is the prioritisation of effective and efficient production over other matters in the 
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decision making processes in the company. This prioritisation dominantly reflects the 
management’s pursuit of the economic interest rather than safe production.  
 
Moreover, two secondary factors were also identified in this study. First it showed that the 
Chinese cultural context also affects ship-shore communication. In a sense, parallel to that 
of the profit motive, it helped to promote downward communication while it hindered 
upward communication within an organisational hierarchical structure. Second, the role of 
monitoring compliance, involving powerful industrial bodies such as oil majors was also 
influential on the nature and frequency shore-ship communication while adding an 
increased workload and stress to crew.  
 
As a result, communication for shore support was comparatively insignificant in aiding the 
promotion of OHSM in the absence of material resources from the shore management. Also, 
the communication for management control showed that the management’s tight control 
over ship’s sailing schedules and biased focus on crew’s behaviour were unable to 
contribute to the improvement of workplace OHSM. Indeed, they contribute to worsening 
OHSM outcomes. Furthermore, the prevailing under-reporting and biased reporting suggest 
that the OHS indicators were only a nominal symbol and could not truly reflect shipboard 
OHSM situation. Finally, the study revealed that shore-ship communication was not helpful 
for reducing shipboard OHS problems and promoting organisational learning. Thus, the 
continuous improvement of shipboard OHSM practice was found not to have been 
achieved.  
 
In term of its effects on crew’s health, safety and well-being, the study suggested that in 
some respects – especially in relation to stress and fatigue, the form and content of shore to 
ship communication may have actually served to worsen crew’s health and safety 
experience on board ships, both in terms of psychological and physical stressors.  
 
In general, this Chapter summarised and discussed the key themes that emerged from the 
previous four data chapters. From the perspective of shore-ship communication, this study 
showed certain positive evidence in terms of the shipboard OHSM. The management’s 
support can be useful. In addition, Chapter 4 discussed both the positive and negative roles 
of supply chains in relation to workplace OHSM. In this study the major actor in supply 
chains, the oil majors, imposed pressures on both shore management and ship’s crew and 
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affected internal communication between them, their positive role in health and safety 
management should not be underestimated. For example, the high-standard inspection 
syllabus and strict on-the-spot inspections from oil majors can push company management 
to improve and investigate OHSM practices. Nevertheless, a majority of the collected data 
suggests that the OHSM practice in both companies is still far from ideal and fails to meet 
the stated safety policies and objectives of both. Further discussion and conclusions are 
presented in Chapter 10.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 214 
CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSIONS 
 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
Having discussed the contexts of communication – factors underlying the nature of 
workplace and organisational communication and the influence of shore-ship 
communication on shipboard OHSM, it is time to summarise the study and draw 
conclusions. It must be recognised that this study has been constrained by the time and cost 
factors experienced by many PhD researchers. Also, the limited maritime literature sources 
as well as a comparative lack of previous empirical studies (perhaps due to the difficulties 
of field work, as described in Chapter 3) have served to limit the scope of this study. 
Furthermore, organisational communication is omnipresent and complex, while this PhD 
study is mostly focused on shore-ship formal communication. Notwithstanding, these limits 
have not forestalled some major findings that emerged from the study. In this Chapter I 
present my main findings concerning the role of this form of communication and their 
implications for the effectiveness of OHSM on board vessels. My presentation of these 
findings leads to some conclusions concerning communication in effective OHSM and also 
suggests implications for the effectiveness of OHSM regulatory strategy in the shipping 
industry, and in particular for the role of the ISM code.  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, my findings indicate that while communication 
clearly plays a role in determining OHSM practice, what determines the nature and 
outcomes of such communication more fundamentally, is the prioritisation of efficiency and 
profit by the companies concerned rather than safety. Although this study was conducted in 
the Chinese chemical shipping industry, this prioritisation is not in my view determined by 
the particular conditions of Chinese chemical tankers (while acknowledging the fact that 
the Chinese cultural elements certainly aids this domination as I have discussed in section 
9.2.4). My findings resonate well with the wide literature on merchant shipping generally 
and globally, which emphasises this a similar observation (Parker, et al., 1997; Couper, et 
al., 1999; Alderton, et al, 2004). Thus it can be seen that imbalance between profit and 
safety is not a particular feature of the Chinese chemical shipping industry but symptomatic 
of such imbalance found in other employment situations globally.  
 
It has been commonly recognised that conflicts emerge when safety, efficiency and 
economic return are conflated by company management (Nichols and Tucker, 2000; 
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Panopoulos and Booth, 2007). In my study, it is easily seen from the four data chapters 
(Chapter 5-8) that there was a significant gap between what the management of the 
companies studied asserted or expected concerning OHSM and how the crew responded 
and what really happened on board. This showed that a dichotomy of purposes of 
communication existed between the shore management and ship’s crew. Such dichotomy 
highlighted the strong influence of conflicts of interests between the management and crew. 
In this regard, it has been previously attested in the sociological literature that an ‘identity 
of interest’ between the management and the managed remains unproven (Nichols and 
Armstrong, 1973; Nytro et al., 1998; Gunningham and Johnstone, 1999, p.9; Nichols and 
Tucker, 2000 and Hutter, 2001, p.312), and such conflict remains unchanged in modern 
organisations. In this respect, my study of the Chinese chemical shipping industry reaches a 
similar conclusion.  
 
The priority of profit over safety is basically embedded in the fundamental conflicting 
interests between the shore management and ship’s crew. Together with some cultural 
factors peculiar to the Chinese context such as respect for authority and avoidance of direct 
conflict, as well as some features of industrial organisation such as the inspection by oil 
majors, they strongly influenced the nature and role of communication between the 
management and crew, and in turn, had a significant impact on the practice of OHSM.  
 
10.2 MAJOR FINDINGS 
The study showed that shore management and crew communication in the two Chinese 
chemical shipping companies examined primarily took an asymmetrical (top-down) form, 
reflecting the power relations within these companies. Moreover, the study found that the 
communication was generally disengaged with OHSM concerns, which contributed to an 
unfavourable shipboard working environment, and suggested a limited outcome of OHSM 
in the Chinese chemical shipping industry.  
 
10.2.1 Asymmetrical Communication 
The study found that, for the management, hierarchy, positional power and economic 
concerns were major factors influencing, or more exactly, reinforcing downward (shore to 
ship) communication. Examples indicating such influences are indicated in Chapter 5 and 6 
and were particularly evident in the orders and instructions given by the shore management 
during a ship’s sailing at sea.  
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On the other hand, for the crew, their concerns about salary, personal reputation, job 
promotion and security, as stated in section 9.2.1, were major factors influencing, or more 
exactly, hindering upward (ship to shore) safety reporting. Consequently, the data shows 
that reporting safety related problems was purposefully manipulated and withheld by many 
of the crew. The result showed that under-reporting was prevalent among crew onboard 
four ships. Many examples of this are presented in Chapter 7. In addition, external 
industrial bodies in the shipping industry, particularly in the chemical shipping sector, could 
have significant influence on upward (ship to shore) communication. From a fear of 
exposing workplace problems to external inspectors (their check of written records), crew 
hesitated to make written report to their company, since their perceptions were that  
reported problems could be easily observed by inspectors and could incur further inspection 
and ultimately jeopardise their economic interests and job security (see section 7.3). The 
study suggests that the upward safety communication, particularly written communication 
was therefore significantly withheld by crew.  
 
While the shore management all agreed that crew’s reasonable suggestions or reporting of 
good practices could make significant contributions to improvement of OHSM, the study 
found that the crew was not really motivated to make such reports. Because of the 
bureaucracy of the shore management, the limited role of trade unions units on board ships 
and the precarity of seafaring occupation, the crew had little incentive to report such good 
practices. In addition, the shipboard hierarchy also affected the crew’s attempt to report. For 
a ship's crew, particularly the low ranks, the inequality perceived between them and shore 
management posed significant barrier to communication and my findings showed that 
crew’s willingness to give suggestions to shore management was limited.  
  
In addition, the study showed that elements of Chinese culture, identified in section 7.3.2, 
8.3.3 and 9.2.4, may also have contributed to weak upward communication. As stated in 
section 8.4, the study in the Chinese context made it difficult to distinguish the cultural 
influence from that of power imbalance and seafaring labour market. Thus, the strength and 
importance are difficult to ascertain due to the lack of comparable research on other 
nationalities. Though, this study suggests that certain cultural traditions in the Chinese 
context would seem important barriers to effective communication. The large power 
distance (in this study that between the Chinese managers and crew) and tendency of 
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centralised decision making process in organisational context help explain why crew’s 
contributions to safety reporting and safety suggestions remained minimal. It added some 
weight to the imbalance of communication between the two.  
  
Many studies have showed that open and well-balanced communication in an organisation 
has special implications for managing OHS activities effectively. In general, this study 
shows that the communication between shore management and ship yielded the opposite 
situation for the above reasons.   
 
One point worth mentioning during the study was that peer communication was observed 
between crew on one ship or between different ships, but it was discretionary and subject to 
personal relationships. Although the study showed some positive signs of such 
communication, they were unrelated to the shore-ship communication on which the study 
focused. As such they did not follow from such communication, but were separate from it 
and at best, they could be said to represent ways in which the crew made their own sense of 
how to work safely on ships.  
 
10.2.2 Communication Disengaged with the Concern of OHSM 
Within the hierarchical system of both companies, as illustrated in the introduction to the 
cases (see Chapter 4), the management occupies the leading position. In this respect, the 
hierarchical structure strengthened the management’s role in decision making on OHSM 
related issues. Although the management asserted that crew’s decision making was 
respected, the examination of shore-to-ship communication showed that the decision 
making process in both companies remained centralised and the crew’s decision making 
actually played only a limited role. As a consequence of tight management control, 
ship-to-shore communication left the crew with little autonomy in deciding OHSM related 
issues. 
 
The study revealed that the main purpose of technology-mediated communication was to 
give orders or instructions for ship’s sailing schedules, which was mostly prioritised by the 
shore management in both companies (as shown in section 6.2.2 and 9.2.2). It indicated that 
the primary consideration of the management was to satisfy the requirement of charterers 
with fast delivery of cargoes, while safe delivery of cargoes became their secondary 
consideration. As for the crew, they were vulnerable in terms of their income and job 
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security in the presence of the centralised management’s power over them and rewards and 
punishment scheme. The sailing schedules placed them under substantial pressure, which 
undermined their ability to deal with OHS issues and caused them to believe they cut 
corners in delivering the OHSM. The study revealed that the primary driving motivation of 
the management was their business interest. The management’s interest of business 
orientation dictated the content of the technology-mediated shore to ship communication 
process. In addition, the communication during ship visits showed the management’s focus 
on crew behaviours and performance rather than a concern with creating a safe working 
environment. In general, the shore to ship communication showed that the shore 
management failed to prioritise ‘safe place’ approaches to OHSM and emphasised instead 
the safety related behaviour of the crew.   
 
Although safety reporting was made at regular intervals, the problem of under-reporting 
and biased reporting suggests that it contributed little to the effectiveness of OHSM. 
Similarly, bureaucratic management, the inactiveness of shipboard trade unions units (in C1) 
and the precarity of seafaring occupations combined to suggest that crew (both individually 
and collectively) contributed little to the improvement of OHSM in upward 
communication.  
 
In the literature, incorporation of health and safety considerations into the communication 
process has been highlighted and is regarded as the key to determining workers working 
conditions (Shaw and Blewett, 2000; Frick et al., 2000). To a large extent, the study 
revealed that, affected by the conflicts of interests between the shore management and 
ship’s crew, their communication generally lacked of serious OHS considerations in their 
working practice. In brief, it revealed that, from both the management and crew’s 
perspectives, shore-ship communication incorporates a very limited concern for OHSM.  
 
10.2.3 Communication Contributing to Unfavourable Working Environment 
The examination of shore-ship communication showed that not only did it not improve 
OHSM, it actually contributed towards a poor shipboard working environment rather than 
an improved one.  
  
The technology-mediated communication imposed significant psychological pressure and 
physical stress to the crew, as shown in section 6.2 and 9.4. In a similar sense, ship visit 
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communication between the management and crew brought about a significant increase in 
work load (including practical work and paperwork) for the crew and affected the crew’s 
daily work routines and rest time. It further intensified crew’s psychophysical pressure. In 
all, the shore to ship communication for management control showed that those combined 
effects to crew’s OHS could have indirect effects on crew’s health, safety and well-being. 
The negative implications for crew’s shipboard working environment were considerable. 
  
The under-reporting/biased reporting of safety related problems implied that those 
problems, particularly those with so-called less consequences, remained on board. Typical 
examples can be seen in section 7.3.3 and 7.3.4 (unreported personal injury incidents and 
near misses). Although ‘self-digestion’ of the problems on board was mentioned by some of 
the crew (see section 7.3.5 for explanation), it only meant that crew were aware of them 
and managed to deal with them on their own. It never meant an appropriate solution to the 
problems in the absence of substantial management support. As a consequence, some of 
them remained unsolved and can pose significant threats to crew’s OHS as well as their 
working conditions. In addition, crew’s limited autonomy and participation in OHSM as 
identified in section 9.2.3 suggest that they played a very limited role in improving 
shipboard OHSM.  
  
On the ships in the present study, although the management in both companies asserted that 
their safety performance was good, this however was not the crew’s perceived experience 
and did not mean that they worked in a safe working environment, as illustrated in the data 
and discussion chapters.  
 
10.2.4 The Limited Outcome of OHSM  
Based on the previous discussions, this sub-section attempts to give an overall assessment 
on shore-ship communication and its influence on the outcome of OHSM in both 
companies. Chapter 5 showed that, in general, shore to ship communication played some 
positive roles. For example, it helped inexperienced crew solve some technical problems. 
Also, the communication of safety information helped a majority of crew learn lessons 
from past accidents and improved their workplace safety performance and behaviours. 
They were the positive outcomes of OHSM that were identified from the study.  
 
However, these were offset by a number of negative aspects. For examples, the 
 220 
communication showed the limited willingness of the shore management to supply material 
resources identified by crew as necessary for OHS. In Chapter 6, the technology-mediated 
communication showed the management’s emphasis on sailing schedules rather than proper 
OHSM. As a consequence, the combined effect of psychological and physical pressures on 
crew is very likely to worsen crew’s OHS and undermine shipboard OHSM practice. In 
brief, given the positive role of shore technical support and safety information support, its 
influence on workplace OHSM was very likely to be undermined by the lack of material 
supply and tight management control.  
  
Meanwhile, the study of ship to shore communication showed the prevalence of 
under-reporting and biased reporting (Chapter 7). It meant that the real shipboard situation 
was not truly reported. And it challenged the value of OHS indicators widely used in 
OHSMSs. In addition, the examination of the effectiveness of safety suggestions made by 
crew shows that they contributed little to the improvement of the OHSM (Chapter 8) due to 
the factors such as the managerial influence, the shipboard hierarchy and Chinese cultural 
elements. The under-reporting and biased reporting of safety related problems from crew 
with few suggestions given by them for improvement of OHSM implies that crew’s 
participation in the process of OHSM was limited. Section 2.6.2 reviews the literature that 
demonstrates how worker participation plays an important role in OHSM. The limited 
crew’s participation emerged from this study suggests that their overall contribution 
however was weak in this respect and affected the quality of safety information, and 
organisational learning. In addition the psychophysical pressures borne by crew also 
affected the arrangements for individual or collective learning activities onboard. In this 
sense, its role in continuous improvement of OHSM was limited.  
  
In all, the asymmetrical communication (mainly top-down), the disengagement of OHSM 
concerns in shore-ship communication and the unfavourable shipboard safe working 
environment together suggest the expected outcome of OHSM, as stated in the policies of 
OHSM in both companies, has not been achieved. In the literature chapter the OHSM 
policy was highlighted as one of the leading principles of an OHSMS. However, the 
literature also points out that in practice it frequently happens that the way of achieving an 
OHSM policy could be opportunistic and even in conflict with the goals of a safety policy 
(Hackman and Wageman, 1995). The slogans and arguments originated from a safety 
policy could even be contrary to the reality of every day practice (Vokutch and VanSandt, 
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2000). This study provided further evidence of these tendencies – obvious problems were 
not identified in terms of shore-ship paperwork (written) communication. Pro forma, served 
as evidence that the OHSM objectives were achieved, but the investigation showed that the 
reported events failed to reflect the real conditions onboard. In this sense, the OHSM 
practices in both companies indicated that crew’s compliance of companies’ OHSM policy 
remained superficial.   
  
To sum up, the discussion showed that shore-ship communication in two Chinese chemical 
shipping companies was of limited help in safeguarding crew’s OHS and shipboard OHSM 
practices. Although both company’s OHS policies stated in their management systems (as 
illustrated in the introduction to the two cases in Chapter 4) was by no means questionable, 
there was a significant gap between what was expected and what really happened onboard. 
In this sense the result of the study suggests a very limited outcome for OHSM in the 
Chinese chemical shipping industry. 
 
10.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS FOR THE ROLE OF 
COMMUNICATION IN EFFECTIVE OHSM  
Since shore-ship communication is an important aspect of the framework of OHSMSs, my 
findings suggest a need to rethink its role in promoting effective OHSM. In the wide spread 
discussions on adopting such systems in the literature, many authors agree that the 
intervention of an OHSMS cannot achieve successful outcomes of OHSM without certain 
essential pre-conditions. To summarise, among those identified pre-conditions, available 
resources to support OHS activities, the senior management commitment, integration with 
OHSM concern, and independent employee representation and participation were 
highlighted by Hutter (2001), Gallagher et al. (2003, p.77), Baird (2005), Akerlind et al. 
(2007) and Bornstein and Hart (2010, pp.63 & 64). In this study, the data presented has 
shown these preconditions remained unmet. The special focus on economic returns in the 
frequent use of telephone communication as a main channel for management control 
indicates that the management’s commitment to OHSM was not paramount (as shown in 
sections 9.2.2 and 9.3.2, respectively). Crew’s limited autonomy and participation in 
OHSM suggest their weak (collective) bargaining power and their scant contributions to the 
improvement of OHSM, as indicated in section 9.2.3.  
  
The absence of those essential pre-conditions resulted in only partial delivery of the 
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OHSMSs in ways similar to those found by Gallagher et al. (2003, p.77), who explained 
that partial delivery of an OHSMS could equate with the completion of the paperwork 
component, with the applied component lagging far behind. Hopkins (2000, p.147) further 
argued that safety management systems can degenerate into nothing more than complex 
paper systems of paper. The emphasis on paperwork has therefore been criticised as a 
bureaucratic practice that could hinder effective operation of OHSM (Strathern, 2000; 
Bhattacharya, 2009). Onboard the ships in the present study, it was found that although the 
paper trail and tick box approach was completed, actual safety practice remained poor. It 
showed a noticeable mismatch between the written records and real practice. In this sense, 
the partial delivery, as shown in this study, contributed to the limited outcome of 
implementation of the OHSMSs in both chemical shipping companies.  
 
10.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR MARITIME REGULATORY STRATEGY 
The findings of this study, together with previous studies, suggest that there is an urgent 
need for maritime policy makers both at international and national levels and for industrial 
practitioners to re-think the role of the ISM Code in promoting OHSM in the international 
shipping industry to re-consider maritime regulatory strategies. 
 
In the literature chapter the trend towards regulated self-regulation in the international 
shipping industry, as illustrated by the ISM Code, was discussed. As stated in section 2.6.1, 
the Code, required shipping companies subject to its application to establish management 
systems to manage OHS activities. However, from a shore-ship communication perspective, 
the study of the Chinese chemical shipping industry showed that crew’s OHS and shipboard 
OHSM practice were not improved by its implementation. The less positive OHSM 
consequences and more negative ones both suggest the failure of the Code to improve the 
reality of OHSM practice. This has also been pointed out in previous studies in the 
international shipping industry (see section 1.1 and section 2.6.1). As elsewhere, these 
findings suggest need to examine and rethinking regulatory strategies (Quinlan and 
Mayhew, 2000; Aronsson et al., 2002 and Saksvik and Quinlan, 2003) and re-consider its 
role in promoting OHSM in the shipping industry.  
  
Gunningham (2007) has emphasised that the regulatory approaches should be both context- 
and industry-specific. Although the ISM Code was dedicated to address the international 
shipping industry, it failed to address the significant contextual variations between 
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countries/regions that could significantly affect the outcome of the OHSM. In this regard, it 
is worth noting that previous studies on the impact of similarly conceived regulated 
self-regulation identify significant gaps between countries in the operation of international 
measures (Frick and Wren, 2000; Karageorgiou, et al., 2000; and Bruhn, 2006). 
Summarised from these authors work, the contextual factors included, but not limited to, 
socio-economic situation, basic OHS laws and traditional practice, legal infrastructure that 
governs organisational structure, particularity of the sector, labour market, organised labour 
and/or trade unions. In the present study a typical example of such contextual differences 
was the different (lower) level of worker participation in OHSM in the Chinese context as 
opposed to that in other countries.  
 
Given the physical distance between the shore office and a ship, one of the main 
management practices for a company was to rely on the assessment of written reports 
submitted by crew to measure that crew’s operational practice. The study revealed a 
considerable mismatch between written reports and real shipboard practice. It indicated the 
inadequacy of paperwork-based assessment practice. The problem of relying on written 
reports to judge the success and failure of an OHSMS in the shipping industry has also 
been addressed by other authors, such as Anderson (2003) and Bhattacharya (2009 and 
2011). Therefore, it seems that there is a need to address the ‘audit trail’ management 
approach in the future.   
  
In section 10.2.1 in the Code, it states that the Company should arrange ship visits and 
work inspections at appropriate intervals (IMO, 2002b). In this study, the data suggests the 
management’s ship visit communication not only increased crew’s psychological pressure, 
but also contributed to heavier workload. It was found that the skewed focus on crew’s safe 
behaviour helped little in improving shipboard OHSM practice. It implies that the current 
regulatory approach to enforcement for the adoption of OHSMSs and implementation of 
the Code should be revisited and reinforced.   
  
It is argued that regulator-led ‘advice, encouragement and coercion’ are essential for 
companies without a natural interest in safety, and there might be a need for ‘deterrent 
penalties’ to ensure meeting OHS standards (Genn, 1993, p.219). Nichols (1997, p.212) 
noted that one of the strategies to improve workplace OHSM was that the whole process of 
health and safety management be subject to external monitoring and external enforcement. 
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Thus, it is understood that the control of the process underpins the operationalisation of an 
OHSMS. In the context of the shipping industry, problems emerging from day-to-day work 
processes are not easily monitored due to the gap of physical distance. Typically, the 
inspection or audit conducted by maritime administrations or external industrial bodies 
mainly occurred in one or two days during a visit to a ship in port. The physical distance 
makes it difficult for external inspectors to make any attempted random spot check on 
board a ship since it is always outside at sea and not easily accessed. Most significantly, the 
research voyages revealed that many of the problems related to process management were 
exposed when a ship was at sea. Under such a circumstance, it might be a good idea that an 
inspector/auditor could be arranged onboard a ship for a longer observational period, say, to 
sail with the ship for a (short) voyage. Although previous studies showed the constraints of 
resources for inspection and control (Walters, 2005), in doing so, it is believed that more 
problems regarding the process management could be witnessed and identified.  
 
Finally, in section 2.6.2, the ISM Code was assessed in comparison with other regulatory 
schemes. One of the weak points in the Code was that it did not explicitly address the role 
of seafarers in OHSM. Since the Code had an immediate impact on the development of 
OHSMS in a shipping company, it was understandable that the role of seafarer participation 
in OHSM could not be assured. The low level of seafarer participation in OHSM identified 
in this study suggests the need to strengthen the seafarer’s role in OHSM in the Code.  
 
In all, as a researcher, I am not in a position to make detailed suggestions for how changes 
should be made in the identified areas in practical terms. However, this study does emerge 
some valuable implications for re-shaping maritime regulatory strategies.  
 
10.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES 
Adkins (2002, p.333) pointed out that ‘reflexivity is recommended as a critical practice for 
social research’. At this stage when the thesis is ready to be concluded, it seems wise to 
have some reflexive thinking on the topic of this study that could potentially pave the way 
for future studies. This study focused on the formal communications between shore 
management and ship’s crew. The study adopted a functional approach and paid special 
attention to key subject areas about OHSM related communications. The focus of this study 
leaves room for more studies of this industry.  
  
 225 
Basically, communication itself is everything and everywhere in our social lives. In a 
similar sense organisational communication is omnipresent and complex. Apart from 
formal (oral and written) communication, there exists informal communication that occurs 
in parallel. It is particularly evident in relationship-oriented societies such as in China (see 
section 2.7.2 and 8.3.3). Grapevine systems and rumours are extreme examples of this kind. 
On some occasions informal communication can affect or even countermand formal 
communication, which can have a strong influence on the outcome of OHSM. Thus, 
informal communication is an area that should be studied in the future. In addition the 
interplay between formal and informal communications could also be explored.   
  
My field work on board ships suggests that on board communication is a topic worth 
thorough investigation. Some of the data I collected were about this though they could not 
be used in consideration of their relevance to my research question. As mentioned in 
section 9.2.1, there exists a relatively independent hierarchical structure on board a ship. 
The communication between the deck and engine room department, the vertical 
communication within each department should be systematically investigated. Meanwhile, 
how on board communication is affected by shore management might also be examined.  
  
The previous topics that I addressed lie in the range of internal communication within an 
organisation. In reality internal communication can significantly be affected by 
management’s and crew’s communication with external bodies. For example, in this study, 
it showed the considerable influence of oil majors. Thus, the communication with relevant 
external bodies could be independently investigated. They include industrial bodies, such as 
oil majors and CDI; administrative departments such as the FSC, PSC, Vessel Traffic 
Service and port authorities as well as industrial service providers, such as cargo and ship 
surveyors, shipyard repair, ship-chandlers and local agencies. The investigation could be 
conducted by a selected important body or a group of bodies, depending on its research 
design.   
  
To conclude, the above suggestions are made based on a literature review, particularly the 
review of maritime literature, and years of personal experience working with this industry. 
Although I am not in a position to pinpoint specific research topics for other researchers, 
the proposed areas of study are certainly worthy of concern. Considering that this study was 
conducted in the Chinese context, the findings cannot be compared with other industries or 
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the shipping industry in other countries. A horizontal comparative study across 
industries/countries would be of interest to many in the OHSM field.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Participant Information Sheet 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
(English Version) 
 
Research Aims 
This project is conducted for the purpose of fulfilment of my PhD in Cardiff University in 
the UK. It aims to explore the role of shore-ship communication in influencing OHSM in 
the Chinese chemical shipping sector. It was proposed in consideration of the particularity 
of management-employee communication in the shipping industry as opposed to that in 
traditional land-based industries. Although the development of modern communication 
technology has significantly facilitated communication between shore and ship, the 
effectiveness of such communication awaits further investigation in the presence of various 
social, economical and cultural factors. The findings of this study will contribute to a 
comprehensive understanding of shore-ship communication from a wider sociological 
perspective.  
 
Research Methods 
The study mainly uses semi-structured qualitative interviews with shore management ship’s 
crew, and there was no need for an interviewee to make any preparations.  
 
Researcher’s Promises 
The study is approved by the Cardiff university research ethics committee. The study shall 
by no means have any negative affect on any individual or organisation. As a researcher, I 
hereby make the following promises to my interviewees.  
1. This study is entirely for academic purposes, and has nothing to do with any official 
sensitive topics such as political, economical, and trade issues.  
2. All the interviewees involved are anonymised and their talks are entirely confidential.  
3. The response to the interview questions is entirely at an interviewee’s discretion.  
4. For convenience of my data collection and handling, I request that for interviews be 
recorded. I promise that all the recordings will be kept confidential and be limited to my 
own use. They will by no means be exposed to any other person.  
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Researcher’s Contact Information 
My Name is Conghua Xue, and I am currently studying at the Seafarers International 
Research Centre at Cardiff University in the UK. I am also a registered maritime lecturer at 
the NT Shipping College in China. If you have any inquiries about my research, please 
contact me at: 
 
Mobile: + 44 7570891xxx (UK); +86 13773678xxx (China) 
Email: Xuech@cardiff.ac.uk 
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Appendix 2: Interview Guide – Shore Management 
 
Interviewee’s Biographical Information 
Position/Age/Education/Sea Experience/Contract/Employment History 
 
Importance of Communication 
The role of technology-mediated communication and face-to-face communication in the 
shipping context 
The effect of physical distance on shore-ship communication 
Channels of understanding crew’s thoughts and shipboard OHSM conditions 
 Its role in improving OHSM 
 
Effectiveness of Shore to Ship Communication 
Technology-mediated Communication 
Purposes of communication 
 Delivery of organisational support 
 Management and supervision of shipboard OHSM-related activities 
Management’s attitude towards crew’s decision making/crew’s authority 
The effect on shipboard OHSM practice/Examples 
 
Ship Visit Communication 
Occasions of ship visit 
Major concerns in communication between visitors and crew 
 Safety Inspection/Outcomes/Its affect on crew/Its affect on OHSM 
 The role of visitors in improving OHSM 
 
Effectiveness of Ship to Shore upward Communication 
Safety-related Problem Reporting 
Management’s attitude towards crew’s safety reporting 
Factors affecting crew’s safety reporting to shore management 
Consequences/Feedback/Examples 
 
Making Suggestions 
Management’s attitude towards crew’s safety suggestions 
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Crew’s involvement and participation in safety policy making process 
Factors affecting crew’s suggestion reporting 
The role of a shipboard trade union unit (group) in making OHSM related suggestions 
 
The Impact of Employment Modes 
Different employment modes and their impact on crew’s safety reporting or safety 
suggestions 
Explanation with examples 
 
In-Closing 
The importance of chemical management onboard/Risks to crew’s OHS 
The role of shore management in chemical management 
The effectiveness of OHSM onboard 
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Appendix 3: Interview Guide - Crew 
 
Interviewee’s Biographical Information 
Position/Age/Education/Sea Experience/Contract/Employment History 
 
Importance of Communication 
The role of technology-mediated communication and face-to-face communication in the 
shipping context 
The effect of physical distance on shore-ship communication 
 
Effectiveness of Shore to Ship Communication 
Technology-mediated Communication 
Purposes of communication 
 Delivery of organisational support 
 Management and supervision of shipboard OHSM-related activities 
Crew’s attitude on the effectiveness of such communications 
 Problems and difficulties/reasons 
 The independence of crew’s decision making/authority 
 The effect on shipboard OHSM practice/Examples 
 
Ship Visit Communication 
Occasions of ship visit 
Major concerns of the shore management during a ship visit 
 Safety Inspection/Outcomes/Its affect on crew/Its affect on OHSM 
 The role of visitors in improving OHSM 
 
Effectiveness of Ship to Shore upward Communication 
Safety-related Problem Reporting 
Crew’s attitude towards safety reporting 
Factors affecting crew’s safety reporting to shore management 
Consequences/Feedback/Examples 
 
Making Suggestions 
Crew’s attitude towards safety suggestions 
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Crew’s involvement and participation in safety policy making process 
Factors affecting crew’s suggestion reporting 
The role of a shipboard trade union unit (group) in making OHSM related suggestions 
 
The Impact of Employment Modes 
Different employment modes and their impact on crew’s safety reporting or safety 
suggestions 
Explanation with examples 
 
In-Closing 
The importance of chemical management onboard/Risks to crew’s OHS 
The role of shore management in chemical management 
The effectiveness of OHSM onboard 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 248 
Appendix 4: Shore Management Interviewees List 
 
Management Interviewees in C1 
Rank Age 
Range 
Education Years of Sea 
Experience 
Final Sea 
Qualification 
Years in 
Office 
Vice General 
Manager (Safety) 
51-55 University 18 Captain 10 
Marine Affairs 
Manager 
46-50 University 14 Captain 8 
Marine Affairs 
Superintendent 
51-55 College 20 Captain 7 
Marine Engineering 
Manager 
46-50 University 17 Chief Engineer 4 
Marine Engineering 
Superintendent 
46-50 University 20 Chief Engineer 6 
Quality and Safety 
Superintendent 
41-45 University 12 Captain 8 
Crewing Vice 
Manager 
31-35 University 4 2
nd
 Officer 6 
 
Management Interviewees in C2 
Rank Age 
Range 
Education Years of Sea 
Experience 
Final Sea 
Qualification 
Years in 
Office 
Vice General 
Manager (Safety) 
46-50 University 16 Captain 5 
Safety and Quality 
Manager 
41-45 University 12 Captain 5 
Marine Affairs 
Manager 
41-45 University 18 Captain 4 
Marine Affairs 
Superintendent 
36-40 University 10 Captain 5 
Marine Engineering 
Manager 
46-50 University 20 Chief Engineer 4 
Marine Engineering 
Superintendent 
46-50 University 25 Chief Engineer 1 
Crewing Vice 
Manager 
35-40 University 10 Captain 4 
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Appendix 5: Crew Interviewees List 
 
Interviewees on S1 C1  
Rank Age 
Range 
Education Years of Sea 
Experience 
Years Or Months  
in C1 
Captain 41-45 University 17 17 yrs 
Deck Department 
Chief Officer 31-35 University 8 8 yrs 
2
nd
 Officer 26-30 College 7 7 yrs 
3
rd
 Officer 26-30 College 3 3 yrs 
Bosun 36-40 High School 5 5 yrs 
Rating 31-35 High School 4 4 yrs 
Engine Room Department 
Chief Engineer 36-40 Secondary School 16 16 yrs 
2
nd
 Engineer 36-40 College 13 13 yrs 
3
rd
 Engineer 31-35 College 10 10 yrs 
Chief Motorman 36-40 High School 7 7 yrs 
Motorman 21-25 College 2 2 yrs 
 
 
Interviewees on S2 C1  
Rank Age 
Range 
Education Years of Sea 
Experience 
Years or Months  
in C1 
Captain 36-40 University 13 7 yrs 
Deck Department 
Chief Officer 41-45 College 20 5 yrs 
2
nd
 Officer  41-45 College 12 8 yrs 
Bosun 36-40 Secondary School 10 5 yrs 
Rating -1 36-40 High School 8 8 yrs 
Rating -2 26-30 College 3 3 yrs 
Engine Room Department 
Chief Engineer 46-50 College 20 8 yrs 
2
nd
 Engineer 35-40 University 10 10 yrs 
3
rd
 Engineer 26-30 College 4 4 yrs 
Chief Motorman 36-40 High School 8 8 yrs 
Motorman 21-25 College 2 2 yrs 
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Interviewees on S3 C2 
Rank Age 
Range 
Education Years of Sea 
Experience 
Years or Months 
in C2 
Captain 36-40 University 13 5 yrs 
Deck Department 
Chief Officer 31-35 University 10 2 yrs 
2
nd
 Officer 26-30 College 6 2 ms 
3
rd
 Officer 31-35 Secondary School 6 3 yrs 
Bosun 46-50 High School 20 10 ms 
Rating 26-30 High School 1 6 ms 
Engine Room Department 
Chief Engineer 56-60 Secondary School 30 3 yrs 
2
nd
 Engineer 51-55 College 20 7 ms 
3
rd
 Engineer 31-35 College 5 6 ms 
4
th
 Engineer 36-40 Secondary School 2 2 yrs 
Chief Motorman 41-45 High School 8 4 ms 
Motorman 26-30 High School 2 4 ms 
Pumpman 36-40 High School 10 6 ms 
 
Interviewees on S4 C2  
Rank Age 
Range 
Education Years of Sea 
Experience 
Years or Months  
in C2 
Captain 46-50 University 25 2 yrs 
Deck Department 
Chief Officer 36-40 College 14 2 ms 
2
nd
 Officer 26-30 College 6 3 ms 
3
rd
 Officer 26-30 Secondary School 4 2 yrs 
Bosun 36-40 High School 4 10 ms 
Rating -1 36-40 High School 4 2 ms 
Rating -2 26-30 High School 2 3 ms 
Engine Room Department 
Chief Engineer 41-45 College 20 8 ms 
3
rd
 Engineer 26-30 College 4 4 yrs 
4
th
 Engineer 41-45 Secondary School 4 4 yrs 
Chief Motorman 31-35 High School 6 6 ms 
Motorman 21-25 College 2 8 ms 
 
 
